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ABSTRACT
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The dissertation is an investigation into the structure of
Aristotle's modal propositions through careful attention to
the text of the Prior Analytics
.
I take account not only of
recent attempts to formalize Aristotle's modal syllogistic
but also of the discussion that Aristotle himself provides
about modal statements. I provide evidence that his modal
propositions are to be construed in a de re manner and then
go on to investigate the problems raised by a de re
analysis, particularly those problems concerned with
Arisototle's modal conversion principles. A large part of my
project is to show that these can be given a valid de re
analysis that sits well with the results Aristotle sketches.
Terms in modal syllogistic premises are shown to be
restricted in ways that reflect Aristotle's early
metaphysics and notions of predication.
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INTRODUCTION
In Chapters A8-22 of the Prior Analytics
,
Aristotle
investigates syllogisms involving modally gualified
premises. This modal syllogistic' has been getting bad
reviews ever since Aristotle wrote it. Of Aristotle's recent
critics Jaakko Hintikka and Albrecht Becker are among the
harshest, and much of the recent literature is an attempt to
answer their evaluations of the troubles there. Hintikka
regards the errors in the modal syllogistic as so great that
he doubts it is even possible to give a formal model for
Aristotle s logic at all. Becker suggests that maybe
Aristotle is just confused.
' The source of the confusion
a^ording to both Becker and Hintikka lies in Aristotle's
failure to distinguish between what nowadays we call de
d±^t^j and de re modality. De dicto and de re do not mean the
same thing, and there is no way of reducing one to the
other. The thrust of Becker and Hintikka's criticism is that
by conflating the two Aristotle sets out a modal logic that
is simply and blatantly inconsistent.
In the past several years Aristotle's modal syllogistic
has been getting more sympathetic criticism as several
scholars reject Becker and Hintikka's charges of
inconsistency and instead seek reconstructions' that
validate the syllogisms Aristotle claims are valid. These
reconstructions vary enormously. Some do little more than
axiomatize the syllogistic and stop short of offering any
1
kind of interpretation of Aristotle's modal propositions. Of
those that do offer interpretations of the modal
propositions, most advocate de re modals as the proper
logical representation of what Aristotle must mean. Some try
a combination of de dicto and de re operators together with
detailed explanations of how such combinations might not
lead to inconsistency. Still others emphasize the
inappropriateness of such modern devices as the de dicto /de
re distinction to the peculiar matter of Aristotle's logic
and then devise their own allegedly appropriate tools.
Not just the number but also the variety of
interpretations are a not-so-subtle hint that this is
complicated stuff. Certainly anyone studying Aristotle's
modal syllogistic faces serious interpretive difficulties.
Perhaps the biggest single cause of them has to do with the
fact that Aristotle seems to use his modal idioms loosely.
In the course of this study I will consider Aristotle's
modal idioms generally, but initially it will help to single
out just a few of his expressions and look at the
difficulties they raise for the interpreter. Consider, for
instance, the following propositions:
(i) A belongs to every B of necessity, and
(ii) It is necessary for A to belong to every B.
Aristotle uses expressions like these as examples of what he
calls necessary universal affirmative premises, and that
2
suggests that perhaps for Aristotle (i) and (ii) might mean
the same thing. But when we consider the surface form of
these expressions, it looks as though (i) is a good
candidate for de re necessity, and (ii) for de dicto
. That
suggests that (i) and (ii) might not mean the same thing.
The surface form is similar in Greek. A good example of
Aristotle's two ways of expressing necessity comes
at 25a32-33
:
e -£ de ex anankes to A panti e tini toi B huparchei , kai
to B tini toi A ananke huparchein .
It will be part of my project to show why the surface
form of such propositions is sometimes an unreliable guide
to the proper logical representation of Aristotle's modal
premises. This fact has been recognized by many though few
attempt to explain it. Becker and Hintikka do try to
explain, but their results lead inevitably to the charge of
inconsistency. I want to draw attention to the precise
nature of this charge. If Becker and Hintikka are right that
Aristotle's logic conflates the modern notions of de dicto
and de re modality, then we should be able to find evidence
of this in the text. I am less convinced than they are that
it is there. One of my aims will be to examine the extent to
which the text supports the charge of inconsistency since
this has so greatly shaped much of the discussion.
3
The problems at issue here are easy to see in the case
of the apodeictic syllogistic -- that is, that portion of
Aristotle's logic devoted to syllogisms from necessary
premises. It is generally agreed now that a de re
interpretation is right for the apodeictic syllogisms. A de
re interpretation validates those syllogisms Aristotle
counts as valid, while a de dicto interpretation gets them
wrong. But while the syllogisms themselves appear to involve
de re modals, Aristotle's 'proofs' of these very syllogisms
often require conversion principles' which appear to make
sense only on a de dicto interpretation. If both de dicto
and de re modals are required in this way, then Becker and
Hintikka are right -- Aristotle must be confused. What I
want to do here is look carefully at the text to see whether
there is any evidence indicating that modal conversion must
ever be given a de dicto analysis.
Whether or not we can give de dicto or de re
conversions depends upon the basic internal structure of
Aristotle's modal premises (modal propositions) . I will
focus specifically on the controversy about determining what
is the proper representation of the internal structure of
Aristotle's modal propositions. My concern is over whether
we can give a precise and coherent analysis of the structure
of these propositions. I think that to a large extent we
can, and in showing how, it becomes apparent how clear some
4
of Aristotle's insights really are. These insights
inevitably link with Aristotle's notions about predication
developed more fully in his other logical works.
Some scholars, like Storrs McCall, suggest that a good
understanding of the modal syllogistic can be had without an
analysis of the structure of modal premises. The question
then is not about how to analyse Aristotle's modal premises
but about whether to at all. McCall argues against basing
any proofs in the modal syllogistic on principles belonging
to what he calls "the modal logic of propositions" [McCall,
1963, p. 32]. And so McCall does not offer any workable
interpretations of these premises; he leaves them ambiguous.
McCall's axiomatic method, though it leaves the
premises unanalyzed, does provide a workable representation
of the modal syllogistic. Because it is so workable it has
become the preferred representation today, and contemporary
logicians interested in Aristotelian logic have shown that
it can be a valuable tool. Fred Johnson and S.K. Thomason
each take McCall's representation as their starting point
and develop a semantics for it.
While McCall's method has stimulated recent scholarship
and lead to a renewed interest in ancient logic, McCall's
reconstruction leaves unanswered some important interpretive
questions. Chief among them remains the question posed by
Becker and Hintikka about whether Aristotle's modal premises
can be given a uniform analysis with respect to the modern
5
de dicto/de re distinction. Answering this requires finer
distinctions than we can make if we leave the modal
propositions unanalysed. And, so, because it does leave them
unanalyzed, McCall's representation of modal premises is
ill-suited to the questions I want to try to answer about
the inner structure of these premises. For this reason I
will try, instead, to find modal LPC-translations
.
Some people argue against the sorts of modal LPC-
translations that I give here. The first point against my
translations has to do with the fact that in LPC a
proposition of the form Vx(Bx-»Ax) is true even when there
are no B's. Aristotle's logic, on the other hand,
presupposes the existence of at least some B's. So from the
very outset there is a difference between the two logics.
But all that is needed to accommodate this difference is a
general restriction on LPC-interpretations to the effect
that no terms are empty. So, Vx(Bx->Ax) when offered as an
interpretation of Aristotle should really be understood as
presupposing the existence of some B's. An additional
restriction on LPC-interpretations helps when constructing
intuitive counter-examples in the syl logisitic . In addition
to having no terms empty, neither do any terms exhaust the
universe. The first restriction guarantees that for any term
B we pick, there will always be some individual that makes
Bx true. The second restriction guarantees that there is no
single term which applies to everything. So, for instance.
6
there is nothing like a separate existence predicate in the
syllogistic. In a situation involving only two individuals c
and d, and two predicates A and B, generally it helps to
think of each predicate holding of one and only one
individual. These restrictions are themselves not modal
qualifications. They apply equally to non-modal and modal
propositions in Aristotle's syllogistic.
There are also complaints against translating into LPC
that are specifically modal. First, taking Vx(Bx-»LAx) as a
reading of Aristotle's necessary universal affirmative
premise makes the predicate LA end up behaving like a 'modal
term. 1 Some scholars want very much to avoid treating
necessar i ly-A
' as a term. For example, William and Martha
Kneale [1961] argue against it on the grounds that it makes
the modal operators appear trivial. Reading Aristotle with
modal terms makes Vx(Bx->LAx) just a special instance of
Vx(Bx-»Ax). The Kneales think that is implausible and are
quick to discount such readings. They think this argues in
favor of a de dicto analysis of modals. 1 The issue of de re
and de dicto interpretations is one I will take up. I will
argue that a de dicto analysis does not in fact solve the
interpretive problems in the modal syllogistic.
Another feature of my analysis that is likely to
attract criticism is my preference for using standard modal
]
I discuss their argument in section 4.3 and again in
Chapter 9.
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logic, and even occassional ly possible worlds, to talk about
Aristotle's modal notions. Many authors prefer to use purely
extensional set theory to represent Aristotle's logic.
Johnson and Thomason develop a purely extensional semantics
for Aristotle, invoking extensions of A's, necessary-A
* s and
necessary-non-A
' s . Paul Thom commends their project:
One has to regard this kind of semantical analysis
of the modal syllogistic as particularly
appropriate if one thinks that Aristotelian
metaphysics are in any way implicit in that
syllogistic.
But he adds to this a warning about the importance of
avoiding possible worlds:
For, Aristotle's metaphysic envisages a single
world. True, in that world there is a fundamental
difference bewteen some sets (the Aristotelian
Kinds) and others. But this difference is not, to
Aristotle's mind, explained by any consideration
of what is the case in other worlds. It is a
primitive difference which fundamentally
structures this world -- Nature.
[Thom, 1996, p. 5]
I agree with what he says, and my use of possible worlds
will be confined to interpreting the modal LPC-propositions
that I use to represent Aristotle's modal propositions. The
issue isn't whether or not Aristotle has in mind anything
like possible worlds. The issue is how we might represent
what Aristotle is doing. Possible worlds sometimes provide
an effective means for doing this. The matter isn't an
important one, since modal operators in the syllogistic are
8
only operators on single terms. For example, the necessary
4) s are just the essential-^
' s . What is important is that
the extensional semantics reflects a de re analysis of
modal terms.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NON-MODAL BASE
1 • 1 Categorical Sentences
In order to examine what Aristotle is doing in the
modal case, it is necessary first to understand the non-
modal syllogistic. Traditionally, commentators use the
vowels A, E, I, and 0 to represent Aristotle's four types of
categorical sentences:
Aba
Eba
Iba
Oba
'A belongs to all B' (A)
'A belongs to no B
'
(E)
'A belongs to some B' (I)
'A does not belong to some B' (0)
Where there are no modal operators involved, Aristotle's
propositions can be easily understood by translating them
into LPC:
Aba : Vx (Bx -» Ax)
Eba : ~3x (Bx & Ax)
Iba : 3x (Bx & Ax)
Oba : ~Vx (Bx -» Ax)
where it is assumed no terms are empty or exhaust the
universe. One difference that should be noted is that where,
for example, we say "every B is an A, ' Aristotle says "A
belongs to all B' or "A is predicated of every B.' (See for
example 24b27-30, 25b37-40.)
One reason for preferring the LPC-translat ions to the
A , E , I , 0 notation arises with the addition of the modal
10
operators. In considering a modal sentence like Aristotle's
A belongs to every B of ncs-esiSi i.y
,
z.5a32
,
it seems there
ai.c two quite different ways of formalizing it in modal LPC.
The A,E,_l,0 notation, on the other hand, masks any
difference. With L for the necessity operator, in LPC there
is the de dicto reading, LVx(Bx->Ax), and there is the de
re, Vx(Bx-»LAx).
The fact that Aristotle himself doesn't make explicit
any such distinction makes some scholars wary of applying
the distinction to the modal syllogisti
notation gives a convenient way to schematise Arist
logic without having to distinguish between the different
modal notions. But representing a 'necessary universal
affirmative' as LAba doesn't leave us any closer to
understanding what Aristotle really means. If what we want
is to try to see what Aristotle means, then we need to dig
deeper than the A,E,I,0 notation allows.
r* p.f1 pi 1 T1 V>^ A IT T C\^ U JU j. . i. iiC i. i f I _i_ I o
1 . 2 The Perfect Syllogisms
Aristotle assumes some syllogisms as axiomatic, or
'complete,' 24b23, and derives others from them. 2 The
complete deductions are the four moods of the first figure,
traditionally known as Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio.
2Corcoran and Smiley disagree with this description.
They see the syllogistic as a system of natural deduction,
not an axiomatic system as I assume here. I address their
concerns later in this section.
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Aristotle explains that the first figure is complete because
it stands in need of nothing else besides the things
[terms] taken in order for the necessity to be evident,"
24b23-24
. Consider his description of how terms are ordered
m the first-figure moods Barbara and Celarent:
Whenever, then, three terms are so related to each
other that the last is in the middle as a whole
and the middle is either in or not in the first as
a whole, it is necessary for there to be a
complete deduction of the extremes. (I call that
the middle which both is itself in another and has
^^other in it this is also middle in position
-- and call both that which is itself in another
and that which has another in it extremes.)
( 25b32-38
)
We might give a more general picture of the first-figure
connections between the terms, where A is the major extreme,
B is the middle term, and C the minor extreme:
A -» B C
Taking the term to the right of an arrow as the subject of a
premise and the term to the left as the predicate, then we
can relate the subject C to the predicate A. The picture
then is one of simple transitivity. As Gunther Patzig [1968]
interprets Aristotle, it is this feature that makes the
3Aristotle uses 'necessity' here to indicate the
necessity of the connection between the premises and
conclusion. This is not the same as either the de dicto or
de re necessity that I'm interested in here. What I am
interested in is the kind of necessity that features in
necessary propositions .
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first figure complete -- it needs no other justification.
Each of the first-figure moods follows this schema, but what
differs among them is the way each combines different
premise types — the A,E,I,0's.
The first combination Aristotle considers is Barbara.
This is what we get when both premises are universal
affirmatives: "if A is predicated of every B and B of every
C, it is necessary for A to be predicated of every C,"
25b38-40
.
Precisely how to represent this is a matter of some
controversy. Several scholars follow the example set by Jan
Lukasiewicz [1957] who insists that the syllogisms be
represented as single conditional propositions. As
Lukas i ewi cz argues against the traditional representations:
It must be said emphatically that no syllogism is
formulated by Aristotle as an inference with the
word 'therefore' (ara), as is done in the
traditional logic. Syllogisms of the form:
All B is A;
All C is B;
therefore
all C is A
are not Aristotelian. [Lukasiewicz, 1957, p. 2 1
]
4
Forms like this, Lukasiewicz says, are a later invention and
not Aristotle's own. Lukasiewicz thinks Aristotelian
syllogisms are implications of the form 'if a and B,
4Austin suggests some evidence to the contrary. His
lone example is from the Posterior Analytics , ii, 16.
13
then y,
' where a and B are the premises and y is the
conclusion, and where the syllogism as a whole is just a
single proposition. So following Lukasiewicz, and
translating into LPC, we can represent Barbara as
(1) [ Vx ( Bx-»Ax ) & Vx ( Cx-*Bx ) ] -> Vx(Cx->Ax).
I. M. Bochenski [1951] and Patzig [1968] both follow
Lukasiewicz, preferring to represent the syllogisms as
conditional propositions. Storrs McCall claims to harbor
some misgivings about representing the syllogisms in this
way [McCall, 1963, p. 6]. But his reservations, it appears,
are not strong enough to warrant a change, for McCall uses
conditional propositions to represent the syllogisms
throughout his text.
Several philosophers have plenty more than misgivings
about the matter and so levy some strong criticism against
Lukasiewicz on this point. Among these critics are Smiley,
Corcoran, Smith, and Prior. Corcoran favors representing
Aristotle's whole syllogistic as a system of natural
deduction, so that rather than setting out the various
syllogisms as single propositions, Corcoran regards them as
simple deductions. Prior, too, is critical of Lukasiewicz
and points out the need to distinguish Aristotle's meta-
theory from the syllogisms themselves. Prior thinks that
what are needed are "not propositions but implicative
propositional forms, corresponding to the inferential
14
forms [Prior, 1955, p. 117]. Robin Smith, commending
Corcoran's method of representation, explains that one of
its pr inicple virtues comes from the fact that taking the
syllogisms as deductions works well where constucting a
formal model is our objective [Smith, 1989, p. xvii].
For my purposes here the style of representation
doesn't matter at all. Nevertheless, and with a nod to
Prior's very legitimate concerns, one way to handily side-
step the question is this: let's say an Aristotelian
syllogism is an inference with two premises, a and B, and a
conclusion, y. If it is stated as a -> (B -> y) , then,
provided we are allowed Modus Ponens -- the rule not the
formula"5 -- then any conditional will license the
corresponding inference. So perhaps it doesn't matter
whether we interpret Aristotle as talking about conditionals
or inferences. This, of course, is taking Modus Ponens as
part of Aristotle's background meta-theory, but I think this
5 Lewis Carroll, in "What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles," [1895] pokes fun at the trouble that comes from
confusing these two. The Tortoise challenges Achilles to
reach the end of a logical race-course that begins with a
'Hypothetical Proposition.' The race runs something like
this: suppose that we have proved a and a -> B, for some
particular formulae a and B, then we want to conclude that B
must also be true. Achilles is ready to race immediately to
this conclusion, but the Tortoise points out Achilles is too
quick and really not very shrewed. The Tortoise won't yet
accept that B must be true. First Achilles must prove
{(a & (a -* B)) & [(a & ( a -> B ) ) -> 6]} -> B
...and so on with many millions more to come! The point is
really that a valid formula is never a rule.
15
simply does
assumption is by no means far-fetched. Aristotle
not formalize all details of his meta-logic. 6
Whether to represent the syllogistic as an axiomatic
system or as a system of natural deduction is not a question
of which logic is right -- they are equivalent. It is a
question of what exactly we take Aristotle to be setting out
in the Prior Analytics
. As my project here is to give a good
analysis of the inner structure of modal premises, then
whether we take the syllogistic as an axiomatic system or as
natural deduction, my results should hold in either case.
The issue would become an important one if, like Corcoran
and Jonathan Lear [1980], we were concerned to show that the
syllogistic is complete and self-contained — that is, if we
didn't assume as I do here that Aristotle, although
reasoning in accordance with valid principles of
propositional logic, need not always make those principles
explicit. Corcoran argues that Aristotle's syllogistic is
"fundamental in the sense that it presupposes no other
logic, not even propositional logic" [Corcoran, 1974b, pp
.
92-93, author's italics]. 7 As Corcoran tells it, the
assumption that it does has grave and entirely unacceptable
60ther methods Aristotle uses but does not formalize
are proof by ekthesis and proof by contraposition.
7 Both Corcoran and Lear require considerable
interpretive work in order to get their completeness proofs.
This raises questions beyond those I am able to deal with
here. Most important among them is whether there really is
enough textual support for their claims.
16
consequences: if it is right and Aristotle does presuppose
some more basic logical principles, "then," Corcoran
insists, "Aristotle cannot be regarded as the founder of
logic" [1974b, p. 98]. Instead, it seems, Aristotle would
just be a nice old man with an axiomatic theory of
universals
.
Corcoran's worry here seems to me to be too extreme; I
do not share his view that this might affect Aristotle's
reputation. But there is a real philosophical issue that has
to do with how the syllogistic relates to Aristotle's
project in the Posterior Analytics. And Corcoran, I think
correctly, is concerned to treat the Analytics as a unified
whole in which the syllogistic represents Aristotle's
efforts to make explicit the logic underlying the scientific
knowledge that is the topic of the Posterior Analytics
. But
that we need to go to such extremes as Corcoran to achieve
this is not at all clear to me.
For these reasons I am inclined to side with
Lukasiewicz in that I think that Aristotle does assume
certain principles of logic. This will be an important
point. But the style of notation is not important, and so,
simply for ease of exposition, where Aristotle describes
Barbara, "if A is predicated of every B and B of every C, it
is necessary for A to be predicated of every C," I will
express it as
17
( 2 ) Vx (Bx Ax)
Vx ( Cx -> Bx
)
Vx ( Cx -4 Ax ) .
In Aristotle’s terminology, A is the major term, and the
premise containing the major term is the major premise. C is
the minor term, and the premise containing the minor term is
the minor premise. Here, in Barbara both the major and the
minor premises are of the traditional A-type, which is to
say, they are both universal affirmative.
The other first-figure moods come about when the
premise-types are changed. We get Celarent when the first or
major premise is a universal privative and the minor premise
is a universal affirmative: "if A is predicated of no B and
B of every C, it is necessary that A will belong to no C,
25b32-26a2
. Darii and Ferio, the other first-figure moods,
illustrate the same transitivity exhibited by Barbara and
Celarent, but where Barbara and Celarent show that a
universal conclusion follows from two universal premises,
Darii and Ferio illustrate transitivity holds when one
premise is particular and the other universal. But whenever
one premise is particular, only a particular conclusion (an
I or an 0 ) will follow.
1 . 3 Non-Modal Conversion
Among the principles used getting from first-figure
axioms to the theorems are the principles of 'conversion.'
One of the chief difficulties in Aristotle's modal
18
syllogistic involves his use of modal conversions.
Aristotle's description of the modal conversions is
analogous to his non-modal conversions, and for that reason
I shall describe first his use of conversion rules in the
non-modal cases. These are agreed to be relatively
unproblematic. Aristotle discusses conversion for non-modal
cases explicitly in Chapter A2
. Both types of universal
statement -- that is, privative and affirmative universals
convert. "The [universal] positive premise necessarily
converts, though not universally but in part. For instance,
if every pleasure is a good, then some good will be a
pleasure," 25a7-9. In LPC we can understand this as
(3) Vx(Bx->Ax) -» 3x ( Ax&Bx ) .
This LPC interpretation fits well with Aristotle's
explanation, for as he continues, "if A belongs to every B,
then B will belong to some A," 25al7-18.
Similarly, "it is necessary for a universal privative
premise of belonging to convert with respect to its terms,"
25a6-7. In LPC we represent this as
(4) ~3x( Ax&Bx) -* ~3x(Bx&Ax).
While both kinds of universal -- privative and
affirmative -- convert, only one kind of particular
statement does. If a premise is particular and affirmative,
then the terms must 'convert partially.' "If A belongs to
19
some of the B s, then necessarily B belongs to some of the
A's," 25a20-21.
(5) 3x ( Bx&Ax ) -> 3x ( Ax&Bx ) .
A conver s i on is a 1ways possible with a particular
affirmative premise, but not with a particular privative.
Aristotle provides an example of a particular privative
statement that does not convert: if man does not belong to
some animal, then we cannot validly conclude that animal
will not belong to some man, 25al2-13. We cannot because
animal does belong to every man, i.e., every man is also an
animal. So, there can be no conversion rule for
particular privatives.
The conversion principles given as ( 3 ) — ( 5 ) are among
the tools Aristotle uses to get from his first-figure axioms
to proofs of the validity of other moods in other figures.
Aristotle claims in Chapter A3 that the conversion rules
hold in the modal cases as well. "It will also be the same
way in the case of necessary premises: the universally
privative premise converts universally, while each kind of
affirmative premise converts partially," 25a27-29.
The details of modal conversion require closer
examination. In the non-modal syllogistic, tools like
conversion get us from the first-figure axioms to the second
and third figures; modal conversion works the same for
Aristotle, allowing him to derive many other (valid) modal
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deductions. For this reason, some commentators have thought
that the modal syllogistic can be studied in a purely
axiomatic way that is, not by translating into LPC, but
by representing the modal premises in the (uninterpreted)
A,E,I,0 notation.
Storrs McCall approaches it this way and is able to
provide an axiom system that McCall claims gets Aristotle's
modal syllogisms exactly right [McCall, 1963, p. 49],
McCall's approach takes its cue from Nicholas Rescher's.
Both try to interpret Aristotle by constructing a system
that takes the major premise as providing a general rule'
the minor premise as a special case. ' One disadvantage
of this so-called intuitive' approach is that there is very
little evidence in the Prior Analytics to suggest that this
is at all what Aristotle has in mind. McCall's end results
might match Aristotle's own, but the devices McCall relies
on are not clearly Aristotle's. Hintikka has harsh criticism
of McCall on that point and notes that McCall "fails to
provide a single reference to Aristotle's actual discussion
of modal syllogisms to back [his theory] up" [Hintikka,
1973, p. 146]. Nevertheless, part of McCall's claim is, I
think, pretty clearly correct -- his results are all the
ones Aristotle wants and none of the ones he doesn't. Still,
McCall's exactness leaves open some of the same questions we
have with Aristotle and leaves us still trying to understand
why Aristotle says what he does in the modal case.
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Unanalysed premises pose little problem in the non-modal
case, but the introduction of the models creates
ambiguities. The problem as I see it is to try to gain an
understanding of the modal syllogistic, and this reguires
that we delve deeper and consider what exactly Aristotle
means by his modal premises. It would be good to see whether
we can use modal LPC to represent the meanings Aristotle
could possibly intend.
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CHAPTER 2
DE RE LI
-CONVERSION
2 • 1 The First-Figure Modal BasP
Throughout this study I will refer to non-modal,
assertonc premises as X-premises. A syllogism involving
only X-premises is then an XXX syllogism. The third X
indicates that the conclusion is also an X-proposition
. I
will call premises about necessity (or apodeictic premises)
L-premises. An LLL syllogism then is a syllogism with two
L-premises and an L-conclusions
.
Aristotle doesn't offer any explanation of the LLL
syllogisms. He treats them as basic axioms in his logic and
merely stipulates (in Chapter A8 ) that they work just the
same as the assertoric syllogisms do:
In the case of necessary premises, then, the
situation is almost the same as with premises of
belonging: that is, there either will or will not
be a deduction with the terms put in the same way,
both in the case of belonging and in the case of
not belonging of necessity, except that they will
differ in the addition of 'belonging (or not
belonging) of necessity' to the terms,
( 29b36-30al )
.
If the only difference between assertoric premises and
necessary premises comes from the addition of 'belonging of
necessity' to the terms, then it does look as though
Aristotle might well mean what we call de re. This passage,
29b36-30al, is often cited as evidence that, here, at least,
Aristotle is pretty clearly not thinking of de
dicto necessity.
Still, it is worth noting that when given a de dicto
interpretation all of the LLL syllogisms are (trivially)
valid: if the XXX syllogisms are valid, the de dicto LLL
syllogisms will be too since if (a & B) -> y is valid, then
trivially so is (La & LB) -> Ly.
In addition to the LLL syllogisms, Aristotle counts a
number of mixed modal' syllogisms as valid. A syllogism is
called mixed when one premise has a modal qualifier and the
other premise has either no modal or a different one. So,
for example, an LX premise-combination 'mixes' a modally
qualified L-premise with a non-modal X-premise. Aristotle
considers several such combinations that he thinks can yield
L-conclusions
.
1 Among those Aristotle says are valid are all
of the first-figure LXL syllogisms: Barbara LXL
,
Darii LXL
,
Celarent LXL, and Ferio LXL. These seem to require a de
re interpretation.
On a de re interpretation the first-figure LXL
syllogisms appear to be just special cases of the assertoric
(XXX) first-figure syllogisms. An illustration will help
make this clear:
J His student Theophrastus vehemently disagrees,
insisting that the conclusion can never be 'stronger' than
either premise, i.e., that an L-conclusion can never follow
from an X-premise.
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Aristotle's first-figure syllogisms have a basic
structure that we can represent as
B A
C B
C A
where the term on the left gives the subject and the term on
the right
,
the predicate. So on a de re analysis that
attaches the modal operator to the predicate, a necessary
premise relating, for example, the subject B to the
predicate A will have the form
B LA.
A premise with that form still fits the structure of a
first-figure syllogism. In Aristotle's terminology the
A-term in the argument scheme above is the 'major term. ' The
major term is the one that gives the predicate of the
syllogism's conclusion. If that term is modally qualified,
then the structure of the first-figure dictates that the
predicate of the conclusion will be similarly qualified. So,
for example:
B LA
C B
C LA
The principle at work here is Uniform Substitution. We can
uniformly substitute a modally qualified predicate for a
non-modal one and preserve validity.
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Each of the LXL first-figure syllogisms can be gotten
m this way. We get Barbara LXL and Darii LXL by Uniform
Substitution of LA for A:
Barbara LXL
Vx ( Bx->LAx
)
Yx ( Cx-»Bx
)
Vx ( Cx->LAx
Darii LXL
Vx ( Bx-*LAx
)
lx(Cx&Bx)
3x ( Cx&LAx
And we get Celarent LXL and Ferio LXL by Uniform
Substitution of L~A for A. 2
Celarent LXL
Vx( Bx-»L ~ Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
Vx ( Cx-»L~Ax
Ferio LXL
Vx ( Bx->L~Ax
)
5x ( Cx&Bx
)
3x ( Cx&L~Ax
Uniform Substitution is validity preserving, so since the
XXX syllogisms are valid, then on this analysis all the
first-figure LXL syllogisms come out valid too. These modal
LPC translations also seem not a bad fit for Aristotle's
descriptions of these syllogisms in A9 : Barbara and Celarent
LXL at 30al7-23
,
and Darii and Ferio LXL at 30a37-b2.
7A note about LE- and LO-premises: there is a serious
question about how to represent premises of these sorts in
modal LPC. Just looking at the surface form of an LE-premise
"A belongs of necessity to no [B]
'
(31a36) might suggest
that we can represent that as ~3x(Bx&LAx). Later in Chapter
4, I explain why that is not what Aristotle means by a
universal necessary privative ( LE ) premise, but at this
stage I will use the right representation which is
Vx ( Bx->L~Ax ) . This makes the form of a particular necessary
privative (LO) premise lx(Bx&L~Ax). And so where we want to
get privative LXL syllogisms from XXX syllogisms, we can
substitute L~A for A.
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Not one of these LXL syllogisms comes out valid when
the modals are interpreted de dicto. De dicto Barbara LXL
would be:
Barbara LXL
LVx ( Bx-*Ax
)
_
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
LVx(Cx-^Ax)
Consider an instance of this de dicto Barbara. Assume that
everyone who is a resident of Amherst is a bachelor.
L (All bachelors are unmarried)
Ail residents of Amherst are bachelors
L (All residents of Amherst are unmarried)
The premises are true, but the conclusion is false.
There is also a convenient formal way of giving a
falsifying model to illustrate the invalidity 3
. Assume two
J In the case of the assertoric syllogisms only a one-
world model is needed, but in the modal cases we need two
worlds. If the modal operators are not completely trivial,
they must make a difference between the valid XXX syllogisms
and the invalid mixed modal LXL and XLL syllogisms. In one-
world models the modal syllogisms would collapse into non-
modal syllogisms and the modal operators would be completely
trivial. So where modals are involved we need to assume at
least a two-world model.
It is generally assumed that in Aristotle's logic no
terms are empty or exhaust the universe. The restriction
that no terms are empty guarantees that every term is true
of at least on thing. The restriction that no terms exhaust
the universe guarantees that in no world is everything A or
everything B or everything C -- i.e., something must be not-
A, something must be not-B, something must be not-C. So, for
example, in a universe of two individuals a and b, for each
of Aristotle's terms A, B and C, either a or b is true but
not both a and b are true.
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worlds, w, (the actual world) and w2 , and let w, see itself
and w 2 . The falsifying model is as follows:
Barbara LXL
LVx ( Bx-»Ax
)
Yx ( Cx-»Bx )
LVx(Cx-^Ax)
w i : Aa, Ba, Ca (and ~Ab, ~Bb, ~Cb)
VA : Ab, Bb, Ca (and ~Aa, ~Ba, ~Cb)
I'll exPlain how to contruct the model. Since the first
premise in Barbara involves de dicto necessity, it has to be
true that all B's are A' s' in every world that w
:
can see.
So it has to be true in w1# because w x sees itself. And it
has to be true in w2 because w x sees w 2 .
First look at the situation in w, . We can make 'all B's
are A’ s' true in w
:
by making both Ba and Aa true in w
x .
To
make the second premise 'all C’s are B's' true in ww Ca
will have to be true. So in w
x
it is true that all C's
are A's.
Next, look at w2 . The first premise requires that in w 2
all B's are A's. ' So let Ab and Bb be true in w 2 . The
second premise is a premise about the actual world (w
a ), so
it's already true, because in Wj, all C's are B's. Since the
second premise has no modal force, it doesn't dictate the
value of C in w 2 . And this leaves open the possibility of a
false conclusion: Ca might be true in w 2 , in which case 'all
C's are A's' is false in w 2 . So, de dicto Barbara LXL has
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all true premises, but the conclusion L (All C's are A's) is
false, because it is false in w2 .
Similarly, each of the other first-figure LXL
syllogisms can be shown to be invalid interpreted de dicto
:
Darii LXL
LVx ( Bx->Ax
)
ix(Cx&Bx)
L3x ( Cx&Ax
wl: Aa, Ba, Ca
w2 : Ab , Bb , Ca
Celarent LXL
LVx ( Bx->~Ax
)
Yx ( Cx->Bx
)
LVx ( Cx-+~Ax
wl: Ab,Ba,Ca
w2 : Ab,Ba,Cb
Ferio LXL
LVx( Bx->~Ax
)
3x ( Cx&Bx
)
L ix ( Cx&~Ax )
wl : Ab,Ba,Ca
w2 : Ab , Ba , Cb
This at least gives a presumption that in the cases of the
first-figure LXL syllogisms Aristotle might be thinking of
de re modality.
All of the LLL syllogisms come out valid on the de
dicto analysis, but these too come out valid when
interpreted de re. Consider again the passage at 29b36-30al,
where Aristotle asserts that the difference between the
assertoric and the apodeictic syllogisms comes from the
addition of belonging of necessity' to the terms. This is
his explanation of why LLL syllogisms are valid. But then
Aristotle is describing more here than just the substitution
we need to license the move, for instance, from Barbara XXX
to Barbara LXL, since that requires only substituting LA for
A. If Aristotle means by 29b36-30al that LLL syllogisms
differ from XXX syllogisms just in the addition of necessity
to the terms, then what he is describing requires the
substitution of modal predicates for non-modal predicates
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and the notion that what is necessary is also true
.
4
Consider an example: de re Barbara LLL will be
Vx(Bx-»LAx)
Yx ( Cx-»LBx )
Vx ( Cx-*LAx ) .
If this is to work according to the same pattern as Barbara
XXX, then the modal operator in the second (or minor)
premise must be idle. Less formally, this just amounts to
saying that what belongs of necessity also belongs.
So far I have shown that in the first figure the LLL
and LXL syllogisms are valid on a de ire analysis. But
because these are all in the first figure they do not
require any conversions — their validity is 'evident' as
they stand. And for this reason they make up part of the
axiomatic base of Aristotle's logic. The question I want to
address next is whether the same kind of de re analysis that
works here can get valid syllogisms in any of the other
figures. Aristotle bases his proofs of many of the other
syllogisms precisely on the ability to convert them into the
first figure. In this section I have shown that by this
technique Aristotle might well be converting other
syllogisms into de re first-figure syllogisms. It remains to
4 This is not a controversial point. Certainly, without
the idea that what belongs of necessity also belongs, none
of the LLL syllogisms nor any of the XLX and LXX syllogisms
work so neatly as Aristotle describes. So, although he
appears to use this idea routinely, perhaps he considers it
obvious and doesn't think it needs much explanation.
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be seen whether Aristotle's modal conversion principles can
be given a good de re analysis.
2 . 2 Ll-Conversion
The traditional controversy about how (and whether) to
apply the de dicto/de re distinction to Aristotle's logic
has to do with the fact that the syllogisms seem to reguire
de re interpretations while the conversions seem only to
work de dicto
.
I don't see enough evidence in the Prior
Analytics to support the claim that Aristotle's use of
modals is so flagrantly inconsistent as that. In this
section I want to focus closely on what I will call
Ll-conversion -- the conversion of a necessary particular
affirmative premise. So, my question here is how to
represent what is going on when Aristotle says
(LI) If A belongs... to some B of necessity,
then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A. .
.
,
25a32-33
.
On the de dicto analysis this is just
(1) L3x(Bx&Ax) -» L3(Ax&Bx).
But if (1) really were what Aristotle means, then the third-
figure syllogisms Datisi LXL, Disamis XLL
,
and Ferison LXL
-- all of which he counts as valid -- won't work. They won't
work because they all require conversion back to de dicto
first-figure LXL syllogisms, and all of those were shown to
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be invalid This makes de dicto Ll-conversion look a bad
bet here in the third figure as well.
S °
'
Can we ^ ive a de re reading of (LI) above? One way
to give a de re reading of Ll-conversion would be
(2) 3x ( Bx&LAx ) 3x(Ax&LBx).
But this presents a new problem: in modern logic (2) is
invalid. Let A be 'man' and B be 'bachelor,' then according
to ( 2 ) if some bachelor is a necessary man, some man is a
necessary bachelor.
' This is false since being a bachelor
isn t a necessary property of any man.
Since (2) is invalid it would be good to see if there
is any evidence that it isn't really what Aristotle means by
Ll-conversion. Ll-conversion applies only to third-figure
syllogisms. Consider, first, what converting according to
bhe formula (2) does in each of the syllogisms that reguires
Ll-conversion. These are included in Table 1 below.
"These are de dicto Barbara, Darii, Celarent, and Ferio
LXL . I gave falsifying models for each in Section 2.1.
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Table 1
LI
-Conversion as 3x( Bx&LAx) -> 3x( Ax&LBx)
Datisi LLL
Vx(Cx->LAx)
3x ( Cx&LBx
)
Vx(Cx^LAx)
x ( Bx&LCx
3x ( Bx&LAx
Datisi LXL 6
Vx(Cx-*LAx
)
x ( Cx&Bx
)
Vx(Cx->LAx)
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x( Bx&LAx)
Datisi XLX
Vx(Cx->Ax)
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx(Cx->Ax)
lx ( Bx&LCx
)
3x( Bx&Ax)
Disamis LLL
3x ( Cx&LAx
Vx(Cx->LBx)
3x ( Ax&LCx
lx ( Ax&LBx
3x ( Bx&LAx
Disamis LXX
3x( Cx&LAx)
Vx(Cx->Bx
3x( Ax&LCx)
3x ( Ax&Bx
V ( Bx&Ax
Disamis XLL
3x ( Cx&Ax
)
Vx(Cx->LBx)
3x ( Ax&Cx
3x ( Ax&LBx
3x( Bx&LAx)
Ferison LLL
Vx ( Cx-*L~Ax
)
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
3x ( Bx&LCx
3x(Bx&L~Ax
Ferison LXL
Vx ( Cx-»L~Ax
)
3x ( Cx&Bx
Vx ( Cx-»L ~ Ax
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x ( Bx&L~Ax
Ferison XLX
Vx(Cx->~Ax)
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx(Cx-»~Ax)
3x( Bx&LCx)
3x ( Bx&~Ax
Note that in order to get the logic to work here I'm
assuming that anything that is necessarily-C is also C. I
have not made this step explicit in the syllogisms above,
but without it none of the LLL syllogisms nor Disamis LXX
nor Ferison XLX work properly.
Although the de re conversion here is invalid, the
syllogisms above show that in one sense it does nevertheless
6 I'm including more than just the syllogisms that need
Ll-conversion
. Datisi LXL and Ferison LXL require
I-conversion, but not Ll-conversion . But because they are in
other ways so closely related to the others I have included
them in the table.
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work. It works insofar as the results above might be taken
as a good match for Aristotle's schematic descriptions of
these syllogisms. Where Aristotle says there is an
L-conclusion or where he says only an X-conclusion follows,
this analysis does match those results. This makes invalid
de re Ll-conversion look at least plausible as an
interpretation of Aristotle. If it turns out to be the right
analysis, then rather than just some confusion about de
dicto and de re modals, the situation looks even worse --
Aristotle is confused about validity. In order to show that
Aristotle is not so confused, we want some evidence that (2)
really is not what he means by conversion of a necessary
particular affirmative.
In modern logic (2) comes out false when we put terms
in: A for man, B for bachelor. While these terms give a
straightforward example that shows why nowadays we think (2)
is invalid, these terms don't give a particularly
Aristotlian example. In order to consider whether Aristotle
would accept (2) as the formula for Ll-conversion it might
help to look at an example from the sorts of terms he
routinely uses; so, instead, of 'man' and 'bachelor' let A
and B be 'animal' and 'white.' Then 'A belongs to some B of
necessity' goes to 'something white is by necessity an
animal.' In LPC this is 3x(Bx&LAx) which is the antecedent
of (2). That much is unproblematic. The question then is
whether (2) gets Aristotle's conversion right. If it does
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then x ( Ax&LBx ) must be the right representation of 'some
animal is by necessity white.’ Aristotle's comments in A10
suggest that he might take that to be false.
In 30bl9-40, Aristotle offers an analysis of a second-
figure modal mood. The mood is traditionally known as
Camestres.
' In this particular passage Aristotle gives a
proof of a modal Camestres, in which only the first premise
contains a modal -- necessity. So here we are considering
Camestres LXX
. The conclusion is not a modal statement, and
in explaining this fact Aristotle drops a hint that helps
with my project of giving a good interpretation of the modal
conversions. I will discuss Camestres LXX in more detail
later in Chapter 6.
In 30b34-35
,
Aristotle tells us that "it is possible
for animal to belong to nothing white." From this it would
appear that Aristotle is denying the truth of 'it is
necessary for animal to belong to some white’ -- that is,
denying the truth of some white is by necessity an animal.’
This suggests that he would interpret this latter statement
to mean the same as 'some animal is necessarily white,’ 7
which is certainly false since no animal is white by
necessity. To see how this helps, consider (2) with the
general terms in place of term-var iables
:
’Later in this section I will explain why he would want
to do this.
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( 2 ' ) If something white is by necessity an
animal, then some animal is by
necessity white.
The problem arises here because if (2') really is an
instance of (2) it would seem that 'something white is by
necessity an animal' might be true while it is false that
'some animal is by necessity white.’ If, however, we can
take Aristotle's remark that it is possible for animal to
belong to nothing white' to mean 'no animal is necessarily
white,’ then pretty clearly, (2') cannot be an instance of
(2). Because if no animal is necessarily white, then it will
be false that some animal is necessarily white. So (2)
cannot be the right analysis of Ll-conversion
. Aristotle
might treat (2') as valid, but not an instance of (2).
If (2) is not what Aristotle means then maybe he isn't
so confused as he first appears. Consider an example that
follows Aristotle's suggestions in 30b33-40: a man is by
necessity an animal, but a man may or may not be white. In
other words, being an animal is a necessary property of a
man, but being white is only an accidental property. This
distinction fits the point Aristotle makes when he says "it
is possible for man to become white," 30b34-35. So it is
possible for man to belong of necessity to animal and to
belong to nothing white. This is possible because being
white is accidental to an animal -- that is, it is not a
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property an animal has necessarily. So it seems that for
Aristotle it must be false that some animal is
necessarily white.
What this suggests is that in cases of purported
I-conversion, like (2'), Aristotle would not allow the scope
Oj. necessity to shift from one term to the other as it does
in (2). Again it is important to consider that for Aristotle
it's not just a matter of surface form where the modal
operator is to be attached. His modal idioms don't always
indicate the deeper structure of his propositions. So it
might be that when interpreting
(LI) If A belongs to some B of necessity,
then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A, 25a32-33,
we should give the antecedent as 3x(Bx&LAx), and then
convert to
( 3 ) 3x ( LAx&Bx )
,
keeping the necessity attached to the same term as it is in
the antecedent. Then, instead of (2), the correct form of
Ll-conversion, in this case, would be
(4) 3x(Bx&LAx) h> 3x( LAx&Bx).
This still interprets the modality de re, and it's valid.
But, does it work in the syllogisms as Aristotle describes
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them? Table 2 gives the results of using (4) as the formula
for LI
-conversion in the syllogisms.
Table 2
LI
-Conversion as 3x(Bx&LAx) -> 3x(LAx&Bx)
Datisi LLL
Vx(Cx-*LAx)
3x ( Cx&LBx
)
3x ( LBx&Cx
3x ( LBx&LAx
)
3x( Bx&LAx)
Disamis LLL
3x ( Cx&LAx
Vx(Cx-^LBx)
Hx ( LAx&Cx
3x ( LAx&LBx
3x ( LBx&LAx
3x ( Bx&LAx
Ferison LLL
Vx ( Cx-*L~Ax
3x ( Cx&LBx
3x( LBx&Cx)
3x ( LBx&L~Ax
)
3x(Bx&L~Ax)
Datisi LXL 8
Vx(Cx-»LAx)
3x ( Cx&Bx
)
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x( Bx&LAx)
Disamis LXX
3x( Cx&LAx)
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
3x ( LAx&Cx
)
3x ( LAx&Bx
3x ( Ax&Bx
3x ( Bx&Ax
Ferison LXL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
)
3x ( Cx&Bx
3x( Bx&Cx)
3x ( Bx&L~Ax
Datisi XLX
Vx ( Cx-»Ax
)
3x ( Cx&LBx
)
3x( LBx&Cx)
3x ( LBx&Ax
3x( Bx&Ax)
Disamis XLL
3x ( Cx&Ax
Vx(Cx-»LBx
3x( Ax&Cx)
3x ( Ax&LBx
3x ( LBx&Ax
3x( Bx&Ax) ***
Ferison XLX
Vx ( Cx4 ~Ax
3x( Cx&LBx)
3x ( LBx&Cx
3x ( LBx&~Ax
)
3x ( Bx&~Ax
Of the seven syllogisms that do require LI-conversion, six
of them work. The one that doesn't is marked with '***.' it
uiouimo iiu ij | uuro interpretation gets Disamis XLL vjrong f
i n
-i th an L-conciusion as
Aristotle describes at 31bl2-19. The conclusion here is only
8Datisi LXL and Ferison LXL do not involve LI-
conversion, but I include them here to help illustrate the
pattern of Aristotle's reasoning.
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a non-modal I-premise. In Section 4 of Chapter 3, I look
carefully at the problem with Disamis XLL
. It emerges that
there is some textual difficulty about Disamis XLL. But
before we look at the issues raised by Disamis, let's look
at the syllogisms that do work when the Ll-conversion is
interpreted validly as 3x(Bx&LAx) -» 3x(LAx&Bx).
The valid form of Ll-conversion is not all that is
needed to get the syllogisms in Table 2 to work: we again
need the assumption that what is necessary is also true. In
the invalid conversions we looked at earlier in Table 1, we
needed this to drop idle L 1 s off predicates to make the
logic work. That made it a matter of switching from
belonging of necessity' to merely belonging.
' Now, in the
valid conversions, we need to drop idle L's off subject
terms. This in effect would make the Ll-conversions
x ( Bx&LAx ) -> Jx(AxScBx). While that might be a more
economical description of the logical goings-on, there is no
reason I can see for attributing such economy to Aristotle.
His descriptions of Ll-conversion always involve getting one
L-premise from another L-premise: 'if A belongs of necessity
to some B, then B belongs of necessity to some A, 1 and
Jx(BxScLAx) -> 3x ( LAx&Bx ) seems a better analysis of that.
However, in his descriptions of entire third-figure
syllogisms, it does seem that for Aristotle L’s do drop off
subjects. If they don’t then the conclusion of Datisi XLX
would have to be an L-proposition of sorts: Jx(LBx&Ax).
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Aristotle clearly thinks the conclusion of Datisi here is
not a necessary proposition:
...if the particular premise is necessary, the
conclusion will not be necessary. For let BC beboth particular and necessary, and let A belong toevery C, but not however, of necessity. Then whenBC is converted it becomes the first figure, andthe universal premise is not necessary while theparticular premise is necessary. But when thepremises were like this [in the first figure], the
conclusion was not necessary; consequently, it
w -*-H not be in this case [in the third-figure
Datisi] either, (31b20-27).
At this stage, I will treat the matter of L's dropping
off subjects just as a formal feature of this
interpretation. This shouldn't be troublesome. Later in
Chapter 5, exploring the relations between Aristotle's
metaphysics and predication, this phenomenon becomes more
interesting
.
The necessity in the Ll-premise in some cases has no
real effect on a syllogism's validity. Disamis LXX, Datisi
XLX and Ferison XLX are examples. Each has an Ll-premise
that gets converted, but the resulting conclusion in each
case is not modal. Ferison XLX is particularly interesting
given my project here. In 32al-4, Aristotle offers
wakefulness,
'
' animal
,
1 and white' as terms
(E) If ~3x (White x & Wakeful x)
(LI) and 3x ( White x & L Animal x )
,
(0) then ~Vx (Animal x h> Wakeful x )
.
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something white,
'
'It is necessary for animal to belong to
32al-2, I represent here as 3x ( White x & L Animal x).
Converting this according to ( 4 ) gives 3x (L Animal x &
White x) and turns Ferison XLX into the valid first-figure
mood Ferio XLX.
One thing is still unclear. That is, why should
Aristotle want something white is necessarily an animal' to
ever be true? In the Ferison example he appears to take it
as true. But if he does, then it does look like Aristotle is
contradicting himself -- sometimes taking it as true,
sometimes suggesting that it must be false (An.Pr.
30b34-35 ) , sometimes suggesting that we cannot ever make
such statements {An. Post. A22)
. In An. Post. 83bl9-24, he
explains that accidents can never take the subject position,
only the predicate position. So even though in 'some white
is necessarily an animal,
' white' is the grammatical
subject, it seems that (sometimes, at least) Aristotle is
assuming an underlying logical structure in which 'animal'
is the true subject.
If the valid de re analysis is right, then we can no
longer give a univocal translation of
(5) Some A is B by necessity.
McCall [1963, p. 21], following Rescher, does in fact list
both !x(Ax&LBx) and =)x(LAx&Bx), (among others) as possible
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representations of (5). His comment on possible
LPC-transi at ions is:
None of these interpretations does justice toAristotle's system. Not one of them even
simultaneously provides for the validity ofBarbaras LLL and LXL, the invalidity of Barbara
XLL, and the convertibility of the particularpremise Some A is necessarily B' into 'Some B is
necessarily A.
’
[McCall, 1963, p. 21]
On the interpretation I set out, we can simultaneously
account for each of McCall's worries here. The validity of
Barbaras LLL and LXL is accounted for, as is Ll-conversion
.
The invalidity of Barbara XLL appears to be straightforward
Vx ( Bx-»Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->LBx
)
Vx ( Cx-*LAx ) .
But of course the important point to realize about McCall's
criticism is that he is assuming that the form of (5) is
sufficient to decide the placement of the L. My suggestion
is that we cannot rely on the form alone.
One reason for thinking as McCall does that it is
better to leave the modal premises unanalysed is that it
then seems there is no restriction on our substitution of
terms for variables in the syllogistic. But evidence cited
here suggests that this may not be quite right. Considering
the assertoric syllogistic alone, this point may be easily
missed. But it is harder to overlook when trying to make
sense of Aristotle's discussion of apodeictic premises.
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There, Aristotle sometimes links his use of modals to his
theory of predication in such a way as to prevent certain
terms being taken in the wrong order. For example,
Aristotle, I think, will never want to take as true a
proposition such as
(5) some animal is necessarily white,
where the necessity is attached to 'white.' He may not want
(7) some white is necessarily an animal,
where 'white 1 is the subject, either. But the matter with
(7) is not particularly a problem about modals; it is about
what counts, generally, as good predication. 9 What this
shows, in either case, is that the syllogistic does depend
to a large extent on Aristotle's ideas about predication.
Many scholars note that in the modal syllogisms
themselves -- in the Barbaras, in the Celarents, etc. --
Aristotle seems to want to take apodeictic premises as
expressing necessity de re. The real problems seem to arise
with the introduction of modal conversions. What I have
tried to show here is that the logical structure of
predication often seems to determine which term takes the
modal qualifier. And, as Aristotle describes things, de re
necessity seems to attach to what the underlying theory of
9 Later in Chapters 5-8, I deal with the issues raised
by such propositions.
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predication guarantees is the true predicate. This rules out
the invalid de re conversion in (2) that some have supposed
Aristotle to intend, while it supports the interpretation
given in ( 4 )
.
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CHAPTER 3
DE RE LA-CONVERSION
3 . 1 De Re LA-Conversion
The primary aim of this section is to show that a valid
de re analysis of LA-conversion is, in fact, plausible. I
will assume that, at this stage, there is at least a prima
facie case for de re reading, given the results of Chapter
2. Also, there is good evidence to reject de dicto. Some of
this evidence comes from the kinds of semantic
considerations I suggest in Section 2.2. But the most
obvious evidence is purely formal: it comes from the fact
that the first-figure LXL syllogisms only make sense when
the necessity is interpreted de re. 1 This is an important
point because most of Aristotle's proofs of second- and
third-figure syllogisms depend on 'converting' those
syllogisms back into the first figure, where validity is
plainly evident. Since the first-figure LXL syllogisms are
valid de re but not de dicto
,
then any time we convert a
second- or third-figure syllogism back into a first-figure
LXL syllogism, we should be converting back into a valid de
re Barbara, Celarent, Darii, or Ferio LXL.
We saw in Chapter 2 that there are two ways to give a
de re reading of Ll-conversion . One way makes the conversion
principle valid, the other way does not. The same is true of
1 In Section 2.1, I show that a de dicto reading of the
first figure LXL syllogisms cannot be right.
LA-conversion. The invalid reading is
(1) Vx(Bx-*LAx) -> 3x ( Ax&LBx ) .
The valid reading is
(2) Vx ( Bx-»LAx ) -» 3x ( LAx&Bx ) .
It will help to look at the results of each of these in the
syllogisms. Table 3 illustrates the results of using the
invalid de re analysis of LA-conversion.
Table 3
LA-Conversion as Vx(Bx->LAx) -> 3x( Ax&LBx)
Darapti LLL
Vx ( Cx->LAx
)
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
3x( Bx&LCx
3x ( Bx&LAx
Felapton LLL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-*LBx
3x ( Bx&LCx
3x ( Bx&L~Ax
Darapti LXL
Vx ( Cx-»LAx
)
Vx ( Cx-^Bx
)
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x ( Bx&LAx
Felapton LXL
Vx( Cx-»L~Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->Bx
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x ( Bx&L~Ax
Darapti XLL
Vx ( Cx->Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->LBx
)
3x ( Bx&LCx
3x(Bx&Ax) ***
Felapton XLX
Vx(Cx->~Ax
Vx ( Cx->LBX
3x ( Bx&LCx
3x ( Bx&~Ax
(Darapti LXL and Felapton LXL do not involve LA-conversion.
I have included them here only to give a complete picture of
the L+X syllogisms requiring A-conversions
.
)
This invalid de re conversion gets right three of the
four syllogisms that require LA-conversion. Darapti LLL,
Darapti XLL, and Felapton LLL come out fine. Darapti XLL
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doesn't work. But, Darapti XLL doesn't work even when we
interpret LA-conversion according to (2) above -- i.e., as
7x(Bx->LAx) -> x(LAx&Bx). I'll have more to say about
Darapti, but let's look, first, at what happens in the
syllogisms when we convert according to (2).
Table 4 gives the results of valid de re LA-conversion.
Table 4
LA-Conversion as Vx(Bx-»LAx) -» 3x(LAx&Bx)
Darapti LLL
Vx ( Cx->LAx
)
^x(Cx->LBx)
3x( LBx&Cx
lx ( LBx&LAx
)
3x ( Bx&LAx
Felapton LLL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
Vx ( Cx->LBx
3x( LBx&Cx)
3x( LBx&L~Ax)
lx( Bx&L~Ax)
Again, I drop L's off subject terms to get the
conclusions Aristotle gives. This makes the form of the
LA-conversion, in effect, Vx(Bx-»LAx) -> ix(Ax&Bx). But
Aristotle clearly describes LA-conversion as converting from
one necessary premise to another necessary premise, not from
a necessary to an assertoric premise. So I will treat
Vx(Bx->LAx) -> 3x(LAx&Bx) as the better analysis of
Aristotle's meaning. This won't be a problem if LB->B and if
Darapti LXL
Vx ( Cx-»LAx
)
Vx ( Cx->Bx )
3x ( Bx&Cx
)
3x ( Bx&LAx
Felapton LXL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
3x( Bx&Cx
3x(Bx&L~Ax)
Darapti XLL
Vx ( Cx->Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-»LBx )
Jx ( LBx&Cx
)
Jx ( LBx&Ax
3x(Bx&Ax) ***
Felapton XLX
Vx ( Cx-»~Ax
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
3x ( LBx&Cx
3x ( LBx&~Ax
)
3x ( Bx&~Ax
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x(LEx&Ax) is not an apodcict ic premise for Aristotle. 2
3 . 2 Darapti XLL
Whether we take LA-conversion to be (1) Vx (Bx-»LAx) ->
lx ( Ax&LBx ) or (2) :yx ( Bx->LAx ) !x(LAx&Bx), Darapti XLL does
not work. Now is a good time to look at the traditional
mnemonics for the syllogisms. The name 'Darapti' encodes
instructions for the syllogisms proof as follows: The
initial D ' indicates that the syllogism will be based on
the first— figure syllogism Darii. The vowels in Darapti'
(a, a, i) indicate that we're looking at a syllogism with
two A-premises and an I-conclusion
. In the modal Darapti
XLL, we get an XA-premise, an LA-premise, and an
LI -conclusion
. The letter 'r' indicates that the syllogism
can be proven through impossibility 3
. And, a 'p' after an
a' tells us that the corresponding A-premise
gets converted.
The Darapti XLL in Tables 3 and 4 follows the pattern
the mnemonic dictates. It is not, however, what Aristotle
describes in the text at 31a31-33. The premises are right,
2Chapter 5 is directly concerned with showing that a
proposition whose logical structure is Vx(LBx->Ax) or
Jx(LBx&Ax) is not a true apodeictic. It is, instead, what I
will call a 'genuine assertoric proposition.'
3The mnemonics occasionally indicate moves that
Aristotle himself doesn't make. Proof through impossibility
in Darapti XLL is one example. So, the 'r' in Darapti XLL
isn't particularly Aristotelian.
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but the proof of them isn't. In the text Aristotle does not
base his proof on the conversion of the CB-premise; instead,
he bases it on the conversion of the CA-premise -- for as he
says, "C converts to some A," (31a33). This suggests the
structure of the proof is really
Vx(Cx-*Ax)
Vx ( Cx-»LBx )
3x ( Ax&Cx
)
3x ( Ax&LBx )
.
And this seems to fit what Aristotle does describe:
from premises
Vx ( Cx->Ax
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
)
convert CA to
'A (merely) belongs to every C'
'B belongs to every C of necessity'
3x ( Ax&Cx 'C converts to some A.
"Consequently, if B belongs to every C of necessity, then it
will also belong to some A of necessity," (31a33); that is,
3x ( Ax&LBx 'B will belong of necessity to some A.'
While the proof Aristotle gives at 31a31-33 is
traditionally called 'Darapti' that name encodes the wrong
instructions, since the premise Aristotle converts is really
the first A-premise. The traditional mnemonics are
occasionally misleading, and so it is necessary to consider
them carefully and always with an eye to Aristotle's text.
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In what follows, I note those places where the two differ
and base my interpretations on the text and not on
the mnemonics.
According to the general form of a third-figure
syllogism, the conclusion will always have the A-term in
predicate position, and the B-term in subject position. The
syllogism misnamed as Darapti (I mean the syllogism actually
set out at 31a31-33 ) does not have the right conclusion. It
has B as predicate, A as subject, and so seems to reguire an
additional conversion. It appears to need a conversion of
the conclusion itself in order to make A the predicate and B
the subject. But there is no evidence in the text that
Aristotle has it in mind to convert the conclusion.
The fact that the conclusion here does not follow the
pattern established in the assertor ic might be part of what
led the medievals to call the syllogism Darapti. The
mnemonic instructions might be an attempt to fit the
syllogism to the pattern of the rest of the third-figure
conclusions. And these all relate an A predicate to
a B subject. 4
4 If we were to convert the conclusion anyway, then we
would go from 3x(Ax&LBx) to Jx(LBx&Ax), and as I have noted,
Aristotle seems not to think of this last as an apodeictic
proposition. I'll discuss this matter in greater detail in
Chapter 5.
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3 • 3 Trouble-Spots Reconsidered
The results above in this chapter and also in Chapter
2
'
suggest that a de re analysis of LA- and Ll-conversions
is at least plausible. But it is not obvious whether the
valid or the invalid de re conversions get the better
results. There is little to decide between the two analyses.
The invalid analysis gets all the right results where
LI
-conversion is needed (Table 1). The valid analysis gets
Disamis XLL wrong (in Table 2). But the valid analysis has
the distinct advantage of being valid. It would be good to
see if we can find a test case that shows that either the
valid or the invalid de re conversion is really right.
What we are looking for will be syllogisms that have
the form
C A
C LB
B LA
The syllogisms that do arc Disamis XLL, Darapti XLL, and
Datisi XLL. A diagram might help to illustrate what I have
in mind.
subj pred
C A
C LB
B LA
Disamis
XLL
i
a
i
Darapti
XLL
a
a
i
Datisi
XLL
a
i
i
Reading down, Disamis has a major I-premise, a minor
A-premise, and an I-conclusion . Reading left-to-right , the
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major I-premise relates a subject C to predicate A,
and so on.
If all of these are valid to Aristotle, then pretty
clearly the modal conversion of affirmatives must involve
the (illegitimate) shifting of the modal operator from one
term to another, since in all of the above, the A-term
starts off non-modal, but through invalid conversion ends up
a modal LA in the conclusion. But Aristotle doesn't count
these all as valid. He counts Datisi XLL as invalid
( 31b20-31 ) . And, as we saw in Section 3.2, his discussion of
Darapti XLL is too sketchy to decide the matter, since we
can't be sure what he would say about it if he converted the
conclusion. So, Darapti XLL doesn't give any conclusive
evidence since the syllogism in the text turns out not to
involve any modal conversion at all.
Disamis XLL raises more of the same kind of
interpretive problems. In Section 3.4, I look at these in
some detail.
3 . 4 Disamis XLL
At 31bl2-19 Aristotle describes a modal syllogism that
he counts as valid. Traditionally this syllogism is called
Disamis XLL. The name indicates that, in the third figure,
an Ll-conclusion follows from an assertoric I-premise
together with an apodeictic A-premise. The name also
indicates that both the I-premise and the Ll-conclusion
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require conversion just as the I-premise and I-conclusion in
non-modal Disamis XXX require conversion. Let's consider the
similarities between the XXX Disamis and the XLL:
Non-modal Disamis XXX (28b7-ll) is
lea :: 3x(Cx&Ax)
Acb : : Vx(Cx-»Bx)
Iba :: 3x(Bx&Ax).
Aristotle s proof depends upon two simple I-conversions
:
( 1 ) Jx ( Cx&Ax
)
(2) Jx(AxStCx)
(3) Vx(Cx->Bx)
(4) Hx(AxStBx)
(5) ix(BxStAx)
Given
I-conversion, 1
Given
Darii, 2,3
I-conversion, 4
Disamis XLL, if it follows the same pattern of proof,
must be just a modal version of the same:
lea : : 3x( Cx&Ax)
LAcb : : Vx ( Cx->LBx )
LIba :: 1x(Bx&LAx).
But, unlike Disamis XXX, this isn't valid. So, it seems, we
have a problem. One solution might be to just leave the
propositions here unanlaysed, and, like McCall, represent
Disamis XLL as
lea
LAcb
LIba.
Leaving things this way McCall claims to get all the results
Aristotle wants. From this it might seem that any attempt to
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capture Aristotle's meaning is bound to fail. But this can't
be right.
There is another solution. It might be that Aristotle
himself would agree that the argument above is not valid.
And in fact when we put terms in, it becomes clear that this
is the more plausible answer. Let A be brown, B be animal,
and C be horse:
Some horses are brown
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily brown.
There's no reason to think Aristotle would call this valid;
instead, there's plenty of evidence to suggest that for him
this must be invalid. But where does that leave Disamis XLL?
It shows we really do have a problem there, but a problem of
a different sort than first supposed.
So far I have been setting out Disamis XLL according to
the instructions encoded in the traditional mnemonics. Those
match the instructions for Disamis XXX at 28b7-ll. This
reliance on the mnemonics seems to me to be the source of
much trouble here. Let's put aside for the moment what the
traditional approach dictates and instead look closely at
the text.
Disamis XLL is purported to be the syllogism set out at
31bl6-19. And in fact everything leading up to this passage
suggests that Disamis XLL is what Aristotle has in mind. He
has already framed the discussion saying "...if one
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[premise] is universal, the other is particular, and both
are positive, then the conclusion will be necessary whenever
the universal is necessary," (31bl2-14). This much at least
sounds like Disamis XLL. But consider what Aristotle goes on
to say:
Thus, if it is necessary for B to belong to every
C and A is below C, then it is necessary for B tobelong to some A, (31bl6-17).
From the remarks at 31bl2-16 it would appear that 'A is
below ( hupo ) C’ must mean 'some A is C, ’ since Aristotle
pretty clearly means at 31bl2-16 to describe a particular
premise. Robin Smith notes Aristotle's use of this same
construction at 30a40. The premise there is 'C is under
(hupo) B. ' As Smith explains the 'C is under B’
construction
:
’under’ in this sort of context usually means
either 'within the extension of’ or 'a subject of
predication of. 1 In the present case [30a40], it
has to mean something like 'part of C falls under
B, ’ if Aristotle's argument is to work. He must
mean his proof to follow the same form as that in
30a21-23, though his expression is perhaps
careless. [Smith, 1989, p. 122]
This is a bit like saying Aristotle "has to mean something
like 'part of C falls under B 1 " because otherwise we'd have
to say Aristotle's just confused. But in the case of Disamis
XLL there is a real question about this. My point is that if
the proof encoded by the name Disamis XLL is the right
reading of Aristotle at 31bl6-19, then there's some reason
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to think he might be confused, anyway, since the syllogism
then is invalid.
At any rate, A is below C' on Smith's account would
have to mean Jx(Ax&Cx), not 3x(Cx&Ax) as he gives it. In
other words, it's a CiA premise, not an AiC premise, if it's
an I-premise at all. So the I-premise in the syllogism that
Aristotle sets out doesn't need any conversion — so it's
not Disamis in the first place. And, in fact, Aristotle does
not mention the need to convert here.
But if 'A is below C' means for Aristotle that 'A is
within the extension of C' then an I-premise is not the
right way to represent the meaning. Instead, it would seem
that an A-premise is what's needed: Vx(Ax->Cx). There is
additional evidence in the Prior Analytics that Aristotle
does sometimes use 'under' or 'below' (hupo) to indicate
A-premises. He uses hupo this way in 33b34-35: 'let B be put
as belonging to every C. Then, since C is below (hupo)
B....’ Later, in A19, Aristotle again uses hupo to describe
what is clearly a universal premise. He says 'nothing
prevents C being under (hupo) B' (38a40) and gives an
example with terms C for awake and B for animal: 'everything
awake is an animal’ (38a41-bl). So, returning to the
question of Disamis XLL, there is some independent
justification for taking hupo in 31bl6-19 as indicating an
A-premise and not an I-premise. This would make the name
Disamis XLL and its traditional proof inappropriate, because
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the syllogism in question would have no I-premise at all. At
any rate, the proof given in the text (i.e., the one that is
misnamed Disamis XLL) does not provide any clear evidence
favoring one de re analysis over the other.
If it is right to take hupo here as indicating an
A-premise, then Disamis XLL is not really what Aristotle
describes. What he really gives combines two A-premises:
Vx ( Ax->Cx ) 'A is below C'
Vx_[Cx-»LBx
)
' it is necessary for B to belong to
every C
'
x ( Ax&LBx ) 'then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A.
ix(AxScLBx) is the initial conclusion, reached validly. But
it needs converting to give, finally, the right structure
for a third-figure conclusion. Aristotle makes this
explicit: "if it is necessary for B to belong to some A,
then it is also necessary for A to belong to some B (for it
converts)," (31bl8-19). Converting the conclusion gets the A
into predicate position, B into subject position, as the
pattern of the third figure dictates. In non-modal Disamis
XXX this is a straightforward conversion because the
conclusion there is assertoric. Now, the conclusion is
apodeictic, and that creates a problem. It appears that
Aristotle, finally, does want invalid Ll-conversion
:
3x(Ax&LBx) -» Jx(BxScLAx). So, perhaps, this situation is no
improvement. But look, however, at an instance with terms in
place of variables:
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Vx(Ax-*Cx)
Vx(Cx-*LBx)
man is below two-legged
all two-legged things are by necessity
animals
some man is by necessity animal
some animal by necessity a man.
3x( Ax&LBx)
lx ( Bx&LAx
)
This doesn't look so bad. By taking 'A is below C' to relate
a predicate C to a subject A, we aren't left open to the
possibility that A might be an accident. In An. Post. A22,
Aristotle tells us that 'the white thing is a log' is not an
example of genuine predication. The reason has to do with
the fact that white is only an accident and, so, is not a
proper subject of genuine predication. If we apply that
reasoning here, then, because in the AC premise A is the
subject term, it won't do to have A an accident. The
instance of Disamis above appears to work because A is a
substance term. The traditional Disamis XLL, on the other
hand, leaves open the possibility that the A term is an
accident. Because the structure of the third figure requires
an A-predicate in the conclusion, in the traditional Disamis
XLL, an accidental A term can end up with an L attached,
making the syllogism invalid. The textual syllogism at least
doesn't suffer from that problem.
Later in Chapters 5 and 6, I look closely at some of
the interpretive issues this raises. Next, I want to look at
how we might extend a de re analysis to LE-proposit ions
.
This is the subject of Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
DE RE LE-CONVERSION
4 . 1 Valid Conversion
In this chapter I want to see whether any modal LPC
analysis can do all that Aristotle requires of his
LE-premises. LE-premises appear in all three figures, hut in
the second figure they are especially important. Most proofs
of second- f igure syllogisms depend upon E-conversion, and
where those E-premises are apodeictic, then, the proofs
depend on LE-conversion
. For Aristotle this conversion of
universal privative necessary premises -- that is,
conversion of LE-premises — does preserve validity.
LE-conversion brings second-figure syllogisms back to the
first figure, thereby illustrating the validity of the
second-figure syllogisms themselves. Here, I want to see how
to represent what Aristotle means by a 'universal privative
necessary premise. ' This will require, too, an analysis of
how these LE-premises convert.
Chapters 2 and 3 showed how there are two ways we might
give a de re analysis of each LA- and Ll-conversion . One way
makes them both invalid; the other way makes them both
valid. On the account that gets them valid the L-conversions
come out as straightorward susbstitution instances of the
non-modal conversions -- all that appears to be required in
these cases is the substitution of a non-modal predicate A
by a modal predicate LA. So from A-conversion
(A) Vx(Bx^Ax) 3x ( Ax&Bx ) ,
we get valid LA-conversion
(LA) Vx(Bx->LAx) -> 3x(LAx&Bx).
And from I-conversion
(I) Ix(BxStAx) -> 3x( Ax&Bx),
we get valid Ll-conversion
(LI) ^x(Bx&LAx) -> 3x(LAx&Bx).
Proceeding on a formal basis, it might seem that
LE-conversion would be just as easily gotten from non-modal
E-conversion again with the substitution of LA for A. In
other words, it might seem that from non-modal E-conversion
(E) ~3x(Bx&Ax) -> ~3x( Ax&Bx)
we would get
( LE* ) ~3x(Bx&LAx) -» ~3x(LAx&Bx).
( LE* ) is valid for the same reason E-conversion is valid. It
also works for the same reason that valid LA-conversion
works and valid Ll-conversion works. Aristotle certainly
describes modal conversions very generally, saying just that
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they work in the same way as non-modal conversions do,
( 25a37-41 ) . This makes (LE*) look a plausible analysis.
Nevertheless, (LE*) is a wrong analysis. It is wrong for two
reasons. In the first place ( LE* ) , though itself valid,
doesn't get Aristotle's syllogisms valid. Second, (LE*)
gives the general formula for an LE-premise as ~3x( Bx&LAx )
,
and that, I will show, is really a misrepresentation of
Aristotle s meaning when he describes his universal
privative premises. It's an easier matter to show how (LE*)
gets the syllogisms wrong, so I'll deal with that
problem first:
Consider, what (LE*) does in Cesare LXL
,
(30b9-13):
jX(Bx&LAx)
Vx ( Cx->Ax
)
~ Jx ( LAx&Bx
)
Vx(Cx->Ax)
~3x ( Cx&Bx
)
Using ( LE* ) , I convert ~ 3x ( Bx&LAx ) into ~3x( LAx&Bx). If we
assume that any A is also LA 1
,
then this representation of
Cesare LXL demonstrates first-figure transitivity and gets
the conclusion above ~3x ( Cx&Bx ) . But this is not the
conclusion Aristotle wants. Aristotle clearly thinks a
conclusion should follow from Cesare LXL, but he thinks the
conclusion will itself be a necessary proposition, an
: Later in Chapter 5, I explain why we are entitled to
make such an assumption.
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LE-proposition, relating C and B. 2 This would have to be
" lx ( Cx&LBx ) on the interpretation we're considering. And
this presents a problem: for there is no legitimate way of
attaching the modal to the B-term. Nowhere in the premises
does an L attach to anything but the A-term; in the premises
B and C are not modally qualified. In order to get the
conclusion Aristotle wants, it seems that what is missing is
some way of detaching' the modal from the A term that then
allows us to affix it to the B term. There is no way of
doing that here, and so this analysis of Cesare LXL appears
not to be what Aristotle means.
The kind of principle Aristotle seems to want here is,
in modern logic, plainly invalid. Nevertheless, it is
exactly what is needed to ' prove' each of Aristotle's
syllogisms involving LE-conversion
. There are three such
syllogisms: in addition to Cesare LXL (above), there are
Camestres XLL 3
,
and Festino LXL. Each of these others, just
as Cesare LXL, requires some way of swapping the necessity
3 The same is true of the first-figure syllogism
Celarent LXL on which the proof of Cesare LXL is based. The
conclusion in both cases is for Aristotle a necessary
proposition
.
3We might add Camestres LXX too. On the face of it,
Camestres LXX doesn't involve LE-premises or LE-conversion
since, as its name indicates, both of the E-premises are
non-modal (they are X's not L's). But in the course of
defending Camestres LXX, Aristotle gives an explanation of
why there can be no L-conclusion by showing what would
happen if we assume there were
.
This explanation 'through
impossibility' does involve LE-conversion. I look at this
method in some detail in Chapter 7.
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from one term to another. ( LE* ) doesn't do that, and so
( LE* ) gets each of these syllogisms wrong. (LE*) preserves
validity but Cesare LXL illustrates that the conversion
we're looking for might not really be valid. Consider
Aristotle's account of LE-conversion
:
...if it is necessary for A to belong to no B,
then it is necessary for B to belong to no A
( 25a29-30 ) . 4
This appears to be just the sort of principle that's is
needed to get Cesare LXL to work. If we continue to take
" 3x ( Bx&LAx ) as the form of an LE-premise, Aristotle's
conversion rule comes out as
(LE**) ~3x ( Bx&LAx ) -> ~3x ( Ax&LBx ) .
This takes the L off the predicate of the original premise
and puts it on the predicate of the converted premise. In
Cesare LXL, that is just what is needed to get the modal
operator where we want it in the conclusion:
~3x ( Bx&LAx
)
Vx ( Cx->Ax
)
~3x ( Ax&LBx
Vx ( Cx->Ax
~3x ( Cx&LBx
So, (LE**) fits Cesare LXL nicely.
“Traditionally, this is taken to be a de dicto
principle. But taking it that way doesn't help with the
valid LXL and XLL syllogisms since these all require de re
necessity
.
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In order to emphasize the fact that we’re interested in
universal privatives, I will represent (LE**) using
universal quantifiers, instead of existentials
.
Vx(Bx-*~LAx) -> Vx(Ax-»~LBx)
=
~ Jx(Bx&LAx) ->
~3x ( Ax&LBx )
LE-conversion according to this formula fits Camestres XLL
and Festino LXL. It also works for the second-figure LLL
syllogisms too. So, each of the six syllogisms that depend
on LE-conversion comes out as Aristotle seems to describe.
Table 5 shows the results of taking an LE-premise as
Vx(Bx-*~LAx) and LE-conversion as Vx(Bx->~LAx) -> Vx(Ax-»~LBx)
.
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Table 5
LE-Conversion as Vx (Bx->~LAx) Vx (Ax->~LBx)
Cesare LLL
Vx(Bx-4~LAx )
Vx(Cx->LAx)
Vx(Ax->~LBx)
Vx ( Cx->~LBx
)
Camestres LLL
Vx ( Bx->LAx
)
Vx ( Cx-»~ LAx
Vx( Ax-»~LCx)
Vx ( Bx-»~ LCx )
Festino LLL
Vx ( Bx->~ LAx
3x ( Cx&LAx
Vx ( Ax-» ~LBx )
3x(Cx&~LBx)
Cesare LXL
Vx(Bx->~LAx)
Vx(Cx->Ax)
Vx(Ax->~LBx)
Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
)
Camestres XLL
Vx ( Bx-»Ax
)
Vx(Cx^'LAx)
Vx ( Ax->~LCx
Vx( Bx-^~LCx
Festino LXL
Vx(Bx->~LAx)
3x ( Cx&Ax
Vx(Ax->~LBx)
3x(Cx&~LBx)
All of these work. (LE**) is not a valid principle, but it
may well be that Aristotle sometimes reasons in accordance
with principles that, by modern lights certainly, are
invalid. If Aristotle does do this, then the fact that it's
invalid needn't count against (LE**). Furthermore, precisely
that feature that makes (LE**) invalid makes (LE**) work in
the syllogisms and makes it seem a good interpretation of
LE-conversion. By swapping the modal qualifier from one term
to another, (LE**) gives a conversion that does what is
required to make the logic work in all cases that depend on
LE-conversion. So, in several important respects (LE**)
appears to be a plausible and workable analysis of
Aristotle's LE-conversion principle.
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It is not, however, an analysis we can be satisfied
with. While (LE**) clearly has much to recommend it, it is
very definitely not right. In the next section, I will
show why.
4 . 2 Interpreting LE-Premises
Earlier I suggested that there are two problems with
( LE* ) . In the first place, it fails to get the syllogisms to
work in the way Aristotle says they should. But my second
worry about (LE*) involves the way it analyzes just a simple
LE-premise as x(Bx&LAx). (LE**) is an improvement only
with respect to the first of these concerns. (LE**) gets all
of the relevant syllogisms to work but still gives
1x(Bx&LAx) as the general formula for an LE-premise. If,
however, that is not the right analysis of an Aristotlean
LE-premise, then for all its advantages, (LE**) will not be
right either. So, what does Aristotle say about his
LE-premises?
One of the first instances we have of an LE-premise
comes at 30al7-20, where Aristotle asserts the validity of
Celarent LXL. That isn't all that Aristotle is doing in this
passage -- he occasionally groups related syllogisms
together, pointing out the validity or invalidity of them
all in one go, and 30al7-20 is one such passage. Aristotle,
here, in just three lines, explains that both Barbara LXL
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and Celarent LXL are valid. The construction he uses to do
the job is worth noticing:
. . .if A has been taken to belong or not to belong
of necessity to B, and B merely to belong to C...
then A will belong or not belong to C of
necessity, (ei to men A toi B ex anankes eileptai
huparchon e me huparchon, to de B toi C huparchon
monon
,
outos . . . ex anankes to A toi C huparchei e
oux huparchei)
,
(30al7-20).
The construction is complicated by the addition of the modal
qualifier as well as by the fact that Aristotle is here
aiming 'to kill two birds with one stone, 1 explaining at
once that he counts both Barbara and Celarent as valid. When
Aristotle groups related syllogisms he routinely gives
disjunctive descriptions like the one above. 5 When it comes
to adding the modal qualifier, Aristotle simply and
conveniently adds 'ex anankes
'
to the already
complicated language.
Not all instances of LE-premises are complicated by
such groupings. There are other more straightforward
examples of LE-premises, and some of these, too, seem to
involve just the addition of 'ex anankes' to a non-modal
premise. Consider again what a non-modal E-premise looks
like: for example 'A belongs to no B (to men A medeni toi B
526a37-38 is a nice example showing how dense such
passages can become even without modal qualifiers: "if B
belongs to no C and A belongs or does not belong to some B,
or does not belong to every B, then neither in this way will
there be a deduction."
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a
huparchei
) , (26a25). A later passage at 30b26-27 provides
nice example of how Aristotle adds 'ex anankes
'
to a similar
construction: there the LE-premise is given as ' to B toi C
medeni huparchei ex anankes .
• Robin Smith translates this as
B belongs of necessity to no C.’ At 31a36, we get a
slightly different expression (with, incidentally, different
variables) 'to de A oudeni toi C ex anankes,' or, again
following Smith's translation, A belongs of necessity to no
C.' Aristotle clearly does not intend the different modal
constructions here to signal a difference in meaning -- just
as Smith's translations indicate, Aristotle treats the two
as obviously equivalent ( LE ) expressions.
Turning back to the matter of how to represent these
LE-premises: since ordinary E-premises -- 'A belongs to no
B, ’ ( 26a25 ) or 'A does not belong to every B’, (26a37) --
can be represented by ~3x ( Bx&Ax ) , and since Aristotle's
examples of LE-premises above just add 'of necessity' to
such a premise, then
(Le) ~=Jx ( Bx&LAx ) ,
might seem a plausible analysis of an LE-premise. So, (LE**)
might not look a problem at all.
There are other times, however, when we find a very
different account of what Aristotle calls a universal
privative necessary premise: for example, at 30bl0, 'let it
not be possible for A to belong to any B, (to A toi men B
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medeni endechestho ) . ' Aristotle often expresses LE-premises
in terms of possibility in the Prior Analytics. See for
example 30bll-18; 31a5-10; 31b33-36. In each of these
passages Aristotle sets out the LE-premise as a denial of
possibility. How can we represent an expression like this in
a modal LPC translation?
(Le) !x(Bx&LAx), cannot be the right representation of
Aristotle's meaning here because (Le) ~3x(Bx&LAx) means
is both a B and a necessary-A, ' and that does not
mean the same as Aristotle's 'it is not possible for A to
belong to any B. 1 What seems wrong with (Le) as an analysis
of a universal privative necessary premise is that in (Le)
the modal operator is given as 'necessity' when it really
needs to be possibility' in order to capture the meaning of
this new expression. So, with M = ~L~, 6
( Le2 ) ~3x ( Bx&MAx )
,
appears to be a better translation of Aristotle's expressed
meaning here.
6Aristotle does allow this definition of possibility,
but he later adopts a different and more complicated
definition. Chapter 7 contains detailed discussion of these
different definitions and their uses in the Prior Analytics .
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The difference between
(Le) ~3x ( Bx&LAx
)
and (Le2)
~3x(Bx&MAx)
is the difference between
(i) for no B does A necessarily belong
and (ii) for no B does A possibly belong.
Aristotle's expression 'A belongs of necessity to no B’
appears, in surface form, at least, to be very much like
(i); whereas, his expression 'let it not be possible for A
to belong to any B' seems to mean the same as (ii) above, or
(Le2) ~ x
(
Bx&MAx ) . But both formulas cannot be right because
they have different meanings and Aristotle very clearly
considers his expressions 'it is not possible for A to
belong to any B* and 'A does not belong to B of necessity*
to be equivalent -- he repeatedly offers each as his
necessary universal privatives. For 'A does not belong to B
of necessity,
’ see 25a30-31; 30al7-23; 30b26-27; 31a37. For
'it is not possible for A to belong to any B, ’ see 30bl0-12;
30bl4- 15 ; 31a5-10; 31b33-36. 7
'That Aristotle counts these expressions as equivalent
is not disputed. A comparison of 25a27-31 and 31a5-7 shows
why: at 25a27-31, Aristotle leaves no room for doubt that
'it is necessary for A to belong to no B' is an example of a
necessary universal privative premise. On the other hand, at
31a5-7 he gives ' let it not be possible for A to belong to
any B' clearly as an example of how7 to 'let the privative
premise be both universal and necessary.
'
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While (Le) looks fine where Aristotle makes an
LE-premise by adding 'ex anankes ' to an E-premise, (Le)
doesn't capture the meaning of 'it is not possible for A to
belong to any B. 1 Since Aristotle very definitely does count
his two expressions as equivalent in meaning, what is needed
is an analysis that can work for both expressions. (Le)
cannot do that; I want to show now that ( Le2 ) can. Against
this claim someone might object that ( Le2 ) , ~3x ( Bx&MAx )
,
simply doesn't mean the same as A belongs of necessity to
no B. ' Certainly anyone who insists on relying on surface
structure as an indication of meaning will not see these as
the same. But with Aristotle surface structure is not always
a clear indication of his intended meaning -- the fact that
he has two different expressions for LE-premises is good
evidence of that. If all LE-premises do have the same
meaning, then whatever their surface structure
,
we should be
able to represent their meaning in a single formula. Since,
for Aristotle, both 'A belongs of necessity to no B’ and 'it
is not possible for A to belong to any B' do have the same
meaning, that meaning must be (Le2) ~3x ( Bx&MAx )
.
~3x ( Bx&MAx ) doesn't, on the face of it, look like a
necessary premise at all. But ~3x(Bx&MAx) is equivalent to
Vx(Bx-*L~Ax) which is, perhaps, a more intuitive way of
representing an LE-premise. I'll use this form from now on,
and I'll call it (Le2). The order of the tilde and the L is
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cruri a 1 in fi the formulatilon * To see why, compare ( Le2 ) and (Le)
(Le2) Vx (Bx->L~Ax) [=
~3x ( Bx&MAx ) ] ,(Le) '7x(Bx->~LAx) [=
~3x ( Bx&LAx ) ] .
The latter is the same as (Le), the account considered
earlier and since rejected. Using universal quantifiers
makes the difference between the two interpretations easily
apparent as a difference in the ordering of the modal
operator and the negation. If (Le2) is right, then, for
example, it is not possible for four-legged to belong to
any man means every man is by necessity not four-legged';
it doesn't mean every man is not necessarily four- legged.
'
Whatever the disadvantages of (Le), the conversion
based on it (LE**) does get all the right conclusions in the
syllogisms. Using universal quantifiers (LE**) is just:
(LE**) Vx(Bx->~LAx) -4 Vx(Ax-»~LBx)
.
(LE**) presents a problem insofar as LE-premises can't be
uniformly represented as Vx ( Bx->~LAx ) . What remains to be
seen is whether by representing LE-premises uniformly now as
(Le2) Vx(Bx-*L~Ax) we then forfeit the tidiness of
the conversion.
One important point that (LE**) makes clear is that
getting the syllogisms to work does require a conversion
that swaps the modal qualifier from one term to another.
Taking that as a cue, let's try stating conversion now as:
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( LE ) Vx(Bx->L~Ax) -> Vx ( Ax->L~Bx ) .
Again, we have an invalid principle, but one that does take
the L off the original predicate and puts it on the
converted predicate. But the real test involves putting (LE)
to work in the syllogisms themselves.
Consider again Cesare LXL
,
this time with LE-premises
wj- the form x ( Bx^L Ax), and with (LE) as our conversion:
(On the right I (loosely) quote Aristotle's discussion.)
Cesare LXL (30b9-13):
Vx( Bx->L ~Ax
)
let it not be
to any B
possible for A to belong
Vx ( Cx->Ax j let A merely belong to n
Vx(Ax->L~
> neither is it
to any A
rvr\ n n i r\ for B to belong
Vx ( Cx-*Ax ) but A belongs to every C, consequently
Vx ( Cx->L~ Pv \ it is not poss
antr Puu
ible for B to belong to
This seems a good fit. Of course, the valiidity of the
syllogism can * + K r\KJ established in this way because this
conversion is invalid. In fact, as it's represented here, in
modal LPC, this syllogism is not valid. If we allow the
invalid conversion, this analysis does in fact illustrate
that the second- f igure Cesare reduces to the
first-figure Celarent. 8
8Specif ically, Cesare LXL reduces to Celarent LXL which
is also valid according to Aristotle, (30al7-23). Celarent
LXL, on this analysis, is
Vx(Ax-»L~Bx)
Vx ( Cx-»Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
73
Cesare LXL is only one of six syllogisms requiring
LE-conversion. (LE) fits nicely in each of the others also
in Cesare LLL, Camestres XLL and LLL
,
and Festino LXL and
LLL. Table 6 shows what happens when we take an LE-premise
to be Cx ( Bx->L Ax) and LE-conversion to be
Vx(Bx->L~Ax) -> Vx(Ax->L~Bx)
.
Table 6
LE-Conversion as Vx(Bx->L~Ax) Vx(Ax->L~Bx)
Cesare LLL Cesare LXL
Vx( Bx-»L~Ax
)
Vx ( Bx-*L~Ax
)
Vx(Cx->LAx) Vx ( Cx-»Ax
)
Vx( Ax-*L~Bx) Vx ( Ax-»L~Bx
Vx ( Cx->LAx
)
Vx ( Cx->Ax
Vx ( Cx->L~Bx Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
Camestres LLL Camestres XLL
Vx ( Bx-»LAx Vx(Bx->Ax
Vx(Cx-»L~Ax) Vx(Cx->L~Ax)
Vx ( Ax-»L~Cx ) Vx(Ax^L~Cx)
Vx ( Bx->LAx Vx ( Bx-»Ax
Vx(Bx->L~Cx) Vx ( Bxh>L ~Cx
Vx( Cx->L~Bx \/ir ( T ~ \v a.
v,
' JLJ J-Jsl )
T7nci +- -inn T T T
JL OO Li-UU jjuLj Festino LXL
Vx(Bx->L~Ax) Vx ( Bx->L~Ax
3x ( Cx&LAx 3x( Cx&Ax
Vx ( Ax->L ~Bx ) Vx ( Ax->L ~Bx )
3x ( Cx&LAx 3x ( Cx&Ax
3x ( Cx&L ~Bx
)
3x(Cx&L~Bx)
This may be something of an improvement, but, again,
each of these 'proofs' comes out invalid. They all depend
upon a conversion which is not valid. In his modal
syllogistic Aristotle obviously counts LE-conversion as
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valid. It seems from this that any de re analysis of
LE-premises and LE-conversion comes out invalid. That
doesn't mean that a de re analysis is wrong. Consider what
the de dicto analysis of Cesare LXL would have to be:
L~3x(Bx&Ax)
Vx ( Cx-»Ax
)
L~3x ( Cx&Bx )
.
That's no improvement since that's not valid either. So if
we do accept (LE) as the right representation of Aristotle,
we're left with a puzzle. Why might Aristotle think
LE-conversion is valid? Answering this question is the
subject of Chapter 5.
4 . 3 Complaints Against De Re
Not all of the complaints against a de re analysis
focus on the question of validity. In The Development of
Logic [1961], William and Martha Kneale charge that a de re
interpretation is 'clearly wrong’ for an entirely
different reason:
If modal words modify predicates, there is no need
for a special theory of modal syllogisms. For
there are only ordinary assertoric syllogisms of
which the premises have peculiar predicates.
[Kneale and Kneale, 1961, p.91]
That isn't all the Kneales think is wrong with a de re
analysis -- they also think that Aristotle's conversion
principles do require not de re, but de dicto modality, and
75
hence, that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is
incoherent [1961, p . 91 ]
.
This chapter and the preceeding ones illustrate how a
de re analysis can give a plausible account of conversion. I
want to address the Kneales
' other concern now, about the
effect of modal words modifying predicates. The point of
their criticism here is that a de re analysis makes the
modal syllogistic trivial since all the modal syllogisms are
then just peculiar' variations of the non-modal syllogisms.
There is, however, good reason to believe that Aristotle
would not regard this as a serious criticism of his modal
logic. Consider again his remarks at 29b36-30a3:
In the case of necessary premises, then, the
situation is almost the same as with premises of
belonging: that is, there either will or will not
be a deduction with the terms put in the same way,
both in the case of belonging and in the case of
belonging or not belonging of necessity, except
that they will differ in the addition of
belonging (or not belonging) of necessity' to
the terms ....
There is no indication here that Aristotle regards this as
trivializing the modal syllogistic. We might even take
Aristotle to mean by this that a modal syllogistic that
didn't fall right out of the non-modal would be trivial. If
that is the case then the Kneales 1 complaint very definitely
misses the mark.
Aristotle's comments at 29b36-30a3, above, make clear
that necessary syllogisms differ from assertoric syllogisms
76
in the addition of belonging (or not belonging) of
necessity' to the terms." Scholars eager to show that a de
re analysis is right for Aristotle's syllogistic have clung
tight to this particular passage, pointing to it as good
evidence that de re is really what Aristotle means. But the
evidence presented in this chapter shows that we cannot take
this remark to mean that all necessary premises are gotten
simply by uniformly substituting LA for A in non-modal
premises. In the cases of A- and I-conversion, uniform
substitution of LA for A does preserve validity. So the
valid de re analysis might well be right there. But as
Chapters 2 and 3 show, the evidence in the cases of LA- and
Ll-conversion is not decisive since the valid forms of these
conversions are not the only interpretations that get the
syllogisms to work; we can also give invalid de re
interpretations of LA- and Ll-conversion that are not gotten
by uniform substitution but that work very nicely.
LE-premises, however, are different. Sometimes 'when
Aristotle describes a universal privative necessary (LE)
premise, he isn't simply adding 'necessary' to the terms;
instead, he often expresses an LE-premise as a denial of
possibility -- as, for example, 'it is not possible for A to
belong to any B.' We cannot get this by substituting LA for
A in a non-modal E-premise ~=lx(Bx&Ax); we can get it by
substituting MA for A here, but, then, by substituting that
way, we are not at all doing what Aristotle describes at
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39b35 30a3, above. The other of Aristotle's LE-expressions
,
A belongs of necessity to no B,
' does look like 'of
necessity' is simply added to the terms, but since Aristotle
takes this expression to be equivalent to 'it is not
possible for A to belong to any B,
’ it too must mean
Jx ( Bx&MAx ) and not Jx(Bx&LAx). Substituting LA for A in a
non-modal E-premise would get us ~3x ( Bx&LAx ) , or
equivalently Vx ( Bx->~ LAx ) , and this I have shown is plainly
not what Aristotle means by an LE-premise.
Of course, there is always McCall's answer. We can
avoid all this messy trouble by representing an LE-premise
as LEba ' and then LE-conversion as LEba->LEab. This way
validity of the conversion isn't a problem. McCall is able
to get Cesare LXL, Carnes tres XLL, anH C1 r\C’4” -inn T YT 4-rv• J J. O C. -L. J. X 1 WO]
But McCall doesn't provide a semantics for his propositions
and so it is difficult to evaluate his response.
There are scholars who do try to tell what his
propositions must mean. Fred Johnson and S.K. Thomason, in
particular, each offer a semantics for McCall's system. In
Chapter 5, I look closely at Thomason's semantics to see
D
' no+- t.tV'* -n 4- lr -i n rl r\-f —i V>r» rri ttac for ]VT r'* f'1 1 1 1 oUO L VV11U L J\ J.11U W _1_ XilLCi.^/lCLULX«Jli ilC Vj ± V CO i UI ± O
unanalysed propositions.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ARISTOTELICITY
' OF THOMASON'S SEMANTICS
5 . 1 A Semantics for McCall
Some people prefer McCall's approach to Aristotle's
modal syllogistic because its success does not hinge on the
question of how to interpret the modal premises, and as
these people like to point out, the question of de dicto
versus de re modals isn't one that directly concerns
Aristotle. If we follow McCall we can forget about whether
to interpret necessity de dicto or de re; instead, we can do
things purely axiomatical ly and get the same results as
Aristotle. While that might seem a good move, it doesn't
really go any way towards explaining what exactly Aristotle
is doing. This is because McCall doesn't give a semantics
for his system; in other words, he offers a way to represent
Aristotle's logic, but not an interpretation of it. For this
reason there is just as much a question about what McCall is
doing as there is about what Aristotle is doing, and so the
question in the last chapter about how to interpret an
LE-premise is still open. It would be interesting, then, to
see what would happen if we had a semantics for McCall.
Two logicians have taken McCall's system and given us
just that. Fred Johnson [1989] is the first. Steven
Thomason's original article [1993] is an attempt to improve
upon Johnson's semantics. When we look closely at what
Johnson and Thomason offer we see that we can indeed give de
re LPC translations for the syllogistic even as McCall sets
it out. Given the results in Chapters 2-4, that might not be
surprising. What is surprising, however, are some of the
basic assumptions that their semantics require, and these
warrant some careful attention. In what follows I will take
Thomason's semantics as my example.
In two recent articles [1993 and forthcoming], S.K.
Thomason develops a semantics for Storrs McCall's [1963]
representation of Aristotle's apodeictic syllogistic.
Thomason's work is largely an attempt to improve upon the
pioneering work of Johnson [1989], Thomason is inclined to
think of Johnson's models as 'contrived' in that they are
explicitly defined in terms of certain of McCall's axioms
(Axioms 6-9 in Table 7, below). In Thomason [1993], Thomason
attempts to provide a semantics in which those axioms fall
out, without having to explicitly stipulate that the
interpretations satisfy them. In a forthcoming article
Thomason extends those results, offering a more 'intuitive'
explanation for them. In both of his articles, Thomason
takes McCall's work as his base, and so the semantics he
gives is specifically a semantics for McCall's L-X-M system.
That this in turn makes it a good semantics for Aristotle's
system depends on how well McCall represents Aristotle. In
this chapter I try to consider Thomason's semantics in terms
of Aristotle's texts, showing how ways we might read them do
make the semantics plausible.
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I set out the basics of Thomason's semantics as he
gives them in pages 113-116 of Thomason [1993], initially
making only a few notational modifications. Ultimately, it
will help to give modal LPOtranslations of
Thomason's formulas.
McCall's system L-X-M (with inessential
modifications.
.
. ) is as follows. The language
consists of terms (x,y, ... will be used as
meta-var iables ranging over terms), atoms
Axy ( "all x are y"
)
Ixy ("some x are y"
)
Aky ("necessarily all x are y" )
E'ky ("necessarily all x are non- y"
)
Iky ("necessarily some x are y"
)
O'ky ("necessarily some x are non- y"
)
and formulas i
,
a where a is an atom, and a-»B
where a and 13 are formulas.
The axioms of L-X-M are the tautologies of
propositional logic (with atoms, of course, in
place of the propositional letters) together with
all formulas of the forms A1-A14 of Table [7]...
and the only rule of inference is modus ponens.
The formulas A1-A14 of Table 7 are exactly the axioms of
McCall's system L-X-M.
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Table 7
McCall's Axioms
A1
. Axx <1>
A2
. Ilxx <1>
A3. Ayz-»Axy-»Axz (Barbara XXX) <1>
A4 . Ayz>Iyxn>Ixz (Datisi XXX) <1>
A5 . A 1 'yz->AxyH>Auxz (Barbara LXL) <1>
A6 . E' zy->Axy=>E tJxz (Cesare LXL) <3>
A 7 . A 1 'yz->Ixy->I IJxz (Darii LXL) <2>
A8 . E lJyz-»Ixy-40uxz (Ferio LXL) <2>
A9
. A zy->0' lxy^Ouxz (Baroco LLL
)
<3>
A10 . 0 1 Vz-^A 1 Vx-^O^xz (Bocardo LLL) <1>
All
.
r
j
xy->I 1Jyx ( Ll-conversion
)
<1>
A12 . A"xy-*Axy ( A- subordination
)
<1>
A13 . I IJxy->Ixy ( I-subordinat ion <1>
A14. 0"xy-»0xy ( 0- subordination <1>
Thomason [1993] actually gives three semantics,
increasing the strength from the first to the second to the
third. The first semantics validates only a portion of
McCall's system, the second validates more, and the third
gets the whole of McCall's system. <1>, <2>, and <3> in the
right-hand column of Table 7 correspond to the different
semantic frameworks, indicating the stage at which each of
the axioms above comes into play.
5 . 2 The First Semantics
At the heart of Thomason's semantics are various
functions that assign extensions to the terms. Those
functions are, in Thomason's notation, Ext, Ext*, and Ext ,
which when applied to a term x pick out the sets of things
that are x, necessar i ly-x , and necessarily-not-x,
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respectively. For reasons that become clear later Thomason
imposes certain conditions on the relations between these
various extensions. Let 4> denote the empty set. The
conditions on the first semantics are
(a) 4> * Ext* ( x ) c Ext ( x ) , and
(b) Ext (x) n Ext ( x ) = 4).
A model
l of the first semantics consists of a set of
individuals, W, together with functions Ext, Ext +
,
and Ext",
subject to conditions (a) and (b) . A valuation is a function
V from formulas to (T,F) satisfying the following
(c) V(±) = F
,
(d) V(a->B) = T iff V(a) = F or F(/3) = T.
If M = (W, Ext, Ext +
,
Ext") is a modeli then VM is
the valuation satisfying:
VM(Axy) = T
VM(Ixy) = T
VTyi(A"xy) = T
VM(E"xy) = T
VM(l"xy) = T
VM (
0
M
xy ) = T
iff Ext(x)
iff Ext(x)
iff Ext(x)
iff Ext(x)
iff Ext + (x)
iff Ext* ( x )
c Ext(y)
D Ext(y) * b
£ Ext*(y)
£ Ext (y)
fl Ext + (y) ^ 4>
fl Ext (y) ^ 4>.
These semantic conditions can easily be expressed as rules
for translation into modal-LPC as follows, using A, B, and C
instead of Thomason's x, y, z, and reserving x, y, z for
(bound) individual variables:
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semantics
Axy
Ixy
A"xy
E"xy
I"xy
0"xy
Vx( Bx->Ax
)
lx ( Bx&Ax
Vx ( Bx-»LAx
)
Vx ( Bx->L~Ax
)
3x ( LBx&LAx
3x( LBx&L'Ax) 1
As my aim here is to see whether Thomason's
is a good interpretation of Aristotle, I want to pay close
attention to the specific conditions Thomason imposes.
Condition (b) is straightforward and uncontroversial
. But,
as it stands, condition (a)
<J>
* Ext + (x) c Ext(x), might
occasion some controversy. Only part of (a) is suspect --
the part that says the set of things that are necessari ly-x
is not empty, Ext*(x) *
<J> . I will call this condition
Strong Existential Import': if ordinary existential import
tells us that whatever A may be 3xAx is true, then strong
existential import tells us that given ordinary existential
import ixLAx is true. Thomason's semantics explicitly
requires that strong existential import hold, and his work
shows it is needed to get the logic to work. It is not
J In this translation method, LA simply denotes the
necessary A's. Of course, in ordinary modal logic L is a
sentential operator whose semantics is typically given in
terms of possible worlds: if L<|) is true, then 4> is true in
all accessible worlds. This way of putting it sounds grossly
unAristotelian, and for this reason many scholars eschew L's
and M's. But we needn't do this. The possible worlds
semantics certainly gives the right analysis and much more,
but the 'much more' isn't relevant to Aristotle's modal
logic. His logic concerns a language in which modal
operators have scope only over simple terms, never over
complexes, and so it can be given an analysis in terms of
the extension of terms for necessary-A ' s and necessary-not-
A' s.
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clear, however, that it is a condition Aristotle uses. In
fact, there is a very real question about whether the
motivation for Strong El is at all Aristotelian, or even
compatible with Aristotle's discussions of modals. In the
rest of this section I want to consider how we might try to
justify Strong El with Aristotle.
Here is one way we might take him. Among the things in
Aristotle's metaphysics there are substances and their
accidents. When we say Socrates is a man' we predicate
essentially because being a man is part of Socrates'
essence. When we say 'Socrates is white' we predicate
accidentally. The predication in this case is accidental
because being white isn't involved in what it is to be
Socrates, it's accidental to him. In the Categories
,
Aristotle explains that for a subject to be white is for it
to have a whiteness in it, (la28-29). Matthews and Cohen
[1968] suggest a way of understanding this. They explain why
when Aristotle talks about the whiteness in Socrates we
should understand him to be talking about a particular
whiteness that is in Socrates. This particular whiteness is
not the same whiteness as, say, the particular whiteness
that's in Callias. If we can call this whiteness white, and
Aristotle seems to talk as though we can, then it's part of
its essential nature to be white. Then Callias is only
accidentally white because something in him (his whiteness)
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is essentially white. So if anything is white at all then
something is essentially white, and this is just
Strong Existential Import.
5 . 3 The Second Semantics
Even allowing the assumption of Strong El, Thomason's
first semantics still leaves the validity of Darii LXL and
Ferio LXL, as well as Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL, unaccounted
for. These are exactly the Axioms 6-9 (Table 7) that
Johnson's interpretations are explicitly required to
satisfy. In order to validate Darii LXL and Ferio LXL,
Thomason introduces a new condition on his second semantics.
(Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL fall under the third semantics
which I look at in section 5 of this chapter.)
Thomason defines a model 2 as a modelj that satifies the
additional condition
(1) Ext(x)flExt(y) ^ Ext(x)DExt + (y) * <J>.
Thomason takes this to mean:
(WP) If something satisfies both of two
predicates then something both satisfies
the first and necessarily satisfies the
second. [Thomason, 1993, p.112]
(WP) is a weird principle to attribute to Aristotle. I will
show why. This new condition, expressed in modal LPC, is
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(la) Ix(BxStAx) -> 3x ( Bx&LAx ) . 2
As it stands, (la) is, very plainly, invalid. It would allow
the move, for example, from
(2) 'some man is white'
(which Aristotle says is true) to
(3) 'some man is necessarily white'
(which he repeatedly tells us is false). If (WP) allows the
move from (2) to (3) then we had better not attribute it to
Aristotle since he would most certainly count that move as
invalid. But (1) does get the logic to work, and for this
reason it is worth asking whether there is anything that
could be said for it as an interpretation of Aristotle. Any
reasonable answer will need to block the move from
(2) to (3).
Thomason, at any rate, is aware that his condition (1)
is not an obvious Aristotelian doctrine. He offers a
possible explanation:
2Strong existential import falls right out of this
condition, since
(*) 3x(Ax&Ax) -» lx(Ax&LAx)
is an instance of (la), and
(*
*) implies IxLAx.
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Someone who believes that predicates are, by their
nature, necessarily non-vacuous, might wellbelieve also that they interact in such a way that
when they intersect they intersect necessarily (in
the weak sense that each will be satisfied by
oomething that satisfies the other necessarily).
[Thomason, 1993, p. 120]
Thomason is careful not to actually attribute this notion to
m.ioLOtle; he just offers this as one way of accounting for
the system McCall gives. We might try to justify Thomason's
condition by appeal to Aristotle's talk in Posterior
Analytics A22 about 'genuine predication.' Aristotle there
explains that the white thing is a log' is not an example
of genuine predication. The reason is that 'white'
identifies a subject indirectly, or accidentally. Genuine
predication doesn't allow picking out a subject in this way.
If identifying the subject by a non-substantial term makes
the predication not genuine, then only when we predicate
something of a subject which is identified by a substance
term do we predicate genuinely. For anything to be a
substance is already for it to be essentially what it is. In
this sense we might take 'man' as equivalent to
' necessary=man ’ since anything that is a man is so
essentially. Horse would be equivalent to necessary-horse,
and so on. This gives us a way around the invalid move above
from (2) 'some man is white' to (3) 'some man is necessarily
white'; instead, we would get validly from (2) 'some man is
white* to (4) 'something that’s a necessary-man is white.’
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Since that is not invalid, it seems a better way to go. But
that would mean that Thomason's condition (1) cannot be
quite so general a condition as he makes it out to be.
Instead, we might try restricting it to the valid principle
(lb) 3x (Bx&Ax) -> 3x ( LBx&Ax ) , where B
identifies the subject term of the
predication and the predication is
genuine
.
3
It would be good to see what effect the restriction to
(lb) might have on a particular syllogism. Darii LXL (A7, in
Table 7) is part of McCall's axiom system. Thomason
interprets an Ll-premise as 3x(LBx&LAx). Darii LXL has an
Ll-conclusion, so Thomason's interpretation of Darii LXL is
Vx ( Bx->LAx
)
dx ( Cx&Bx
)
3x ( LCx&LAx )
.
What's involved in getting the logic to work out right?
First, consider the minor premise in Darii above --
x ( Cx&Bx ) . Assuming now that all premises are examples of
genuine predication, then since C is the subject term, we
can legitimately apply (lb) to the minor premise to get
Ix(LCxScBx). Now we have:
30ne might consi de r a further restriction which takes
all terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to be substances.
But then there will be no difference between Barbara XLL and
Barbara LLL. And for Aristotle the first is invalid, the
second valid.
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Vx(Bx->LAx)
-ix( LCx&Bx )
3x ( LCx&LAx
)
and, so, simple transitivity gets the conclusion Thomason's
interpretation requires. Thomason's version of Ferio LXL may
also be derived from (lb).
The restrictions required in (lb) do not pose
insurmountable problems for Thomason's second semantics. In
fact, if Thomason simply restricts his (1) to (lb), he
forfeits nothing other than a little extra generality. And
d^ing oO gets him a far more plausible interpretation.
Thomason might not agree that he forfeits nothing here. He
might think he must then forfeit Disamis XLL
,
because the
restriction I suggest certainly doesn't allow Disamis XLL as
McCall gives it.
5 . 4 Disamis XLL Again
McCall takes Disamis XLL to be
lea
LAcb
LIba,
and this, plainly, is invalid. A simple falsifying model has
terms brown, animal, and horse:
Some horses are brown
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily brown.
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McCall gives no explanation for the apparent invalidity of
the syllogism as he construes it. And this leaves McCall's
interpreters in the rather awkward position of needing to
explain the invalidity away.
Thomason, in the first place, takes an apodeictic
I-premise, LIba, to be doubly modal: 3x ( LBx&LAx )
.
(in a case
where B is a substance term like 'animal,' B and LB are
presumably equivalent.) So Thomason's interpretation of
Disamis XLL will be
3x ( Cx&Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->LBx
)
Hx( LBx&LAx )
,
where A is a predicate term. Here is where Thomason needs
the Weird Principle (WP) that if something satisfies each of
two predicates, then something satisfies the first predicate
and of necessity satisfies the second. So if something is
both C and A, then something is both C and LA. Consider how
this affects the proof of Disamis XLL:
(1) 3x ( Cx&Ax
)
Given
(2) 3x(Cx&LAx) (WP), 1
(3) 3x( LAx&Cx) Conversion, 2
(4) Vx ( Cx-*LBx
)
Given
(5) 3x ( LBx&LAx
)
Transitivity 3,4
The Weird Principle is needed to get this to work because in
premise (1), A is a predicate term, not a subject term. But
there is good evidence that Aristotle himself would reject
(WP). Nonetheless, the Weird Principle does seem necessary,
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since if we take Disamis XLL McCall's way, then Thomason's
Weird Principle follows. On Thomason's interpretation the
B- term in Disamis XLL is an essential B, so B and LB are
equivalent in this case. Identifying the C and B terms gives
Hx(Bx&Ax
)
Vx ( Bx-»LBx )
x ( Bx&LAx )
.
So, Ix(BxStAx) -» ^x( Bx&LAx).
But perhaps we don't want to take Disamis XLL McCall's
way. When we look at the text of the Prior Analytics
,
we
find that Aristotle's description of this syllogism is not
completely clear:
Thus, if it is necessary for B to belong to every
C and A is below C, then it is necessary for B to
belong to some A, (31bl6- 17).
In fact, from the text it appears there are two possible
responses to McCall. In the lines leading up to this, at
31bl2- 16 , Aristotle pretty clearly means to describe a
syllogism with one universal and one particular premise. But
from the text it would appear that 'A is below C' at
31bl6-17 must mean 'some A is C, ' with A as the subject
term. Following McCall, Thomason gives the AC premise as
'some C is A, 1 with C as the subject term. But, as Aristotle
sets out the AC premise at 31bl7-20, the subject-term of the
premise is A and C is really the predicate. That suggests
the syllogism at 31bl6-17 might really be
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Ix(AxStCx)
Vx ( Cx->LBx )
3x ( Bx&LAx )
,
where A is the subject term of the first premise. If we take
it that way, then Thomason doesn't need the Weird Principle
at all. He only needs the restricted version of (1) -- i. s .,
(lb) -- that says we can put an L on a term in
subject position.
Perhaps a still better move would be to say that ' A is
below C at 31bl5-17 really is a universal. The syllogism in
question would turn out to be
Vx( Ax->Cx
)
Vx ( Cx->LBx ^
lx ( LBx&LAx ) .
All Thomason needs to get that to come out right is Strong
Existential Import together with the assumption that no
terms are empty:
( 1 ) Vx ( Ax->Cx
)
( 2 ) Vx ( LAx->Ax
)
(3) Vx(Cx-^LBx)
(4) Vx(LAx->LBx)
(5) 3xLAx
(6) ix(LAx&LBx)
Given
Given
Given
Transitivity 2,3
SEI
4,5
Either of these two readings would, I think, help
Thomason. But because his interest is to give a good
semantics for McCall, Thomason simply admits Disamis XLL as
McCall gives it, and so is left needing to validate
reasoning that Aristotle himself might have rejected.
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5 • 5 The Third Semantics:
Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL remain to be validated, and
these Thomason treats in his Third Semantics. He defines a
model, as a model, that satisfies the conditions
(e) Ext ( b ) cExt“ ( a ) -* Ext(a)£Ext" (b)
(f) Ext ( b ) cExt + ( a ) -> Ext (a) cExt“(b)
.
A formula is valid
3 if it is true in all models,. Since a
model, does satify conditions (e) and (f), Thomason gets
Axioms A6 (Cesare LXL) and A9 (Baroco LLL) to come out valid
because all models 3 are carefully restricted in a way that
guarantees their validity. Consider the justification for
Cesare LXL as Aristotle gives it at 30b9-13:
(1) Vx ( Bx->L ~ Ax
)
(2) Vx ( Cx->Ax )
(3) Vx(Ax->L~Bx)
(4) Vx ( Cx-*Ax
)
(5) Vx(Cx->L~Bx
Cesare LXL does not s
let it not be possible for A to
belong to any B
let A merely belong to C
neither is it possible for B to
belong to any A
but A belongs to every C,
consequently
it is not possible for B to belong
to any C
allowed in subject position. For take A to be animal, B
white, and C man, and suppose that the only white things are
plants, which by necessity are not animals. The illegitimate
move of course is the principle that gets from (1) to (3), a
principle, perhaps, most commonly called ' LE-conversion . ' In
modal LPC this is just Vx(Bx->L~Ax) Vx ( Ax-*L~Bx ) . And this
is equivalent to condition (e) above. As Aristotle first
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states LE- conversion, at 25a29=30, and when he uses it in
Cesare LXL above, the conversion seems to be fully general
that is, it appears that (e) captures just what Aristotle
means without the need for any additional restrictions on
terms. But that is only part of the story that emerges from
the text. As Aristotle goes on to elaborate, it becomes
clear that (e) is really too general for his purposes.
Here is why.
I have already referred to Posterior Analytics 22, in
which Aristotle explains that accidents can never take the
subject position, only the predicate position. What's more,
were an accident to take subject position, then the result
for Aristotle either is not predication at all, or is
predication only by courtesy, 83al5-17. If this holds true
in the Prior Analytics as well, then any instance of (e)
involving an accidental term presents a problem since (e)
puts both the A term and the B term in subject position.
There is some evidence that Aristotle is aware in the Prior
Analytics of the difficulties this raises: In 43bl-6, he
sets out a method for selecting syllogistic premises that
would appear to rule out necessary privative premises
in general
:
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So one must select the premises about each subjectin this way, assuming first the subject itself
and both definitions and whatever is peculiar tothe subject; next after this, whatever follows the
subject; next, whatever the subject follows; andthen, whatever cannot belong (me
endechetai
. . .huparchein
)
to it. (Those to which itis not possible (me endechetai
) for the subject tobelong need not [or, perhaps, must not
4
] be
sslccted, because the privative converts
)
( 43bl-6 ) .
''
If this method applies to universal premises 6
,
then, taken
strongly, it would appear to mean that LE-conversion is
altogether irrelevant to the syllogistic. Even in its
weakest sense, it shows that in the syllogistic Aristotle
doesn t regard every instance of LE-conversion as relevant.
Following the argument in Posterior Analytics 22, one would
suppose the irrelevant LE-conversions are those that involve
some accidental term. LE-conversion, and hence, condition
(e), does work when both terms are required to be substance
predicates, as for instance when A is 'horse' and B is
man': 'all men are necessari ly-non-horses
'
goes to 'all
horses are necessari ly-non-men . ' That seems unproblematic,
4 Robin Smith (p. 151) notes the Greek is open to either
reading
.
bOne might suppose that 43bl-6 is only about particular
premises. But it seems that Aristotle means to set out a
general method for selecting syllogistic premises. In fact,
it would appear that 43b6 must be about universal premises.
This is because Aristotle has earlier explained (25a35-36)
that necessary particular privatives ( LO-premises ) do not
convert, since even non-modal O-premises do not convert in
the syllogistic. The point of 43b6 is that premises about
what is not possible do convert, so unless Aristotle is
contradicting himself, the line must refer to universals.
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especially if we think that all men are necessarily men and
all horses are necessarily horses, and that what it is to be
a horse, i.e., the nature of horse, excludes being a man,
and vice versa.
Let's turn now to Thomason's condition (f). in modal
LPC (f) becomes Vx(Bx^LAx) -> Vx ( L~Ax-»L~Bx ) . Consider an
instance of (f) in which the B term is an accident. Let A be
man and B be white: if every white is a necessary man, then
every necessary-non-man is necessarily-not-white, which
seems not to follow. But if the antecedent in this case is a
premise at all, it is only a premise by courtesy, so it
isn t clear whether in this case we can legitimately or
meaningfully convert according to (f). Thomason introduces
( -l ) in order to validate Baroco LLL. In modal LPC, his
translation of Baroco LLL will be:
Vx ( Bx-»LAx
)
Vx ( LCx&L ~Ax
)
3x ( LCx&L ~Bx )
.
This would seem to fail when A is animal, B is white, and C
is plant. One reply would be to point out that the only term
here that is not modally qualified is the B-term, and that
is a subject term. If Aristotle in the modal syllogistic
really is concerned only with predication that is genuine,
then B is already implicitly modal since it must be a
substance term. This would mean that the terms set out here
— animal, white, and plant — cannot be used to provide a
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counter-example to Baroco LLL
,
and so, presumably, it
is valid.
Maybe this cannot be the whole story. In establishing
the invalidity of Camestres LXL (30b20-40) and Baroco LXL
( 31al0-15 ) , Aristotle chooses terms which obviously allow
for premises which are not genuine. His terms in those cases
are animal, man, and white. The question for principle (f)
is why these terms should not be chosen there. I will try to
answer this in greater detail in Chapter 6. My purpose in
i_he present chapter is to see what can be said in favor of
Thomason's semantics on the basis of Aristotle's text. In
discussing these issues I have accepted Thomason's
translations and considered the extent to which the
assumptions he makes can be textually justified.
5 . 6 Thomason's Relational Semantics
In a forthcoming article 'Relational Models for the
Modal Syllogistic, 1 Thomason aims to make his semantics more
intuitive. What he does is neat, and it raises a new
question: does what makes it more intuitive also make it any
more Aristotelian in flavor? So far, in the earlier sections
of this paper I have tried to find ways of restricting
Thomason's semantic conditions in order to make them better
fit Aristotle. The relational models are based on Thomason's
(unrestricted) semantics, and so the relational account will
be likely to admit some unwanted consequences, such as the
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Weird Principle.
In his relational models, in place of Ext(x) and
Ext* ( x ) Thomason uses jxj and
j
x
n
j
. He also introduces x°
|
to denote the possible x's. | x'
|
is the complement of
Ext (x). If Ext (x) denotes the things that are necessarily
not x's — the things that couldn't be x's — then x°
|
denotes the things that could be x's -- things whose nature
doesn't rule out their being x's. Thomason takes |xn
|
to be
buoic c*nd non-empty
. He then defines jxj and x in terms
of x using two relations R and S. [x
j
is defined in such
a way that for any individual a, a £ | x j iff 3b(b £ |xa | and
bRa). The possible extension is defined similarly: for any
individual a, a £ x
: iff lb(b £ |x'| and bSa) . These can
be understood as saying, less formally, that for any
individual a to be x is for a to be R-related to an
individual b that is necessarily-x . For a to be possibly-x
is for a to be S-related to an individual b that is
necessarily-x.
Expressing this in LPC with A, B, etc., for predicates
representing terms, and x, y, etc., for individual variables
(not terms as in Thomason), then the idea is that we take as
basic for any term A the set of things which are necessarily
A. We might justify this by thinking of the necessary A's as
the things whose nature it is to be A, and all the other A's
as things which are A by some kind of association with a
necessary A. So we might say, then, that Socrates is white
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m virtue of his association with a whiteness, where this
whiteness is white by nature.
If the necessary A's determine the (actual) A's, then
prefixing an L to A is at least intuitively backwards. So
instead of LA, let A* denote those things that are A by
nature. So A* corresponds to LA except that it is not
defined by prefixing a modal operator to A. Then Thomason's
rule would be that instead of writing LAx, one would write
A*x; and instead of writing Ax one would write 3y(A*y &
yRx ) ; and instead of writing MAx one would write ~ly(A*y &
ySx). Consider Hy(A*y & yRx). Let yRx be true iff y=x or x
is in’ y -- 'in' in the sense of the Categories. Then 'x is
A' would be true iff either x is A by nature or there is in
x a y that is A by nature.
In order to get all of McCall's syllogisms, Thomason
imposes certain restrictions on the relational models:
(g) |xn | * <t>
guarantees that there are some necessary x's. That is.
Strong Existential Import still holds. With A* for LA, it
becomes ^xA*x.
(h) R is an equivalence relation.
This validates the 'dubious' inference from ^x(Bx&Ax) to
Ix(BxScLAx) -- that is, it validates (WP) -- as follows:
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Suppose Hx ( Bx&Ax ) . Then, in terms of Thomason's translation,
this means that 3x(3y(B*y&yRX ) & 3z ( A*z&zRx ) ) . That is, for
some x, y, z, we have (B*y & yRx & a*z & zRx). But R is an
equivalence relation, so since (yRx & zRx), then yRz, and so
B*y & yRz & A*z for that same y and z; that is,
lz( ly ( B*y&yRz ) & A*z). So, with x for z, we have
ix ( iy(B*y&yRx) & A*x), and this is just Thomason's
relational interpretation of 3x (Bx&LAx).
If R is an equivalence relation then it's difficult to
give an Aristotelian justification -- in fact, the symmetry
requirement on R introduces problems here. Suppose that
Socrates is white by virtue of the fact that he stands in
relation R to something (his whiteness) that's essentially
white. Then by symmetry his whiteness is R- associated with
Socrates and so his whiteness is human -- since it is
R-associated with something essentially human, namely
Socrates. So there is something (Socrates' whiteness) which
is accidentally human and is essentially white. This is an
odd justification for the principle. But again, the
principle at issue here is the Weird Principle, 3x(Bx&Ax) -4
lx ( Bx&LAx ) , and that, as we have seen, is something Thomason
may not need.
If R is the relation between a substance and an
accident that holds when the substance has the accident in
it, then S is the relation between a substance and an
accident if the accident is the kind of thing the substance
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could have in it. According to the relational semantics, it
will be true that some man is possibly white' if some man
IS associated by S with an essential white (a whiteness).
But Thomason wants to make the S-relation symmetrical. This
would have the whiteness S-associated with the man.
Following Thomason's translations, then, some whiteness
would be a possible man. The plausibility of this depends
upon what, if anything, Aristotle would count as a possible
man; and it is not at all obvious that a whiteness would
count. Again, the symmetry reguirement gets
unintuitive results.
One of the neat things about Thomason's R and S
relations is the way they link with Aristotle's account of
predication in the Categories
.
But Thomason wants both R and
S to be symmetrical relations, and in each case that gets
him into trouble. There's no reason to think that these
relations should be symmetrical. In the case of R, this is
easy to see if we take R to be the converse of the
' in ' -relation in the Categories . in the Categories the truth
of 'Socrates is white' is explained by the fact that he has
'in' him something that is essentially white. That is to
say, something that is essentially white stands in relation
R to him. But the " in ' -relation for Aristotle is a relation
of ontological dependence, and if that were symmetrical then
Socrates (a primary substance) would have to be in a
subject. Aristotle is very explicit that no substance will
ever be that: That it never is present in a subject holds
good of all substance whatever,' Categories, 3a7.
In developing a semantics for McCall, Thomason answers
many of the important interpretive questions McCall leaves
open. For the few respects in which Thomason's results sound
unAr istotel ian, I suggest ways we might try to make his
semantics better fit Aristotle. The Categories suggests a
plausible justification for the Strong Existential Import
that Thomason's semantics requires. Several others of
Thomason's conditions are so general that they admit
flagrantly invalid readings. In all but one of these cases,
^®st j_ i ct ing premises to what Aristotle calls genuine
predication gives a way of blocking the unintended readings
and validating Thomason's conditions. In order to validate
Disamis XLL as McCall represents it, Thomason introduces
what I have called a Weird Principle. But McCall's account
of Disamis XLL is, I think, not obviously right. Finally, in
his Relational Semantics, Thomason gives a clear,
intuitively plausible account of Aristotelian statements of
necessity and possibility. But the symmetry of the relations
he uses is too strong.
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CHAPTER 6
THE APODEICTIC INVALIDS
6 • 1 Restrictions on Terms
In Chapter 5, I mentioned several issues that arise
from trying to fit Thomason's semantics to Aristotle's text.
In this Chapter I want to try to answer a puzzle posed in
Section 5 of Chapter 5. The puzzle goes like this. It seems
that Baroco LLL cannot be shown to be invalid by selecting
animal,
' white,
' and 'plant' as our terms A, B, and C.
Baroco LLL on Thomason's interpretation is
Vx(Bx->LAx)
dx ( LCx&L~Ax
)
lx( LCx&L ~Bx ) .
Thomason, himself, doesn't impose any restrictions on terms
in the syllogistic. And so it would seem that animal, white,
and plant are suitable terms. We then get:
All white things are necessary animals
Some (necessary) plant is necessari lv-not an animal
Some (necessary) plant is necessari ly-not white.
It isn't at all clear what to say about this. Is it really
valid? Is it really an instance of Baroco LLL? Following
Thomason's semantics and placing no restrictions on terms,
this would appear to be an instance of Baroco LLL. But even
assuming the premises are true, it isn't obvious that the
conclusion need be true also. If we count white as an
accidental property of plants, then it might well be that no
plant is by necessity not white, since any plant may be or
become white.
Aristotle doesn't have much to say about why he counts
Baroco LLL as valid. He deals with the LLL syllogisms very
briefly in Chapter A8 of the Prior Analytics
. And his
comments there provide little insight about what he might
say about the argument above. But one thing we can be
certain about is that, for Aristotle, there can be no
invalid instance of Baroco LLL if Baroco LLL is a valid
syllogistic form. So if the premises are true and the
conclusion false, then either that's proof that Baroco LLL
is not valid -- even though Aristotle says it is -- or the
argument above -- with terms animal, white, and plant —
isn't an instance of Baroco LLL.
This latter, I think, is the only reasonable answer.
But then we want to know why these terms are not
appropriate. In Chapter 5, looking at Thomason's semantics,
I suggested the inappropriateness of these terms has to do
with the fact that white' is an accidental property and,
so, cannot be a proper subject of an L-premise. I explained
why Aristotle might think that L-premises, or necessary
predication, must always be predication about subjects in
the category of substances. If that is right, then the
matter of terms for Baroco LLL is then easy to answer.
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Because Baroco LLL has all L-premises, the subject of each
premise must be a substance term, and so 'white' cannot be
chosen as the subject of the first premise here.
If that's all we need then mightn't we just restrict
terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to substance terms and
then avoid the problem of accidental subjects altogether?
This is the way Patterson [1995] reads Jeroen van Rijen
[1989]. 1 If we restrict all terms in the apodeictic
syllogistic to substance terms then any term <j, can just as
well be given as L<t> . An LA=premise 'All B's are necessary
A o then becomes Vx ( LBx->LAx ) . So far so good. This analysis
fits nicely with some of the restrictions I suggested in
Chapter 5. But there is an important difference. Restricting
all terms in the apodecitic syllogistic to substance terms
has the effect of blurring any distinction between the LLL
syllogisms and the mixed modal LXL and XLL syllogisms. Also,
if the restriction is right, then there will be no real
difference between the assertoric and apodeictic syllogisms
either -- the apodeictic will be just the restricted case of
the assertoric when the terms are all substance terms. There
is another major problem: if all terms in the apodeictic
syllogistic are necessary, then there is no difference
between Barbara LLL and Barbara XLL. Aristotle, however,
‘I think Patterson has misunderstood van Rijen. In
fact, some remarks at the end of van Rijen' s book [1989, p.
208] point in the direction of the account I develop in this
chapter
.
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does describe a difference; he says the first is valid, the
second invalid. Patterson [1995] discusses these and other
disadvantages that come of making all terms substance terms.
Patterson is right about the consequences, though it is not
clear that he's altogether right about attributing this
restriction and its troubling consequences to van Rijen.
At the moment, I want to look at yet another problem
that comes of requiring all terms in the apodeictic
syllogistic to be substance terms. The problem is simple:
this requirement does not fit well with Aristotle's own
examples using terms. Van Rijen prefers not to lay much
weight on Aristotle's use of terms and argues that the
striking carelessness of [Aristotle's use of terms]
witnesses the relative unimportance of this part of the
theory's systematics" [van Rijen, 1989, p. 201]. On van
Rijen
' s view, "the only part of apodeictic syllogistics that
can safely be taken to represent [Aristotle's] clear
inuitions [is] the inference base of his system" [1989, p.
201] . It seems to me that it may be a little hasty to ignore
the text to such an extent, since all sorts of interesting
things emerge when we look at Aristotle's own examples. One
of them bears immediately on the question now at hand about
why we can't take all terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to
be substance terms: when we survey the text we see that
Aristotle without fail includes an accident among the terms
for apodeictics. We have already seen some examples of this;
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for instance in Section 5 of Chapter 5, we looked at the
terms Aristotle chooses to show that Camestres LXL and
Baroco LXL are invalid. The terms for each are animal, man,
and white. The fact that Aristotle uses accidents to
illustrate invalidity shows that accidents are a part of the
apodeictic syllogistic. And, so, for this reason too, the
restriction that all terms be substance terms is too strong.
This restriction is too strong to apply across the
board to apodeictic syllogisms since these include the mixed
apodeictic LXL and XLL syllogisms as well as pure LLL
apodeictics. But if we do distinguish between mixed and pure
apodeictics, then there is a place for a restriction to
substance terms. It applies to the pure LLL's. In fact, it
is then just another way of saying, as we did in Chapter 5,
that necessary predication must be genuine predication since
necessary predication must always be about substance-
subjects. On the other hand, if accidents are allowed as
terms in the mixed apodeictics, then perhaps it's the fact
that these are mixed -- the fact that they include an
X-premise -- that makes the accidental terms appropriate
to them.
The way to get clear about this is to look closely at
what Aristotle has to say about terms, how he uses them, and
what exactly they are supposed to show. Aristotle generally
doesn't give terms for the valid syllogisms, so my focus
will be the invalids. Aristotle's method of establishing
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invalidity typically involves setting out counter-examples.
These counter-examples are always given as triples of terms
which, when put into the appropriate form, make the premises
true and the conclusion false. In this chapter I want to
look at those structures Aristotle counts as invalid with an
aim to see whether the counter-examples he offers obey the
restrictions that I have just suggested.
I should explain that these invalid structures aren't
strictly syllogisms' since Aristotle reserves the name
syllogism' only for the valid cases. But the invalid moods
play a very important role in the 'syllogistic' as a whole.
From them we know which structures Aristotle rejects. But
also through his counter-examples, we find some hints about
why precisely he does reject them, hints about what makes
them invalid. For these reasons, the invalids must be
counted as part of the syllogistic, even if they aren't
strictly syllogisms. And, so, any attempt to model the
syllogistic must, of course, get the right results in the
invalid cases as well as the valid ones. Also, a good
account will need to accomodate and make sense of
Aristotle's counter-examples.
Not everyone will agree with this last remark. Van
Rijen plainly does not agree. Aristotle's technique of
setting out counter-examples has long irked scholars. It has
particularly bothered those scholars who regard logic --
Aristotle's included -- as purely formal.
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Lukasiewicz [1957, p. 72] and Ross [1957, pp. 28-29] are
among the unhappy formalists. Ross gives a lengthy and
passionate explanation of his dissatisfaction with
Aristotle's method:
...it is not a completely satisfactory way ofproving the invalidity of invalid combinations;tor instead of appealing to their form as the
source of their invalidity, he appeals to our
supposed knowledge of certain particular
propositions in each case. Whereas in dealing withthe valid moods he works consistently with ABC forthe first figure, MNX for the second, PRS for thethird, and, by taking propositional functionsdenoted by pairs of letters, not actual
propositions about particular things, makes itplain that validity depends upon form, and thusbecomes the originator of formal logic, hediscovers the invalidity of the invalid moods
simply by trial and error. [Ross, 1957, pp . 28-29]
At the heart of Ross' complaint are some very basic
ideas about the nature of logic. Ross adheres to a
traditional view according to which Aristotle's logic, like
all logic, is formal. Taking the syllogistic to be anything
less than purely formal has seemed to many scholars to
suggest that Aristotle's accomplishment is of lesser value.
Since to introduce terms and propositions is to introduce
extra-logical, and hence, irrelevant, information, it has
seemed to some people that Aristotle's counter-examples are
really something of an embarrassment. Only recently have
scholars begun to see the modal syllogistic as a logic of
essentialism that neatly mirrors much of Aristotle's
metaphysics and theory of predication. Even today, the
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formalists still find supporters. Corcoran [1974] is strong
advocate of the formal approach. These different
perspectives are far-reaching, affecting more than just what
we say about Aristotelian counter-examples. They affect what
exactly we take the point of the syllogistic to be in the
broadest sense. I will return to this issue in detail in
Chapter 8. At present I want to focus on the extra- logical
information the counter-examples do provide. However
dissatisfied we may be by the use of counter-examples, one
thing we can be certain about is that they provide
meaningful examples of the kinds of premises Aristotle is
concerned with in the syllogistic. So rather than take the
counter-examples to be examples of bad logic, I want to try
to take them as good examples of what good syllogistic
premises are supposed to be.
6 . 2 A4-6: Assertoric Invalids
The method of establishing invalidity by
counter-examples is not peculiar to the modal syllogistic.
It is a method Aristotle also uses in the assertoric, or
non-modal, syllogistic. The counter-examples there provide
the clearest evidence in the syllogistic of what for
Aristotle counts as a good X-premise. This makes the
assertoric invalids a good place to begin to look at what
kinds of relations between terms do not yield
Aristotelian conclusions.
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In Chapter A4, Aristotle discusses deductions in the
first figure. These are all of the form
BA
CB
CA,
where the term on the left of each premise pair is the
subject, the term on the right is the predicate. In Chapter
A5 he discusses the second figure:
BA
CA
CB
In A6
,
he describes the third figure:
CA
CB
BA.
In each figure, when Aristotle rejects a premise
combination, he shows that it does not, in itself, guarantee
any conclusion. He does this by showing that from true
premises, first, we do not get a negative conclusion and,
second, neither do we get an affirmative conclusion. So for
each rejected premise combination there are two sets of
terms -- that is, two sets of (ordered) triples of terms
<A,B,C>. Both sets make the premises true. The first set is
supposed to show that the conclusion will not always be
privative. The terms that make this clear are 'terms for
belonging,' i.e., from them an affirmative conclusion does
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follow. The second set of terms shows that the conclusion
will not always be affirmative. So, in this case, the terms
are for not belonging.
' Often Aristotle effects the
difference between belonging and not belonging by changing a
single term.
To see how all this works, consider an example. At
26a2-9
,
Aristotle wants to make clear that no conclusion
results from the first-figure combination of 'All B's are A'
and 'No C ' s are B '
:
. . .nothing necessary results in virtue of these
things being so. For it is possible for the first
extreme [the A term] to belong to all as well as
to none of the last [the C term]
. Consequently,
neither a particular nor a universal deduction
becomes necessary; and, since nothing is necessary
because of these, there will not be a deduction.
Terms for belonging are animal, man, horse; for
belonging to none, animal, man, stone.
From the first triple <animal, man, horse> we have premises
All men are animals' and No horses are men, 1 but it is
clear that we cannot have a negative (E or 0) conclusion: we
can't have either No horse is an animal' or 'Some horse is
not an animal' because all horses are animals. From
<animal, man, stone> we cannot have an A-conclusion ('All
stones are animals' is false) nor can we have an
I-conclusion (it is false that 'Some stones are animals').
So whatever form we try to give the conclusion here -- that
is, whether we try to make it an A, E, I, or 0-conclusion --
we can give terms that make the premises true and the
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so no
conclusion false. And so, no conclusion follows;
syllogism results.
T^e method is similar for the other invalid
list each of the triples in Table 8.
moods
.
Table 8
Counter Examples in the Assertoric Syllogistic
terms for belonging for not belonging line numbers,
premise types
<animal, man, horse>
<science, line, medicine>
<good, condition, wisdom>
<white, horse, swan>
<animal, man, white>
<inanimate, man, white>
<animal, white, horse>
A4: First Figure
<animal, man, stone>
<science, line, unit>
<good, condition, ignorance>
<white, horse, raven>
<animal, white, stone>
26a8-9 , A+E
26al2-13, E+E
26a31-36 , I /0+A
26a36-38 , I /0+E
26a40-b9 , A+O/E
26bl0-14, E+0
26b22-25, I+I,
0+0, I+0,0+I
A5 : Second Figure
<substance, animal, man>
<line, animal, man>
<animal, substance, raven>
<animal, substance, unit>
<black, snow, animal>
<white, swan, stone>
<white, animal, raven>
<white, animal, snow>
<white, animal, man>
<substance, animal, number>
<line, animal, stone>
<animal, white, raven>
<animal, substance, science>
<white, stone, raven>
<white, animal, swan>
<white, animal, inanimate>
27al8-20 , A+A
27a21-22 , E+E
2 7b4-6 , 0+A
27b7-8, I+E
27b9-16 , E+0
27b23-26, A+I
27b29-32,0+E
27b32-33 , I+A
27b34-40, I+I
,
0+0 , I +0 , 0+
I
<animal, horse, man>
<animal, horse, inanimate>
<animate, man, animal>
<animal, man, wild>
<animal, science, wild>
<raven, snow, white>
<animal, man, white>
A6: Third Figure
<animal, inanimate, man>
<man, horse, inanimate>
<animal, science, wild>
<animal, man, wild>
<raven, snow, white>
28a31-32 , A+E
28a33-35 , E+E
28b22— 24 , A+0
28b36-38 , I+E
28b39-29al ,0+E
29a2 , E+0
29a7-10, I+I
,
0+0 , I +0 , 0+
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I want to focus on just a few of the points we can
infer from these examples. In the first place, it is
clear that
(a) some white thing is an animal (26b22-25)(b) some man is white (27b34-40)
(c) all men are animals (26a8-9)
are all acceptable premises in the assertoric syllogistic.
This makes assertoric premises very different from the
apodeictic premises that we considered in Chapter 5, where
it seems that necessary premises must be instances of
genuine predication. On the basis of premise (a) we can see
that in an assertoric premise
(1) an accident can take subject position.
So an assertoric premise need not be an instance of genuine
predication. From (b), it is clear that
(2) an accident can take predicate position.
And, the fact that Aristotle uses (c) as an assertoric
premise shows that
(3) even genuine substantial predication
yields acceptable assertoric premises.
Up until now, when I've discussed premises like (c) 'all men
are animals, 1 my main concern has been to show how Aristotle
adds the modal qualifier 'of necessity' to give a (de re)
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L premise: all men are of necessity animals.' But in
Chapters A4-6, Aristotle only considers assertoric premises,
or X-premises. And at A4, 26a8-9, 'all men are animals' is
not modally qualified; it appears here as only an X-premise.
The evidence in Table 8 is interesting also for what it
leaves out. In his assertoric counter-examples, Aristotle
never offers a triple of terms involving more than one
accident. So statements like the white is musical' that
feature in Metaphysics Z4, are not obviously included in the
assertoric syllogistic. Later in the apodeictic syllogistic,
Aristotle does offer counter- examples involving two
accidents. This would seem to suggest that their omission
here in the assertoric syllogistic is just incidental. I
will return to this question in Section 6.4, where I look at
Aristotle's comments about Darii LXL and Ferio LXL
.
In the next several sections, I want to pay careful
attention to how accidents feature in the invalid apodeictic
premise pairs.
6 . 3 Invalid Apodeictics
In Chapter 5 I suggested taking all premises in the
apodeictic syllogistic to be instances of genuine
predication. The point of introducing this restriction was
to block the invalid readings that Thomason would otherwise
have to admit. The invalid readings arose as a result of
what I called Thomason's Weird Principle:
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(WP) If something satisfies both of two
predicates then something both satisfies
the first and necessarily satisfies the
second. [Thomason, 1993, p. 112]
In Thomason's semantics (WP) has the effect of 'upping' the
modality of syllogistic premises from apparently unqualified
assertoric premises to premises involving necessity. If we
allow this 'upping' of modality without any restrictions as
Thomason does, then we admit cases that Aristotle would
plainly count as invalid. This is because Aristotle
routinely uses unqualified premises. In the last section we
found evidence of each
(a) some white is an animal,
(b) some man is white,
(c) all men are animals,
without any modal qualifications. Consider (b) -- Thomason's
principle will take this to some man is necessarily white.'
But that, according to Aristotle, is false. So this way of
upping the modality of the premise is illegitimate. But the
result looks better if we attach the necessity to the
subject term -- then we have 'some necessary man is white.'
In Chapter 5, Section 3, I suggested that we might restrict
(WP) in a way that guards against the blatantly illegitimate
upping of modality. I explained that we might begin by
stipulating that (WP) can only attach the necessity to the
substance term of any predication, on the ground that for
anything to be a substance $ is already for it to be
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necessarily $, or L(J> . Returning to our example (b), since
man is a substance term, man and necessary man are
equivalent, and so, perhaps, 3x(Bx&Ax) can be given as
lx ( LBx&Ax ) . From (c) 'all men are animals' we would get
either 'all necessary men are animals’ or 'all men are
necessarily animals' -- each of which seems fine. Also,
’X ( LBx&LAx ) , which we considered in Chapter 5, seems fine.
If we left the matter there, then from (a) we would get
some white is necessarily an animal.' So we add a further
proviso, in order to legitimately up' the modality of an
X-premise, the predication must be genuine and (WP) can only
make explicit the L on the subject term. As we saw in
Chapter 5, this is the only version of (WP) that Thomason
needs in order to model Aristotle's logic. (He needs more to
model McCall's L-X-M system, which, I argued, turns out not
to be isomorphic with the apodeictic syllogistic.) So we
restrict (WP) to cases of genuine predication and then
replace the substance-subject term <p with the equivalent Lcp
.
This gets nice, tidy results in all the (valid) syllogisms.
But that, I think, isn't the end of the story.
The evidence from Table 8 makes clear that in the
assertoric syllogistic the genuineness of the predication is
not an issue. This is seen from the fact that (a), (b), and
(c) are all given by Aristotle as good assertoric premises.
But, also, the genuineness of premises doesn't seem to
matter in certain parts of the apodeictic syllogistic
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any
either. In order to make clear why this should make
difference at all, I want to look at what Aristotle does say
about the invalid modal moods.
Some of Aristotle's comments about invalids are
peculiar to the modal syllogistic -- in particular, are
those cases he rejects involving the combination of a
necessary premise with an assertoric premise. As we have
seen earlier, Aristotle thinks that sometimes an XL premise
pair does make a syllogism -- as for instance, Barbara LXL
in which the premise pair will always give an L — conclusion
.
But he also thinks that some XL premise pairs do not give
L- cone lus ions for instance, Barbara XLL, which he counts
as invalid. Its conclusion according to Aristotle will not
be an L-conclusion
. In Chapters A9-11 where Aristotle
investigates mixed apodeictics, he has some careful
discussions about those cases in which a conclusion follows,
but not a necessary conclusion. In the next three sections I
want to look closely at the explanations Aristotle offers
about why it is sometimes the case that an assertoric and an
apodeictic premise will not produce a necessary conclusion.
By way of explanation Aristotle typically gives terms to
illustrate that a certain conclusion might follow and not
another. His choices of terms for the mixed modal invalids
are particularly interesting, shedding some light on what
for Aristotle an L-premise really is.
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Chapter A9 covers XL premise pairs of the first figure,
A10 covers those in the second figure, and All the third
figure. I will look at these each in turn.
6 • 4 A9
:. XL Premise Pairs in the First Figure
Aristotle begins the discussion of mixed modals
explaining that
It sometimes results that the deduction becomes
necessary when only one of the premises is
necessary (not whatever premise it might be,
however, but only the premise in relation to the
major extreme), (30al5-16).
This statement is the focus of, perhaps, the most famous
controversy about the modal syllogistic -- why should he
count Barbara LXL valid, but not Barbara XLL. But
Aristotle's own explanations are not worrisome if we accept
a de re account of necessity. As he continues:
For instance, if A has been taken to belong or not
to belong of necessity to B, and B merely to
belong to C: for if the premises have been taken
in this way, then A will belong or not belong to C
of necessity. For since A belongs or does not
belong of necessity to every B and C is some of
the B's, it is evident that one or the other of
these will also apply to C of necessity,
( 30al7-23 )
.
Barbara LXL
Vx(Bx->LAx)
Vx(Cx->Bx)
Vx ( Cx->LAx
)
Celarent LXL
Vx ( Bx-»L~Ax
)
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
)
Vx( Cx->L~Ax
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But, in the first figure, if only one premise is necessary
and it is the premise in relation to the minor extreme
(i.e., the premise that contributes the subject of the
conclusion), then the conclusion will not be necessary:
However, if AB is not necessary but BC is
necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary(ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion
) , (30a23-25)
From this it seems Aristotle means that a CA conclusion
follows from the premises, but such a conclusion will not be
an L-conclusion
. If that is right, then the de re analysis
clearly fits:
Barbara XLX
Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->LBx
)
Vx ( Cx->Ax
To justify his claim, Aristotle considers what would happen
if the conclusion were an L-conclusion:
For if it is, it will result that A belongs to
some B of necessity, both through the first and
through the third figure. But this is false
(pseudos): for it is possible for B to be the sort
of thing to which it is possible for A to belong
to none of, (30a25-27).
The general idea is this:
Given
( 1 ) Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
(2) Vx(Cx-»LBx)
Assume
(3) Vx(Cx-»LAx)
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From (3) we can get something which should not follow from
(1) and (2) -- that is, we can get 3x(Bx&LAx). We can use
either of two different methods to get 3x(Bx&LAx). Darapti
LLL applied to (2) and (3) gives 3x(Bx&LAx), through the
third figure. Also, by LA-conversion of (2) we get the same
conclusion through the first-figure Darii:
(4) 3x ( LBx&Cx
)
LA-conversion 2
(5) 3x( LBx&LAx
)
Darii LLL 3,4
(6) Jx ( Bx&LAx LB->B
According to Aristotle what is pseudos is that "A belongs to
some B of necessity.' The premises require that 'A belongs
to every B.' We might understand Aristotle's point to be
that what makes (6) pseudos is the fact that it doesn't
follow from the premises since it requires more than the
stated premises allow. As Ross puts it:
A. calls the conclusion of this reductio-syllogism
not impossible but pseudos (a27), by which he
means that 'Some B is necessarily A', while
compatible with All B is A'
,
cannot be inferred
from it, nor from it+'All C is necessarily B';
i.e., it may be false though the original premises
are true. [Ross, 1957, p. 319]
Ross goes on to suggest (p. 320) that pseudos, as Aristotle
uses it here, means 'unwarranted.' The reason it's
unwarranted is that it is possible for terms to be chosen in
such a way that A might not belong to any of the B's.
Aristotle provides terms to illustrate this point:
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It is, moreover, also evident from terms that the
conclusion can fail to be necessary, as forinstance, if A were motion., B animal, and C stoodtor man. For a man is of necessity an animal, but
an animal does not move of necessity, nor does a
man. It would also be similar if AB were privative(for the demonstration is the same), (30a28-33).
So, with terms in place Barbara XLX becomes:
Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
Yx ( Cx-»LBx )
Vx ( Cx-»Ax
All animals are moving
A1 1 men are necessary animals
All men are moving
the affirmative case (Barbara) the failure of an
L-conclusion depends upon the fact that if an L-conclusion
did follow, then we would be able to assert
(d) A belongs to some B of necessity.
And that, Aristotle tells us, is pseudos, because terms
might be chosen which satisfy the X-premise but which
falsify (d). This, I take it, is the point of Aristotle's
comment at 30a31-32. Take the same terms: motion for A,
animal for B. At 30a31-32 Aristotle says that 'an animal
does not move of necessity' which is to say that 'A belongs
to some B of necessity' is false in this case. Since a man
is of necessity an animal (30a31-31) and an animal does not
move of necessity, then neither does a man (30a31-32). That
is, Aristotle rejects the conclusion 'All men are
necessarily moving.'
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He also extends the point to the privative: Celarent
XLL is invalid. The same terms show why.
Celarent XLX (30a23-33)
Vx(Bx->~Ax) All animals are not moving
vx(Cx-»LBx
) All men are necessary animals
-x(Cx->~Ax) All men are not moving
The conclusion here is not an L-conclusion, apparently for
the same reason as in Barbara: It would also be similar if
AB were privative (for the demonstration is the same),'
(30a33-34). What Aristotle seems to mean is that the
explanation for the privative case (Celarent) is the same as
the explanation just given for the affirmative case
(Barbara). Since there it was pseudos that 'A belongs to
some B of necessity,
' then perhaps Aristotle means that in
the privative case it is pseudos that 'A does not belong to
some B of necessity. ' Again the same terms show why: an
animal does not not-move of necessity, and since all men are
(necessarily) animals, no man is necessarily
not-moving either.
In both the affirmative case (Barbara) and the
privative case (Celarent) the failure of the L-conclusion
depends upon the pseudos premise of the form 'A belongs (or
does not belong) to some B of necessity.' 'Men' and
'animals' are the sort of things to which 'moving' or
'not-moving' do not apply of necessity, or L-apply. The fact
that Aristotle means to cover both the affirmative and
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privative cases with the same explanation shows that for him
the issue isn't about whether A belongs or doesn't belong to
B and C. The issue is about the appropriateness of the
qualifier of necessity.
' And his example of an
inappropriate use of the qualifier in each case involves
attaching it to an accidental term. By including an
accidental A in the triple of trems, Aristotle accomplishes
several things: he establishes clearly that Barbara and
Celarent XLL are invalid forms, and he sets out valid
instances of Barbara and Celarent XLX.
Suppose for the moment that the A-term were not an
accident. Suppose that instead of 'moving, 1 Aristotle had
said let A be something such as 'living thing' or 'plant.
'
Then the remark at 30a26-27 does not hold. Only when A is an
accident is it 'possible for B to be the sort of thing to
which it is possible for A to belong to none of.' More
simply, only when A is an accident is it right to say that A
might not belong to any of the B's. Or more simply
still, Vx( Bx=*M~Ax ) . 2
Consider what would happen to the Barbara syllogism if
we let A be 'living thing':
2 In Chapter 4, I explain why Vx(Bx->L~Ax) must be the
right analysis for Aristotle's expression 'A necessarily
belongs to none of the Bs. 1 This makes Vx(Bx-»M~Ax) look like
the right analysis for 'it is possible for A to belong to
none of the Bs .
'
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All animals are living things
All men are necessarily animals
All men are living things.
If the A term were given as 'plant' and B and C are as
before -- B is animal, C is man -- then we'd not have
Barbara; we would have Celarent:
All animals are not plants
All men are necessary animals
All men are not plants.
Let's look at Barbara first. There are two senses in which
it might be possible to get an L-conclusion here. The first
way is to say that the syllogism is no longer Barbara XLX
(nor XLL )
.
Since, in fact, all the terms are now substance
terms, perhaps, we might just as well call it Barbara LLL.
But this doesn't seem right since Aristotle says that the AB
premise is not necessary (me estin anankaion). 3 if the AB
premise is not necessary, then simply the AB premise is not
an L-premise. It appears instead to be an ordinary
X-premise. As we've seen in Section 2 of this chapter,
Aristotle clearly uses propositions like 'some man is an
animal' as X-premises in the assertoric syllogistic, so
taking it this way shouldn't present a problem here.
There is another way we might say an L-conclusion is
possible in this Barbara -- it is possible because an
3Sometimes Aristotle makes the same point by calling
the assertoric premises in the mixed syllogisms, premises
about 'merely belonging ( huparchon monon). See, for
instance, 30al9.
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L conclusion might be consistent with true XL premises. That
is not to say that an L-conclusion logically follows from
the premises, but just that it is not inconsistent with
them. If Aristotle were to allow for the possibility of an
L-conclusion, then we might take him to mean that it's
t-ossxble to conclude that all men are necessarily living
things.
' The necessity, we might say, is in this case
warranted insofar as being a living thing is part of the
essence of man. The necessity is not guaranteed by the
logical structure, but neither does it result in anything
pseudos. One way we might explain this is to say that what
makes an L-conclusion possible has to do with the meaning of
the terms, since it's the meaning of 'animal
,
1
'living
thing
,
1 and man 1 that make the L-conclusion permissible.
With Celarent, too, there is a sense in which an
L-conclusion does fit. All men are necessarily not plants'
is true because the essence of man excludes being a plant.
So anything that's a man is necessarily not a plant. And, of
course, anything that's an animal also is necessarily not a
plant. So again, perhaps, an L-conclusion is warranted,
not pseudos.
What this shows is that Aristotle's explanation of the
invalidity of Barbara and Celarent XLL depends upon the
X-premise (the AB premise) being assertoric, and not modally
qualified. Aristotle's explanation shows that the
possibility of an accidental A-term is sufficient to
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establish the invalidity of the forms Barbara XLL and
Celarent XLL. But nowhere in his discussion does Aristotle
suggest that he means to rule out the possibility of a valid
instance of Barbara XLL or Celarent XLL. In Barbara and
Celarent, the fact that the AB premise is assertoric leaves
open the possibility of A's being either an accidental term
or a substance term. It is possible when A is a substance
term to have an L-conclusion either about belonging
(Barbara) or not belonging (Celarent). So the fact that the
AB premise is assertoric gives Aristotle's explanation of
invalidity its bite and gives rise to a new question: does
Aristotle, perhaps, intend to allow valid instances of
invalid forms -- that is, are there, for Aristotle, valid
instances of Barbara XLL and Celarent XLL?
In supposing that the A term in Barbara and Celarent
might be a substance term, thus, making an L-conclusion not
pseudos, I have been stretching things rather far. I'm also
relying on just the kind of thinking that Ross objects to
when he complains in the first place about Aristotle's
counter-examples. They introduce meanings; and meanings,
Ross wants to say, are irrelevant to logic. Whether a thing
is a substance or an accident is a metaphysical notion, not
a matter of formal logic. But if Aristotle's metaphysical
notions are tied up with his logical notions in such a way
that an X-premise is ambiguous because it might be a premise
about substantive predication or it might predicate an
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accident of the subject, then the picture we get from Ross
might not be the right picture.
In 30a34-36, Aristotle discusses the particular
first-figure syllogisms:
In the case of the particular deductions, if the
universal is necessary then the conclusion will
also be necessary [Darii LXL and Ferio LXL] ; butif the particular premise is, the conclusion will
not be necessary, whether the universal premise is
privative or positive [Darii XLX and Ferio XLX1
,
( 30a34-36 )
.
Smith has a intriguing comment about 30a35:
Although Aristotle actually says the conclusion
will not be necessary,
' it does not actually
follow in this case (and similar cases) that the
conclusion is not necessary but instead only fails
to follow that it must be. We may take Aristotle
to mean that the inference in this case is
invalid. [Smith, 1989, p.122]
By inference ' Smith means the inferential form. As Smith
indicates, the point holds in similar cases as well -- it is
the same point, in fact, that we noticed with Barbara and
Celarent XLX. In each case, the inferential form does not
guarantee an L-conclusion
. But all Aristotle says is that
"the conclusion will not be necessary.' Here, in accounting
for the invalidity of Darii and Ferio LXL, Aristotle again
introduces terms:
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•••if the particular premise is necessary, the
conclusion will not be necessary (for nothinqimpossible results 4 ), just as it was not in the
case of universal deductions; and similarly alsom the case of privatives. Terms are motion
animal, white, (30b2-6).
I mark the rejected L-conclusions with a ' *
'
:
Darii XLL
Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
£x ( Cx&LBx
)
lx ( Cx&LAx
All animals are moving
Some white thing is a necessary animal
Some white thing is necessarily moving
Ferio XLL
Vx( Bx->~Ax
Jx ( Cx&LBx
3x ( Cx&L~Ax
)
No animals are moving
Some white thing is a necessary animal
Some white thing is necessarily not
moving
Earlier I pointed out that none of the counter-examples
for the assertoric syllogistic involves more than one
accident. Here, in the apodeictic, Aristotle explains why
Darii and Ferio XLL are invalid by setting out terms of
which two are accidents -- 'white' and 'moving.' Only one
accident appears in any premise, but both feature in the
conclusions. In Barbara LXL and Celarent LXL
,
the
L-conclusions are rejected apparently beacuse no thing moves
4Both Ross and Smith are bothered by the remark ' for
nothing impossible results ( ouden gar adunaton sumpiptei).'
Ross [1957, pp . 320-321] investigates the surrounding
passage in considerable detail, looking for parallel
arguments that might explain the language. Finding none, he
brackets 'ouden gar adunaton sumpiptei.' Smith takes this
expression to mean 'nothing impossible would result from
supposing the conclusion not to be necessary' [Smith, 1989,
p. 122]. I don't have anything to add to this discussion.
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or doesn't move of necessity. This same reason makes the
L- conclusions of Darii and Ferio XLL unacceptable, too.
Still, we can avoid the use of two accidents and illustrate
the invalidity by taking different terms. For example, let A
be moving, B be animal, and C be man. Later in this chapter
I will have more to say about premises such as 'some white
thing is a necessary animal' that come of Aristotle's terms.
6 • 5 A10: XL Premise Pairs in the Second Figure
Aristotle s account of the second figure provides more
interesting data and an unusually extended discussion of
terms for invalid combinations. He begins his discussion in
A10 by making the same point about when a conclusion will
not be necessary':
In the case of the second figure, if the privative
premise is necessary, then the conclusion will
also be necessary; but if the positive premise is,
the conclusion will not be necessary, (30b7-9).
Aristotle goes on to justify this by converting the second
figure into the first figure:
But if the positive premise is necessary, the
conclusion will not be necessary. For let A belong
to every B of necessity but merely belong to no C.
Then, when the privative premise is converted, it
becomes the first figure; and it has been proved
that in the first figure, when a privative premise
in relation to the major term is not necessary,
the conclusion will not be necessary either.
Consequently, neither will it be of necessity in
this case,' (30bl9-24).
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The syllogism Aristotle describes here is called Camestres
LXX. His decription translates easily into modal LPC:
Camestres LXX
Vx(Bx->LAx)
Vx(Cx->~Ax)
Vx ( Ax-»~Cx
)
Vx(Bx->~Cx)
A belongs to every B of necessity
but merely belongs to no C
then, when the privative is converted
it becomes the first figure
( i . e
. ,
Celarent XLX)
At 30b22-23 Aristotle reminds us that the conclusion of the
first-figure Celarent XLX will not be necessary. His point
seems to be that since the first-figure Celarent XLX
provides the basis for the proof of the second-figure mood
Camestres LXX, then in this second-figure mood, as in the
first, the conclusion will not be necessary. In 30b22-23
about Celarent XLX we're told ' oude to sumperasma estai
anankaion.' About the conclusion of Camestres XLX, Aristotle
says oud epi. touton estai ex anankes .
' The former is 'not
necessary' the latter is 'not of necessity.' It seems that
in spite of the different locutions, these two expressions
mean the same thing -- that is, in each case, the conclusion
is not an L-conclusion
.
Robin Smith offers two explanations of 30b24:
'Of necessity' is ambiguous: it could mean either
that the conclusion which follows cannot be 'of
necessity' (i.e., necessary), or that it is not of
necessity (need not be) a necessary conclusion.
[Smith, 1989, p. 122]
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In other words. Smith thinks 'of necessity 1 here
means either
(i)
or
(ii)
the conclusion which follows cannot be
an L-conclusion,
the conclusion which follows need not be
an L-conclusion.
If (i), then only an X conclusion -- i.e., an assertoric
conclusion -- will follow. But if (ii), then the conclusion
could be an L-conclusion but need not be. Either (i) or (ii)
is sufficient to invalidate the form Camestres LXL
. But
Aristotle invalidates it with a counter-example, and a
counter-example will never show that an L-conclusion does
follow; it shows that it does not. In fact, a
counter-example only establishes that there is an instance
in which an L-conclusion does not follow. It was this that
makes it plausible to wonder, as we did in the last section,
whether Aristotle might allow a valid instance of the
(invalid) first-figure Barbara XLL . Smith's point about the
ambiguity of the conclusion is not of necessity 1 holds in
the first figure as well. But there is a difference between
the first- and second-figure counter-examples. In order to
see what it is I want next to look at the counter-examples
for the second-figure invalids.
In a long passage, 30b20-40, Aristotle carefully sets
out and discusses terms for Camestres LXL. He gives these as
animal, man, and white. Just a few lines later, discussing
134
Baroco LXL and XLL, he mentions very briefly that the same
terms can be used for these as well. Aristotle says that
Festino XLL is also invalid, but offers no terms for it. In
Table 9, I list the invalid second-figure forms and offer
the obvious readings we get using the terms as Aristotle
suggests. I use the to indicate that these L-conclusions
are rejected by Aristotle.
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Table 9
Invalid Second Figure L+X Forms
Camestres LXL
Vx(Bx->LAx
)
Vx(Cx-»~Ax
* Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
)
(30b20- 40)
All men are necessary animals
All white things are not animals
All white things are necessarily not men
Festino XLL
Vx ( Bx-*~Ax
3x ( CxScLAx
* 3x(Cx&L~Bx)
( 31al5-17
)
(no terms given)
Baroco LXL
Vx ( Bx->LAx
)
x ( Cx&~Ax
* ix(Cx&L~Bx)
( 31al0-15
All men are necessary animals
Some white thing is not an animal
Some white thing is necessarily not
a man
Baroco XLL
Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
x ( Cx&L~Ax
)
( 31al5- 17)
All men are animals
Some white thing is necessarily not an
animal
* 3x(CxStL~Bx) Some white thing is necessarily not
a man
Cesare XLL
Vx ( Bx-»~ Ax )
Vx ( Cx-»LAx
* Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
(Aristotle does not mention Cesare XLL,
but it would seem to be invalid if these
others are
. )
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Let's try to take account of the new evidence from
Table 9. Since Aristotle only gives terms for Camestres LXL
and Baroco LXL and XLL, I'll focus on those. We’re looking
at the second figure, so we are only concerned here with
privative conclusions relating C and B terms. Each of the
rejected conclusions is not of necessity. 1 On the de re
analysis we're using, that means that the rejected
conclusions are all about what is 'necessarily not B.
'
Looking back on the first-figure invalids, the rejected
conclusions there involved attaching an L to an accidental
term, such as 'moving.' But this isn't the matter here in
the second-figure invalids since as Aristotle sets out the
terms the one that falls within the scope of the L is always
a substance term — man. ' And, as I have suggested, for
substance terms an L can be attached without change of
meaning. So something different must be going on here that
explains why these second-figure L-conclusions are rejected.
It isn't obvious just what that something is. At first
glance it appears that the matter might have to do with the
subject term which in each example is the C term, 'white.'
Recalling again Aristotle's discussion in An. Post. A22, we
might suppose that he rejects the L-conclusions above
because, when terms are put in place, none of the
conclusions can be an example of genuine apodeictic
predication. Each of the conclusions treats the accidental
term 'white' as the subject term, and genuine predication
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requires that 'white' can never be the subject. That much
seems plausible, but there is a problem. If that explains
why the L-conclusions in Table 9 are rejected, then it would
seem that the CA premise in Baroco XLL must be rejected for
the same reason. White is the subject of an L—proposition
there too: some white thing is necessarily not an animal.'
So, the same reason would make the CA premise and the CB
conclusion either both true or both false or, perhaps, both
ungrammatical. Whichever it is, the result is that the terms
Aristotle mentions don't really show that Baroco XLL is
invalid. That, in itself, may not be a big problem. Even if
the terms he offers don't do a good job of illustrating the
invalidity, we can still salvage the point by choosing terms
more carefully. For example, let A be man, B be moving, and
C be animal. And suppose that everything that is moving
is a man.
Vx(Bx-»Ax) All moving things are men
5x ( Cx&L~Ax ) Some animal is necessarily not a man
* 3x(Cx&L~Bx) Some animal is necessarily not moving
Here, we do have true premises and a false conclusion --
true premises because although an accident B is a subject
term, this is in an assertoric proposition, and we have seen
in Section 6.2 that accidents can take subject position in
assertoric propositions. The conclusion is false because
every animal can move. To put the point another way, in a
true proposition the L doesn't attach to a predicate like
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is not moving.
’ The same point was needed earlier in
Section 4 of this chapter to invalidate the first-figure
Celarent XLL, Darii XLL
,
and Ferio XLL
.
There is more to say about the second-figure invalids.
But some of it applies also to the third-figure invalids. I
will look at these next.
6 • 6 All: XL Premise Pairs in the Third Figure
The third-figure invalids are Felapton XLL, Datisi XLL,
Disamis LXL
,
Bocardo XLL and LXL
,
and Ferison XLL. I list
these in Table 10, together with the obvious readings we get
using Aristotle's terms. As before, I use the '*' to
indicate that these L-conclusions are rejected.
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Table 10
Invalid Third Figure L+X Forms
Felapton XLL
Vx(Cx-*~Ax)
Vx(Cx->LBx)
* 3x ( Bx&L~Ax
)
( 31a37- blO
)
All horses are not awake
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily not awake
Datisi XLL
Vx( Cx->Ax
)
*x ( Cx&LBx
)
* 3x ( Bx&LAx
( 31b20-31
)
All animals are wakeful
Some animal is necessarily a biped
Some biped is necessarily wakeful
Disamis LXL
3x ( Cx&LAx
Vx ( Cx->Bx
* 3x ( Bx&LAx
( 31b31-33
Some animal is necessarily a biped
All animals are wakeful
Something wakeful is a necessary biped
Bocardo XLL
x ( Cx&~Ax
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
* 3x ( Bx&L ~ Ax
( 31b40-32al
Some man is not wakeful
All men are necessarily animals
Some animal is necessarily not wakeful
Ferison XLL
Vx( Cx->~Ax
lx ( Cx&LBx
* 3x ( Bx&L~Ax
( 32al-4
)
All animals are not wakeful
Some animal is necessarily white
Some white thing is necessarily not
wakeful
Bocardo LXL
lx ( Cx&L~Ax
Vx ( Cx-»Bx
* lx(Bx&L~Ax)
( 32a4-5
Some animal is necessarily not a biped
All animals are moving
Some moving thing is necessarily not a
biped
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In the third figure counter-examples Felapton XLL,
Datisi XLL
,
Bocardo XLL, and Ferison XLL all have true
premises but obviously false conclusions. Disamis LXL and
Bocardo LXL are also rejected, but their conclusions are not
obviously false; instead, they are like the conclusions of
the second-figure invalids Camestres LXL and Baroco LXL.
That is, these all have accidents in subject position of an
L-proposit ion
.
Ferison XLL is especially interesting because of its
two accidental terms. Terms for Ferison XLL are wakeful,
white, and animal. From what I've said so far, it would seem
that the CB premise some animal is necessarily white' must
be false, on the grounds that because white is really an
accident it can only belong to a thing accidentally. But
Aristotle several times offers some animal is necessarily
white' as a true L-proposit ion . In fact, Aristotle tells
that all swans are necessarily white. This is a favorite
puzzle among Aristotle's commentators and critics. I think
Aristotle has goofed, and I have only a simple point to add
to the discussion. It seems to me that what we make of the
goof has to do with how we think Aristotle would respond if
we showed him a black swan. Would we expect him to go off
and re-write his metaphysics or would we expect him to
change his tune about swans? Black swans do exist. If
Aristotle came across a flock of them, then very likely he
would change his tune and acknowledge that the statement
141
swans are white of necessity' is in fact false. There is,
of course, a more serious question about just how his
metaphysics can allow an accident to be a necessary property
of a subject. And there is a large body of literature about
such things as propria and necessary accidents. But it isn’t
clear that the whiteness of swans counts as either of these.
Instead, it seems to be a simple mistake. At any rate, it is
not a problem with the logic here. To avoid the matter
altogether, let the terms for Ferison XLL be wakeful, man,
and animal. The premises are still true, but the purported
L-conclusion is then 'some man is necessarily not wakeful,'
and that is false.
6 . 7 The L-Not Principle
Having looked at all of the mixed apodeictic counter-
examples, let's return now to the puzzle, at the beginning
of this chapter, about condition (f) from Thomason's
semantics, (f) is Vx(Bx-»LAx)-»Vx(L~Ax->L~Bx)
,
and Thomason
imposes this condition in order to validate Baroco LLL. In
Chapter 5, I left unanswered the question about what really
to say about (f). We saw there that (f) might be plausible
when terms are restricted to substance terms. But if one of
the terms is an accident, then it is very difficult to know
what to say. Let's look again at an example: suppose A is
animal and B is white. Then if every white is a necessary
man, every necessary non-man is necessarily-not white. This
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might well be invalid. It might not make sense at all.
There's not much in Aristotle's text to help here -- we just
don't know whether (f) is Aristotelian. But as Thomason
shows
,
it does get the right results for Baroco LLL
. In
Thomason’s interpretation Baroco LLL:
Vx ( Bx-»LAx
)
dx ( LCx&L~Ax
)
3x ( LCx&L ~Bx )
.
But there s a question, too, about what exactly is going on
in Baroco LLL. I want to try to see what is going on there
without explicitly appealing to (f). Maybe then we can see
whether there's a good Aristotelian-sounding explanation
for ( f )
.
In Chapter 5, I offered some textual evidence which
suggests that for Aristotle necessary premises always
involve genuine predication. The BA premise in Baroco above
is a necessary premise. So to make the genuineness of this
premise explicit, we give its true structure as Vx ( LBx->LAx ) .
And Baroco LLL then becomes
Vx ( LBx->LAx
)
Hx ( LCx&L ~Ax
)
3x( LCx&L~Bx
But that alone isn't enough to validate Baroco LLL. What's
needed still is a principle that makes ~LB equivalent to
L~B. If B is a substance term, then there's some sense in
this: consider the substance term 'animal' -- anything that
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is not necessarily an animal, is also necessarily-not an
animal. It's not unreasonable to think that Aristotle might
have had something like this in mind. So, maybe in this way
we can say ~ LB and L~B are equivalent. I'll call this the
L-not Principle
. The L-not Principle together with
restricting L-premises to genuine predication gives a way to
validate Baroco LLL. Taking Vx(LBx-»LAx) as the first
premise, we have:
(1) Vx( LBx->LAx
)
Given
(2) 3x ( LCx&L~Ax
)
Given
(3) Vx ( ~ LAx-»~ LBx ) Contraposition (1)
(4) Vx ( L~Ax->L~Bx
)
L-not Principle (3)
(5) 3x ( LCx&L~Bx Transitivity (2), (4)
This may not be the way Aristotle reasons, but it is not
obviously unAristotel ian either. And, it does validate
Baroco LLL and justifies a version of (f) with restricted
subject terms.
But this raises a whole new problem. If the L-not
Principle is right, then it would seem that some of the
mixed apodeictic invalid syllogisms can then be validated.
Camestres LXL is one of these invalids.
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Camestres LXL
(1) Vx(Bx->LAx)
(2) Vx(Cx-*~Ax)
(3) Vx(Cx->L~Bx)
Camestres LXL can be validated as follows:
(4)
Vx(LBx->LAx) T-pr inciple (1)
(5) Vx( ~LAx-»~LBx) Contraposition (4)
T-principle(6) Vx ( ~Ax->~LAx
)
(7) Vx ( Cx-» ~ LAx
)
(8) Vx(Cx->~LBx)
(9) Vx(Cx->L~Bx)
Transitivity (2,6)
Transitivity (7,5)
L-not (8)
Aristotle's own account of Camestres LXL, at 30b20-40,
looks very different from this. He plainly counts Camestres
LXL as invalid and offers terms to show that an L-conclusion
does not follow. Those terms are animal for A, man for B,
white for C. As Aristotle offers the terms, the B-term is
already a substance term. (But also the genuineness of the
L-premise (1) will require that B be a substance term.)
Since B is a substance term, it seems there is no trouble
applying the L-not Principle: we can say that ~LB is
equivalent to L~B. That is, anything that's not-necessarily
a man is also necessar i ly-not a man. In this way, the L-not
Principle takes us from (8) 'all white things are not
necessary men' to the conclusion (9) 'all white things are
necessarily not men. 1 So, if that's right, Camestres LXL is
then validated.
When Aristotle describes why he counts Camestres LXL as
invalid, the explanation hinges on the account he gives of
the conclusion. Aristotle says that the conclusion will not
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be necessary; it seems that by this he means that an
L-conclusion can be false. The problem is that in rejecting
an L-conclusion, he doesn't make it obvious just how he
interprets that conclusion. From the proof above, (supposing
the genuineness of L-premises and allowing the L-not
^^"Lnciple) Camestres LXL is formally valid. Yet Aristotle
rejects the L-conclusion. What's going on?
If we focus on the logical form of Camestres LXL and
say that /x ( Cx->L~Bx ) is the conclusion, then, with genuine
L-premises and the L-not Principle, Camestres LXL is really
valid. Allowing accidentals in assertoric premises won't
help here because the B term to which the L-not Principle
applies is already guaranteed to be a substance term by the
genuineness requirement on premise (1). Perhaps we might
respond by taking the conclusion to be Vx ( Bx->L~Cx ) . Then,
with premises Vx(Bx->LAx) and Vx(Cx->~Ax), we produce
something which, in fact, isn't valid, but, on the other
hand, neither is it an instance of Camestres LXL. There
appears to be a dilemma.
It seems to me that when we look closely at what
Aristotle says about Camestres LXL, he has a rather
ingenious way of getting the best of both sides. It seems
that he does not treat 'all white things are necessarily-not
men’ as an instance of Vx ( Cx->L~Bx ) . Instead, he analyses it
as an instance of Vx ( Bx->L~Cx ) , which he then explains is
false since 'a man may become white.’ Perhaps Aristotle
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would interpret the conclusion this way because the
restriction to essential subjects makes him reject an
L-conclusion of the form 7x(Cx->L Bx ) . In setting out terms
for Camestres LXL
,
Aristotle makes C an accident -- 'white.'
So maybe the way to understand Aristotle is as saying that
the only (meaningful) way to give an L— conclusion here is as
sll men are necessar i ly—not white. 1 Since if he does adhere
to the comments in An. Post. A22, about genuine predication,
then all white things are necessarily-not men' cannot be a
genuine L-proposition
. If Aristotle rejects an L-conclusion
in Camestres LXL when terms are animal, man, and white
because he is refusing to analyze 'all white things are
necessarily not men' as Vx(Cx-»L~Bx ) , then maybe what he
means by 'the conclusion will not be necessary' is that from
the premises we can't have any L-conclusion because a
genuine Camestres conclusion in this case cannot be stated.
By modern logic, that makes Camestres LXL valid. If in an
argument you cannot have true premises and a false
conclusion, then you have a valid argument. So, since here
we can't have any L-conclusion, we have a valid argument.
Aristotle appeals to LE-conversion in the middle of his
discussion of Camestres LXL: 'For if B belongs of necessity
to no C, then C will also belong to no B of necessity, ’
( 30b26 )
.
In stating LE-conversion, Aristotle is, in a sense,
trying to have it both ways. Since, when he comes to put
terms in, he gives B as man, C as white, he is, on the one
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hand, allowing white as a subject term, but on the other
hand, apparently interpreting it as the predicate term. It
looks like Aristotle is allowing white as subject in the
surface structure -- some white things are necessar i ly-not
men.' But he's not allowing white as subject at the logical
level, and, instead, analyses 'some white things are
necessarily-not men' as 'some men are necessar i ly-not
white. That would mean that while at the surface level,
conversion appears to be from 'all white things are
necessarily-not men' to 'all men are necessarily-not white,’
at the logical level, the only conversion is from one
formula to the very same formula. So while he appears to
consider the validity of Camestres LXL
,
he isn't really
dealing with Camestres at the logical level. And so his
method won't establish that Camestres LXL is invalid.
It might seem that if this way of taking Camestres LXL
has us calling it a valid syllogism, then this way must be
wrong. It certainly would be wrong if Aristotle were to say
that Camestres LXL is 'invalid.' But to say that an argument
is valid or invalid is not to use Aristotle's terminology.
His handling of the matter is more subtle. In the assertoric
syllogistic, when he considers the 'validity' or
'invalidity' of arguments, he says simply 'there is a
syllogism' or 'there is no syllogism.' In the assertoric
syllogistic, Aristotle establishes invalidity by showing
that from the given premises there is no syllogism because
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whatever form we assign to the conclusion we can have it
false even when the premises are true. His method, in
effect, is to say: Take these two premises. Does a
conclusion follow?' If we can falsify a conclusion no matter
what its type (A, E, I, or 0), then 'there is no syllogism.’
In the apodeictic syllogistic, Aristotle's approach is
similar, but not exactly the same. Here he says: 'Take these
two premises. Does an L-conclusion follow?' The type of the
conclusion is already determined by the assertoric form.
Tradition counts Camestres LXL as invalid. But all Aristotle
really says is that the conclusion will not be of
necessity.' Aristotle rejects the conclusion, apparently,
because it can't be analysed according to the structure that
the proof dictates, which is Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx ) . Although Aristotle
talks about Camestres LXL as though he has established
invalidity, he really doesn't establish that Camestres LXL
is invalid. If invalidity means not getting an L-conclusion
because we cannot even state one, then invalidity doesn't
mean what it usually does.
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CHAPTER 7
POSSIBILITY AND CONTINGENCY
7 . 1 Introduction
the next two chapters I turn to the problematic
syllogistic. The problematic syllogistic is the part of the
Prior Analytics that concerns 'premises about possibility.’
Aristotle deals with these in detail in chapters A13-22.
Also, chapter A3 contains some brief, preliminary discussion
of possibility. The problematic syllogistic as a whole has
proven extraordinarily challenging to logicians. There are
many reasons for this. Some of the difficulties arise
because Aristotle uses 'possible (endechomenon)' and its
variants ambiguously. Sometimes he clearly means possible in
the sense of not-necessar i ly-not
,
that is, possible in the
sense of the logician's M. Other times Aristotle means
possible in the sense of contingent, that is, neither
necessary nor impossible. While the different senses of
'endechomenon' at times frustrate interpreters, often where
there is a question of which meaning Aristotle has in mind,
the context of the surrounding passage contains clues.
Distinguishing the different meanings is sometimes enough to
make sense of otherwise puzzling logical maneuver ings . On
the other hand, the most serious and perplexing difficulties
with the problematic syllogistic appear to be genuine
logical blunders for which the text provides little
explanation. These blunders appear, for example, in the
discussion of the Barbara at 34a34-b2 and the Celarent at
34bl9-35a2 / both of which Aristotle wants to prove "through
impossibility.' The method of proof is itself dubious. I
focus on problems of this sort in Section 7.5.
I do think the difficulties in the problematic
syllogistic are too severe and extensive to hope that any
analysis can adequately explain all of the evidence.
Eventually it would be good to try to explain each of the
many separate problems encountered in this part of the
logic. All I can do here is make a start at this. To do
this, I have divided the material into two chapters. In this
chapter, I look at some of the traditional difficulties that
arise in the problematic syllogistic. In Chapter 8, I
propose and test a hypothesis about the problematic
syllogistic, trying to apply the same kinds of devices that
I used with respect to the apodeictic syllogistic in
Chapters 5 and 6.
In this chapter, I divide some of the syllogisms into
"families, 1 grouped together insofar as they share certain
common features. Some of the groups present interpretive
dilemmas; some groups seem to depend on unsound reasoning
and slippery logical methods; others groups contain
syllogisms about possibility that are valid and easily
explained. The various groups are neither exhaustive nor
exclusive. But they do give a sense of the kinds of problems
encountered in this part of the modal syllogistic. My hope
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is that by isolating some of the trouble spots and
recognizing them as such, enough consistent material will
Suixl remain to give a sense of some of the ways Aristotle
understands possibility.
' In Chapter 8, I suggest a way of
reading Aristotle that brings a large part of the
problematic syllogistic into line with the account I suggest
for the apodeictic.
7 • 2 The Question of M's or 0's
Aristotle begins chapter A13 by explaining right away
what he takes a 'premise about possibility’ to be here:
I use the expressions 'to be possible
(endechestai )
'
and 'what is possible (to
endechomenon )
’ in application to something if it
is not necessary but nothing impossible will
result if it is put as being the case (for it is
only equivocally that we say that what is
necessary is possible), 32al9-22.
This is a new sense of possibility. 1 In fact, it is a new
definition (horismos
,
33a24-25). The only sense of
'possibly' used up until now is the kind of possibility
described in the apodeictic syllogistic. There Aristotle's
meaning is ' not-necessar i ly-not . ' Recall Aristotle's
interpretation of LE-premises as denials of possiblility . An
example of such an LE-premise is 'let it not be possible for
A to belong to any B, ’ at 30bl0. In Chapter 4, I explained
though, as I will show there is at least the
suggestion of contingency in the latter part of A3.
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why we should represent this as Vx ( Bx->L~Ax ) , or,
equivalently, as Vx (Bx->~MAx)
. If such an LE-proposition is
t<j be understood as a denial of possibility at all then the
meaning of possible' must be the same as ' not-necessari ly-
not
. Using M s and L's, Mp =df L p. This definition is the
same as our modern definition of possibility.
When he comes to discuss the problematic syllogistic,
Aristotle tells us plainly that he uses 'possibly' to mean
'neither necessary nor impossible.' This way of taking
possibly' makes it the same as modern contingency. To
distinguish this from M, logicians denote 'contingent' with
a Q- QP =df ~Lp&~L~p. It is perhaps unfortunate that
Aristotle used variants of 'possible (endechomenon)
'
for
both possibility (M) and contingency (Q), but for the most
part he does note which sense he has in mind in the various
parts of the modal syllogistic. In the handful of places
where he doesn't precisely spell out which sense he means
there is plenty of trouble to be found. Perhaps the worst
such interpretive difficulties come with Aristotle's vague
explanations of syllogisms involving possible+assertor ic
premise combinations. I will look at the matters with these
in Section 7.5. But first, let's consider what Aristotle has
to say about how premises about possibility convert.
Chapter A3 is directly concerned with converting
premises about possibility. There is, however, some
controversy about what meaning or meanings possibly 1 has in
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chapter A3. I think that in A3 Aristotle is interested
mainly in M-conversions
,
with Q-conversions getting only a
Ui ^ Ci mention at the end. Not all scholars agree. Ross
[1957/ pp . 294-299] and Thom [1996, p. 38], for example,
clearly regard ' endechesthai
'
in A3, 25a40-b3 as already
incorporating the contingency usage. Ross and Thom look
ahead to chapter A13 and import the later definition of
'possible' backwards into chapter A3. They then try to
explain all of A3 in terms of contingency. Contingency does
feature in A3, but it doesn't characterize the entire
discussion of what is ' endechomenon
'
there. My way of
reading Aristotle is a little controversial, so let's look
at the evidence.
In A3 Aristotle tells us that possible premises
do convert:
When it comes to possible premises, since 'to be
possible' is said in several ways (i.e., we say of
what is necessary, of what is not necessary, and
of what is potential that it is possible), the
situation with respect to conversion will be the
same in all these cases with the affirmatives,
( 25a37-41 )
.
Paul Thom reads this as saying that A-conversion and
I-conversion 'hold in all senses of possible.' He then takes
contingent to be one sense of possible and finds in 25a37-41
an argument for QA- and Ql-conversion
:
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(QA) if every b is contingently a, then some a is
contingently b,
(QI) if some b is contingently a, then some a is
contingently b. [Thom, 1996, p. 38]
Ross isn't clear about where exactly 'contingency' comes
into the discussion, but he, too, wants to find QA- and
Ql-conversions in the present passage. [See Ross, 1957,
pp. 296-297.]
When we look at the different senses of 'possibly 1
Aristotle mentions in the passage guoted above, A3,
25a37-41
,
there is certainly no explicit mention of
contingency. All that we are told is:
(a) what is necessary is said to be possible,
(b) what is not necessary is said to be possible,
and
(c) what is potential is said to be possible.
None of these expressly implicates 'contingency.' In fact,
the sense of possibility given in (a) is plainly
inconsistent with contingency. So, contra Ross and Thom, it
seems to me that A3, 25a37-41 is really about conversions of
MA- and Mi-premises, and not about Q-premises at all.
Ultimately, this will be a minor point, but one that helps
avoid the sorts of unnecessary complications encountered in
Ross' analysis.
As I'm suggesting we read Aristotle, all that we find
at A3, 25a37-4 are affirmative M-conversions . The
conversions are stated more explicitly a few lines later:
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For if it is possible for A to belong to every or
L° some B, then it will be possible for B tobelong to some A, (25bl-2).
At first glance, a good analysis of these might appear to be
(MAI) Vx(Bx->MAx) -4 3x ( Ax&MBx
)
(Mil)
~\x ( Bx&MAx ) -4 3x ( Ax&MBx ) .
When we put terms in place of variables, these analyses
don't look so good. Consider (MAI) with white for A and man
for B: if all men are possibly white, then some white thing
is possibly a man.' For this to be alright, 'some white
thing is possibly a man must' be true. But there is a
question, I think, about whether it is true. If it isn't,
then both (MAI) and (Mil) must be rejected.
In order to know if it is true that some white thing is
possibly a man, we need to know what is it to be a possible
man, or possibly a man. There's enough in Aristotle's
metaphysics to give a reasonable sense of what he means by
necessary ' where (J) is a substance term, like 'man. ' But
in general, Aristotle is not as clear about the notion of a
'possible 4> ’ as he is about the notion of a 'necessary <f> . '
The matter becomes especially difficult where
<J> is a
substance term. In the Physics and in the Metaphysics
,
Aristotle does discuss 'potentiality' with respect to
substances, but there is a question about whether the
'potentiality' there is incorporated in the syllogistic.
Paul Thom [1996, p. 5] suggests it isn't. I am inclined to
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agree with him. I return to this question in greater detail
later in Chapter 8.
One way around the matter is to give an interpretation
xn keeping with the analyses I used for valid LA- and
LI
-conversions in Chapters 2 and 3. Then, a good de re
account of MA- and Mi-conversions would seem to be:
(MA2) Vx ( Bx-»MAx ) 3x(MAx&Bx)
(MI 2) lx ( Bx&MAx ) -> 3x ( MAx&Bx )
.
In addition to MA- and Mi-conversions
,
Aristotle also
appears to want ME-conversion : "for if it is possible for
[B] to belong to none [of the A's], then neither will it be
possible for A to belong to any B,
"
(25b3). The valid
reading of this would have to be
( ME 1 ) Vx(Ax->M~Bx) Vx ( LBx->~ Ax ) .
The invalid reading, modelled on LE-conversion in Chapter 4,
would be
(ME2) Vx(Ax-»M~Bx) -4 Vx ( Bx-»M~ Ax ) .
Aristotle does explain that he is concerned with negative
statements about what is possible 'in virtue of (i)
belonging of necessity or (ii) not of necessity not
belonging,' 25b4-5. So, pretty clearly he wants to consider
M-conversions and not Q-conversions here. But whether we put
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M's or Q's in above doesn't settle the question about
whether (ME1) or ( ME 2 ) is right. Neither, I think, do
his examples:
. . . i l. is possible for a man not to be a horse or
for white to belong to no coat: the first of these
of necessity does not belong [ ( i ) ]
,
while the
other does not necessarily belong [ ( i i ) ]
,
and the
premise converts similarly, (25b5-9).
Consider the conversions each in turn.
(a) For if it is possible for horse to
belong to no man, then it is possible
for man to belong to no horse, (25bl0).
(b) if it is possible for white to belong to
no coat, then it is possible for coat to
belong to nothing white, (25bll).
(a) is fine if what is necessar i ly-not-(j> is not-possibly-<{>
.
But, it isn't obvious just what is going on in (b)
.
Using
( ME 2 ) as the conversion principle, (b) is a problem if
'coat' is a substance term and there are white coats. The
issues this raises are the subject of Chapter 8. But with
respect to the matter here about how to represent
ME-conversion, as far as I have been able to discover,
Aristotle never uses ME-conversion. So, the question of how
to represent it might in fact turn out to be
relatively unimportant.
What is clear is that so far in Chapter A3 — that is,
up until 25bl3 -- there is no hard and fast evidence that
Aristotle really means contingent when he uses
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' endechomenon .
'
But that is not to say that contingency is
a^- t'jgethex. absent from the discussion in A3. When Aristotle
does introduce his contingency sense of 'endechomenon,' he
signals the difference carefully. He has already explained
( 25b3f f ) that possible premises (i.e., M-premises) convert
following the same pattern as E-conversion. At A3, 25bl4, he
changes tack:
But those premises which are said to be possible
(endechesthai) because of being so for the most
part or being naturally so (which is the way that
we define ( diorizomen ) what is possible) will not
be the same in privative conversions. Instead, the
universally privative premise does not convert,
and the particular premise does convert. This will
be evident when we discuss the possible,
( 25bl4-19
)
This appears to be the only mention in Chapter A3 of a
definition. Up until this point 'to be possible,’ we’re
told, is 'said in many ways’ ( pollachos legetai to
endechesthai, 25a37-38.) Now, 'to be possible’ is precisely
defined as 'being so for the most part or being naturally
so.’ Privative E-premises about this kind of possibility do
not convert. But, surprisingly, O-premises do, (25bl3). This
last remark has received a lot of attention. More than its
due, perhaps, for it seems to be a goof. Tredennick puts the
problem in perspective: 'why is it that Aristotle, after
expressly admitting [the convertibility of the particular
negative problematic premise], apparently never avails
himself of it?’ [See Tredennick, 1983, p. 190ff.]
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In the next section, I will look at whether the
convertible premises that fit the definition at 25bl4-19
also fit the definition of 'contingent' in Chapter A13. I
will present some evidence to show that they are in fact the
same — that is, what we find here in A3, 25bl4-19, is a
foreshadowing of the argument in A13 about the failure of
QE-premises to convert. But for Aristotle even when
Q-premises can convert, there is not the same kind of
conversion as in all the other cases. This is the subject of
Section 7.3.
7 . 3 Conversion of O-Premises
The conversion described in Chapter A13 is different
from anything so far encountered in the text. Here is where
the difference between taking 'possible' to be an M or a Q
really matters.
It follows that all premises about being possible
convert with each other. I do not mean that
affirmative premises convert with negatives, but
rather that such as have an affirmative form
convert with respect to their opposite: that is,
'possible to belong’ converts to 'possible not to
belong,' 'possible to belong to every' converts to
'possible to belong to no' (or 'not to every’),
and ' it is possible to belong to some converts to
'it is possible not to belong to some,'
( 32a31-35 )
.
Ross calls this 'complementary conversion' [Ross, 1957,
p. 298]. It automatically falls out of the definition of
contingency. We might think of complementary conversion as
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conversion only homonymously
,
since it differs from all
other conversions by leaving the order of the terms
unchanged. A formal representation of complementary
conversion will help make this clear. Consider a QA-premise
it is contingent that A belongs to every B. ' This converts
to it is contingent that A belongs to no B.'
(CC-A) Vx (Bx-»QAx) = Vx (Bx-»Q~Ax)
.
A Ql-premise some B is contingently A' converts to 'some B
is contingently not A':
(CC-I) =lx(Bx&QAx) = Hx(Bx&Q~Ax)
.
Robin Smith sums up the goings on here nicely: "we may add
or remove 'not' within the scope of 'possible' with
preservation of equivalence" [Smith, 1989, p. 125]. Of
course. Smith means possible' in the sense of 'contingent.'
And Aristotle's own comments make clear that it is only
contingent premises that convert in this way:
For since what is possible is not necessary, and
it is possible for what is not necessary not to
belong, it is evident that, if it is possible for
A to belong to B, then it is also possible for it
not to belong, and, if it is possible for it to
belong to every one, then it is also possible for
it not to belong to every one, (32a36-40).
One of the most interesting features of complementary
conversions is that for Aristotle both the original
propositions and the propositions that result from the
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CC conversions are affirmative in form, and not privative,
32bl-2
. So, according to Aristotle, each of the following is
an affirmative statement:
Vx ( Bx->QAx
)
Vx ( Bx->Q~Ax
)
3x ( Bx&QAx
lx ( Bx&Q~Ax
Earlier in that part of Chapter A3 that is clearly about
contingency, Aristotle makes the same point:
being possible [contingent] to belong to none or
not to some' has an affirmative form. For 'is
possible' is arranged similarly to 'is,' and 'is'
always and in all ways makes what it is added to
in predication an affirmation, (25b20-23).
This suggests that Aristotle doesn't think there is any
difference in truth value between Vx( Bx->QAx) and Vx(Bx->Q~Ax)
when A and B are the same in each. From this it seems that a
difference in truth value comes about only through changing
the subject term.
In order to see how complementary conversions work in
the actual syllogisms, it is necessary first to discuss
another matter that arises in the problematic syllogistic --
ampliated contingent premises.
7 . 4 Ampliation
An ampliated contingent premise is just a regular
Q-premise whose subject term is qualified by a (de re)
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modal. Consider an example: every B is contingently A. 1 The
regular unampliated reading is Vx (Bx-*QAx) or its equivalent,
Vx(Bx->Q~Ax)
. In both of these the only term that is modally
qualified is the predicate term. The ampliated reading puts
a separate modal on the subject term as well. As for
instance, Vx(MBx^QAx) and Vx (MBx^Q~Ax)
. These are examples
of ampliation to the possible.' We might also 'ampliate to
the contingent’ and give Vx (QBx-*QAx) and Vx (QBx->Q~Ax)
.
Why do we need ampliation at all? Paul Thom
explains succintly:
We need a separate class of ampliated contingency-
forms because A13, 32b23-32 notes a syntactic
ambiguity in the expression 'kath' hou to B, to
endechesthai '
. it appears from that text that
contingency-propositions may be either ampliated
or unampliated. 2 [Thom, 1996, p. 9]
Aristotle is less succint:
Now, the expression ' it is possible for this to
belong to that’ may be understood in two ways: it
may mean either 'to that to which this belongs’ or
'to that to which it is possible for this to
belong.’ For 'of what B is true, it is possible
that A’ signifies one or the other of the
following: 'of what B is said’ or 'of what it is
possible for B to be said’. But 'it is possible
that A <is said> of what B is’ is no different
from 'it is possible for A to belong to every B.’
Therefore, it is evident that 'it is possible for
A to belong to every B’ might have two meanings,
( 32b25-32 )
.
2Thom investigates both ampliation to the possible and
to the contingent, but his own account ultimately requires
only ampliation to the possible [Thom, 1996, p. 212ff ]
.
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Clearly, one meaning involves ampliation. The other meaning
does not.
xhe li aditional view is that ampliation is needed to
validate a^x QQQ syllogisms. A look at the logic makes clear
why it's needed. Consider Barbara QQQ without
ampliated premises:
Vx ( Bx-»QAx
)
Vx ( Cx^QBx
Vx ( Cx-»QAx
That's not valid. It doesn't follow that everything that's
contingently B is actually B. For example, a horse may be a
contingently moving thing because it might move (or not
move), but it doesn't follow from this that the horse is
actually moving. The point is that since something can be
contingently B without being actually B, transitivity fails,
and the Barbara above comes out invalid. Ampliating the
premises avoids this problem. Here is Barbara QQQ with
premises ampliated to the contingent:
Vx ( QBx->QAx
)
Vx ( QCx->QBx
Vx ( QCx-QAx
That's valid, trivially. Ampliating to the possible works
for Barbara QQQ too:
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Vx ( MBx->QAx
)
Vx(MCx->QBx)
Vx ( MCx^QAx )
.
It works here because QBx-»MBx.
Nowhere in his discussion of ampliation does Aristotle
tell us which kind of ampliation he has in mind. He merely
notices that possible premises may be understood as
ampliated or not. He only stipulates that there is
ampliation and leaves it at that. We get no detailed
explanation. In the notes to his translation, Smith looks
for some explanation of this 'rather surprising' new twist:
One consideration may be the need to have a single
middle term in a deduction. If we regard 'it is
possible that A to B 1 as attributing the predicate
'possibly A' to B, and likewise 'it is possible
that B to C 1 as attributing the predicate
'possibly B 1 to C, then these two premises appear
to contain four terms: 'possibly A,' 'B,'
'possibly B, ’ and 'C.' On the interpretation which
Aristotle advocates, there are only three terms,
but they are 'possibly A,’ 'possibly B, ’ and
'possibly C.' [Smith, 1989, p. 128]
This explanation is still ambiguous. Smith seems to mean
that the ampliation is always to the contingent. His point
about the number of terms doesn't hold otherwise, since if
the ampliation is to the possible (M), then Barbara QQQ will
still have four terms: 'MB,' 'QB,' 'MC,' and 'QA.'
I think Smith is probably right, but there is more we
might add, given some of the evidence from Chapters 5 and 6.
I argued there that a good way of explaining the pure
apodeictic Barbara — Barbara LLL — takes the terms to be,
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in effect, 'necessarily A,' 'necessarily B, ' and
necessarily C. If that is right, then it makes sense to
suppose that when Aristotle came to discuss pure contingent
QQQ syllogisms he adopted the same pattern. Alternatively,
the fact that he seems to adopt such a pattern suggests that
the account of the LLL 1 s in Chapter 6 might be the
right one.
There's another explanation, too. It might be that
ampliation is just a cover for what is otherwise a glitch in
the logic. We might think this because in most of the
problematic syllogistic Aristotle seems to get on well with
just the simple, unampliated Q-premises. There is not any
mention of ampliation in the discussion of complementary
conversions. Later, in Chapter 8, it emerges that ampliation
isn't obviously a feature in any of Aristotle's Q+Q, Q+X, or
Q+L counter-examples. So, perhaps, Aristotle introduces the
notion of ampliation and, hence, the two meanings of 'some B
is possibly A, ' simply in order to account for a feature in
the logic that Aristotle noticed but cannot otherwise
explain. This feature would seem to be just that unampliated
QQQ syllogisms are not valid. The various Barbaras above
make clear that this feature of the logic comes about as a
result of a de re reading of the contingency operators. It's
hard to see how ampliation is in any way relevant to a de
dicto reading.
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But look again at Barbara QQQ without ampliation:
Vx ( Bx->QAx
)
Vx(Cx^QBx)
Vx(Cx-*QAx)
.
That's invalid as it stands, but it would be valid if even
only the first premise were ampliated. Look at a valid
instance of Barbara QQQ taken this way:
All contingently moving things are contingently white
All animals are contingently moving things
All animals are contingently white.
The ampliated premise raises a question about meaning. The
remarks at 32b25-32 indicate that for Aristotle the
ampliated and unampliated senses of 'all B are contingently
A' do not mean the same thing. 'All moving things are
contingently white' would seem to be about all actually
moving things. The first premise in the syllogism above,
'all contingently moving things are contingently white,' is
a much weaker statement since it is about all the things
that are actually moving (if there are any) and all the
things that could be moving (but maybe aren't). While that
might seem like a good way of accounting for the ampliated
premise, it isn't clearly in accord with some of Aristotle's
other notions about logic and predication. In various other
logical works, Aristotle makes clear that he does not want
to ever admit accidents of accidents; certainly there are no
syllogisms from premises that predicate accidents of
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accidents. The structure of the ampliated premise above
involves predicating an accident of another accident and,
so, violates the 'no accidents of accidents' principle.
There is a tension between what ampliation requires and what
Ai.j_oi.otle explicitly rules out. Perhaps the way to try to
understand an ampliated premise such as 'all contingently
moving things are contingently white’ is as saying that
everything that s a contingent mover (e.g.
,
every man, every
horse, etc.) is also contingently white. I return to this
matter briefly in Section 7.6 of this chapter and again in
greater detail in Chapter 8.
All of the QQQ syllogisms in the first figure require
ampliation. Aristotle doesn't say so explicitly. And he
doesn't tell us how much ampliation he envisages. So, I will
use as little ampliation as the logic will allow. The first
firgure QQQ syllogisms are listed in Table 11.
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Table 11
QQQ Syllogisms in the First Figure (A14)
Vx ( QBx-*QAx
)
Vx ( Cx->QBx
)
Vx ( Cx^QAx
Barbara (32b38-33al)
( 33a5-12
)
Vx ( QBx->QAx
)
Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
Vx ( Cx->QAx
)
Celarent (33al-5)
Vx ( QBx->Q~ Ax )
Vx(Cx^QBx)
Vx ( Cx-»Q~Ax
Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
Vx ( Cx^QAx
Vx ( QBx->Q~ Ax )
( 33al2-17
Darii (33a23-25)
( 33a27-34
Vx ( QBx->QAx
)
3x ( Cx&Q~Bx
3x ( Cx&QAx
)
Vx(QBx^QAx)
3x ( Cx&QBx
3x( Cx&QAx)
Ferio (33a25-27)
Vx ( QBx-»Q ~ Ax )
Hx ( Cx&QBx
3x ( Cx&Q~Ax
The syllogisms in the left-hand column are all of a
kind. Their validity depends on simple transitivity. The
syllogisms in the right-hand column all depend on the fact
that for Aristotle what is contingently <p is also
contingently not-4>. As Aristotle explains the syllogism at
33a5-12, what is needed is conversion 'in accordance with
possibility. 1 So the proofs for each of the right-hand
syllogisms require CC-conversions . To show how complementary
conversion works here, consider a proof of the syllogism at
33a5-12
:
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(1) Vx ( QBx-»QAx
)
Given
(2) Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx Given
(3) Vx ( Cx->QBx
)
Complementary Conv
.
( 2
)
(4) Vx ( Cx->QAx Barbara (3) (1)
The syllogism at 33al2-17 requires complementary conversion
of each of its premises:
(1) Vx ( QBx->Q~Ax
)
Given
(2) Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
)
Given
(3) Vx ( QBx-»QAx Complementary Conv. (1)
(4) Vx ( Cx->QBx
)
Complementary Conv. (2)
(5) Vx ( Cx->QAx Barbara (4), (3)
The syllogism at 33a27-34 requires only complemetary
conversion of the minor premise. 3x(Cx&Q~Bx) converts to
^x ( CxScQBx ) , and the syllogism becomes Darii QQQ, listed in
the left-hand column of Table 11.
Ampliation doesn't cause any problems in the second
figure because there aren't any valid second figure QQQ
syllogisms. Aristotle rejects all Q+Q premise combinations
in Chapter A17. All but one of these depend on
E-conversions, and according to Aristotle there is no
QE- conversion . In Section 7.6, I'll look closely at his
explanation of this.
There are valid QQQ syllogisms in the third figure.
Aristotle discusses these syllogisms in Chapter A20. I list
them in Table 12. Again, I try to use the minimum amount of
ampliation. As Table 12 shows, the valid QQQ syllogisms in
the third figure need not have ampliated premises, but they
all must have ampliated conclusions.
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Table 12
QQQ Syllogisms in the Third Figure (A20)
Darapti (39al4-19)
Vx ( Cx-»QAx
)
Vx(Cx^QBx)
x ( QBx&QAx
)
( 39a26-28
)
Vx ( Cx->Q~ Ax )
Vx ( Cx-»Q~Bx
)
lx ( QBx&QAx
Fe lapton (39al9-23)
Vx ( Cx->Q~Ax
Vx ( Cx&QBx
!x ( QBx&Q~Ax
)
( 39a38-b2
Vx ( Cx->Q~ Ax )
lx ( Cx&Q~Bx
lx ( QBx&QAx
Datisi ( 39a31-35
)
Vx ( Cx->QAx
lx ( Cx&QBx
lx (QBx&QAx)
( 39a38-b2
)
lx ( Cx&Q~ Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
lx ( QBx&QAx
Disamis (39a35-36)
lx ( Cx&QAx
Vx ( Cx-»QBx
lx ( QBx&QAx
Ferison (39a36-38)
Vx ( Cx-»Q~Ax
Hx ( Cx&QBx
lx ( QBx&Q~Ax
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xhe syllogisms in the left-hand column do not require any
complementary conversions. Aristotle certainly is aware of
consider
,
for instance, his account of the
conversions needed for the first syllogism in Table 12,
Darapti 39al4-19. Aristotle makes no mention of
complementary conversion there; instead, he says:
Then, since the affirmative premise converts in
and it is possible for B to belong to every
C, it would be also be possible for C to belong to
some B, (A20, 39al5-17).
A valid de re reading of this would seem to be
( QA ’ ) Vx(Cx-^QBx) -4 3x ( QBx&Cx ) .
The particular conversion would then be
( QI ' ) 3x ( Cx&QBx ) -* 3x ( QBx&Cx ) .
And in fact (QA') and (QI') are all that is needed to get
the left-hand syllogisms right. So, here in the third figure
it seems that Aristotle is using QA- and Ql-conversions
,
but
they aren't anything surprising -- they are simple
substitution instances of ordinary assertoric A- and
I-conversion, with a modal term QB for B. And so (QA') and
(QI') are trivially valid. The proof for Darapti (39al4-19)
would seem to be as follows:
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(1) Vx ( Cx-»QAx
)
Given
(2) Vx ( Cx-»QBx Given
(3) 3x ( QBx&Cx QA'-conv (2)
(4) lx ( QBx&QAx
)
Transitivity (3)
The proof of the Disamis at 39a35-36 involves an interesting
new twist. It appears that ampliated premises must
also convert:
(1) 3x ( Cx&QAx Given
(2) Vx ( Cx->QBx Given
(3) lx ( QAx&Cx QI ' -conv ( 1
)
(4) lx ( QAx&QBx Transitivity (3), (2)
(5) x ( QBx&QAx Ampliated QI ' -conv (4)
Ampliated QI '
-conversion, just as unampliated
QI ' -conversion, and LI- and Mi-conversion, is a substitution
instance of ordinary assertoric I-conversion with modal
terms for non-modal terms. So it's valid and unproblematic.
The situation is the same for ampliated QA ' -conversion
.
The syllogisms on the right-hand side of Table 12 all
involve complementary conversions. To explain the syllogism
at 39a26-28, Aristotle notes that if 'is possible to belong'
is substituted for 'is possible not to belong,’ then the
syllogism becomes the first figure. This is just
complementary conversion. The proof of the syllogism at
39a26-28 would seem to be as follows:
(1) Vx ( Cx-»Q~ Ax ) Given
(2) Vx ( Cx-»Q~Bx
)
Given
(3) Vx ( Cx-»QAx
)
Complementary Conv. (1)
(4) Vx(Cx-»QBx) Complementary Conv. (2)
(5) lx ( QBx&Cx QA'-Conv. (4)
(6) 3x ( QBx&QAx Transitivity (5), (3)
173
The last two syllogisms in Table 12 will be proven
similarly. Aristotle tells us that there will not be a
deduction through the actual premises taken in the
syllogisms at 39a38-b2. But when they are converted
[clearly, he means by complemetary conversion] then there
will be a deduction, 39b2. So the proofs would seem to be:
(1) Vx(Cx->Q~Ax) Given
(2) 3x ( Cx&Q~Bx
)
Given
(3) Vx ( Cx-*QAx
)
Complementary Conv. (1)
(4) 3x ( Cx&QBx Complementary Conv. (2)
(5) 3x ( QBx&Cx QI 1 -conv ( 4
)
(6) 3x(QBx&QAx Transitivity (5), (3)
(1) 3x ( Cx&Q~Ax Given
(2) Vx ( Cx-»Q~Bx ) Given
(3) 3x ( Cx&QAx ) Complementary Conv. (1)
(4) Vx(Cx-»QBx ) Complementary Conv. (2)
(5) 3x ( QAx&Cx QI ' -conv ( 3 )
(6) 3x(QAx&QBx) Transitivity (5), (4)
(7) 3x ( QBx&QAx
)
Ampliated Ql'-conv (6)
7 . 5 Trouble with Q+X Syllogisms
First figure Q+X syllogisms divide into three sorts.
Aristotle deals with them all in Chapter A15. He begins his
discussion with some careful distinctions:
If one of the premises is taken as belonging and
the other as possible, then, when the premise in
relation to the major extreme [the BA-premise]
signifies being possible, all the deductions will
be both complete and of being possible according
to the stated determination, (33a25-28).
So Barbara QXQ, Celarent QXQ, Darii QXQ, and Ferio QXQ are
valid. But these are not particularly interesting, since
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they are all trivially valid (and don't require any
ampliation). Matters get more interesting when the minor
premise is the Q-premise. This is the second sort of
Q+X syllogism.
However, when the premise in relation to the minor
extreme [the CB-premise] is possible, then not
only are the deductions all incomplete, but also
the privative deductions 3 are not of what is
possible according to the determination, but
rather of what belongs of necessity to none, or
not to every, we also say it is possible for it tobelong to none or not to every, (33b28-33).
The specific syllogisms this passage describes are listed in
Table 13. Even though these are in the first figure, they
are all incomplete. As Aristotle explains: "it will also be
clear that they are incomplete, since the proof is not from
the premises taken,
'
(34a3-4). What makes the incomplete
first figure syllogisms especially interesting is the fact
that in modern logic each is invalid. Aristotle, however,
counts them all as valid. His method of 'establishing' their
validity -- he calls his method 'proof through
impossibility' -- is itself dubious. I will try to explain
what seems to be going on here. It isn't clear from the text
whether Aristotle thinks of the propositions here as
possible (M) or contingent (Q) propositions. I have set out
3Tredennick explains that 'this is a mistake on
Aristotle's part; the qualification applies equally well to
the affirmative syllogisms' [Tredennick, 1983, p. 266]. This
point is generally accepted.
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the syllogisms in Table 13
possibly' in the sense of
seems appropriate.
using M instead of Q where
' not-necessarily-not 1
Table 13
Proof Through Impossibility in the First Figure (A15)
Barbara (34a34-b2)
Vx ( Bx->Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->MBx
)
Vx ( Cx->MAx
( 35a3-ll
)
Vx ( Bx->Ax
Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
)
Vx ( Cx->MAx
)
Celarent (34bl9-35a2)
Vx ( Bx-»~Ax
Vx ( Cx->MBx
Vx ( Cx->M~Ax
)
( 35all-20
Vx ( Bx->~Ax
)
Vx(Cx->Q~Bx)
Vx ( Cx-»MAx )
Darii (35a35-40)
Vx ( Bx-^Ax
3x ( Cx&MBx
3x ( Cx&MAx
( 35b5-8
)
Vx ( Bx-»Ax
)
^x ( Cx&Q~Bx
)
3x ( Cx&MAx
Ferio (35a35-40)
Vx ( Bx->~Ax
3x( Cx&MBx)
3x ( Cx&M~ Ax
( 35b5-8
Vx(Bx->~Ax
3x ( Cx&Q~Bx
3x ( Cx&MAx
)
Aristotle explains that when the premises are like
these, the fact that there will be deductions must be proved
through an impossibility, 34a2-3. Aristotle's method raises
several questions. It will help to look at how he tries to
prove Barbara, since many of the problems encountered in
that proof arise with each of the others also. The proof
begins with what appear to be Q-premises:
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Barbara (34a34-b2)
^ ( Bx->Ax ) let A belong to every B
(2) 7x(Cx->QBx) and let it be possible for B to
belong to every C
(3) Vx(Cx-»QAx) then it is necessary for it to be
possible for A to belong to every C
Aristotle seems to have in mind a reductio proof, since his
next move is to assume that the conclusion is not possible.
Later, he tells us repeatedly that any deduction through an
impossibility is about what is 'not of what is possible
according to our determination [i.e., contingent], but
rather of what belongs to none of necessity,' 34b27-32. [See
also 34b33-35al; 37al5-29.] So the reductio assumption is,
for Aristotle, about what is possible (M) and not about what
is contingent (Q). But there is still an ambiguity in this
next step. Aristotle wants to assume that (3) is impossible.
He says only let it not be possible. ' That might mean
either that we should assume 3x(Cx&~MAx) or that we should
assume the stronger Vx ( Cx->~MAx ) . The first is what we'd
expect to find in a reductio, but Aristotle, rather
surprisingly, opts for the stronger formula at 34a38.
[Compare 34b22-24, 34b28-31.]
(4) Vx ( Cx->~MAx ) let it not be possible for A to
belong to every C
(5) Vx(Cx->Bx) and put B as belonging to every C
This last requires some explanation. Aristotle says about
premise (5) that it "is false (pseudos ) although not
impossible,' (34a37). Tredennick [1983, p. 270] takes
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pseudos' here to mean 'not implied by the original
premises.' From (4) and (5) Aristotle appears to conclude
"/x ( Bx-» MAx ) then it will not be possible for A
to belong to every B
Now, we come to the heart of the problem with
Aristotle's proof. There are two points I want to focus on
here. In the first place, ( 4 ) (
5
) ( 6
)
isn't valid. It isn't
even valid assertor ical ly . Aristotle doesn't explain how he
gets (6) from (4) and (5); he only stipulates that it
follows: 'Therefore, if it is not possible for A to belong
to every C and B belongs to every C, then it will not be
possible for A to belong to every B (for a deduction comes
about through the third figure),' (34a38-40). This is
offered as an example which bears out the principle that
from false but not impossible premises, what results through
those premises will also be false but not impossible,
34a25-27. But Aristotle's application of the principle, in
the proof of the Barbara at 34a34-b2, is flawed.
The second point I want to focus on has to do with what
Aristotle wants the reductio to show. (6) cannot be true if
(1) is true. Aristotle appears to want to make the
incompatibility of (6) and (1) the basis of his reductio.
Having reached (6) by an already dubious method, he
then remarks:
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But it was assumed that it is possible for A tobelong to every B. 4 Therefore, it is necessary for
1 «_ to be possible for A to belong to every C (for
when something false but not impossible was
supposed, the result is impossible), ( 34a40-34b2
)
Aristotle seems to assume that the incompat ibi lty of (6) and
(1) illustrates the falsity of (4), and so establishes the
original conclusion (3).
There are a lot of problems to disentangle here. Smith
and Ross focus much of their commentary on the fact that
Aristotle is here using 'possibly' in the sense of ' not-
necessarily-not .
’ The meaning here does raise plenty of
questions. I want to address a different worry about
Aristotle's method that I think holds regardless of which
sense of 'possibly' Aristotle uses here. My worry is this.
Aristotle seems really to be dressing-up a very simple
matter. If he has (1) and (2), and assumes (5), then simply
from (1) and (5) by Barbara XXX he gets
( 7 ) Vx ( Cx->Ax ) .
And since (7) is stronger even than the conclusion Aristotle
wants to prove, (3) Vx(Cx->MAx), (stronger according to the
T-principle) then clearly (3) follows as well. Clearly, too,
(7) Vx(Cx-»Ax) and (3) Vx(Cx->MAx) both contradict the
4 In fact, the assumption was not that it is possible
for A to belong to every B, but that A does belong to
every B.
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original reductio assumption, (4) Vx ( Cx->~MAx ) . But there is
a very serious problem with all this. The conclusion
Aristotle is after doesn't follow from the original
premises. Aristotle even acknowledges this fact; recall
34a3-4 : the proof is not from the premises taken.
'
If the proof depends on having (1) and (2), and
assuming (5), then the proof is really that Barbara XXM is
valid. Nothing in this shows that Barbara XQM or Barbara XMM
is valid. In fact, they aren't. It seems that what we really
find here is a complicated excuse for putting an M-qualifier
on the predicate term of an assertoric proposition. So long
as the predicate term is an accident, that doesn't present a
real problem. (I'll discuss why in Chapter 8.) But if
inserting an M-operator on an accidental term is all that's
needed, then we could just as well get a conclusion without
syllogizing. There may be more to say about the method of
proof 'through impossibility,' but if I have represented
Aristotle fairly, then he has goofed. The proofs for each of
Celarent, Darii, and Ferio in Table 13 involve
similar problems.
There is a third sort of syllogism dealt with in
Chapter A15. These involve complementary conversion together
with proof through impossibility. The syllogisms that
Aristotle 'proves' this way are listed in the right-hand
column of Table 13. In each, the Q-premises are first
converted according to complementary conversion. Then
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Aristotle appears to shift from Q-premises to M-premises,
and the proofs through impossibilty purportedly validate his
claims. Aristotle does note that when the premises are taken
as he initially sets them out, nothing necessary will
result. 'For a necessity in no way comes about from the
actual premises taken, but when the possible premise is
accordingly converted there will be a deduction,
’
( 35al4-15 )
.
[See also 35a3-8; 35b7-9.]
7 . 6 The Failure of OE-Conversion
In Chapter A17, Aristotle sets out to prove that
possible E-premises do not convert in the same way as their
assertoric counterparts:
First, then, it must be proved that a privative
premise of possibility does not convert: that is,
if it is possible for A to belong to no B, it is
not also necessary for it to be possible for B to
belong to no A, (36b35-37).
Aristotle offers a detailed proof to show why this should
be. In this section I will briefly discuss his argument in
order to look at how the failure of this kind of
E-conversion affects Aristotle's count of valid syllogisms.
In Section 7.2 of this chapter I tried to see if there
is enough evidence in Chapter A3 to tell clearly whether
Aristotle is discussing possibility (M) or contingency (Q),
or both. It seems to me that most of the evidence there
indicates that in A3 it's mainly M’s. The question of M's or
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Q's comes up again now in Chapter A17. Smith and Tredennick
aim for neutral translations of endechomenon
.
Ross, Brogan,
and Kosman think Aristotle's argument in A17 is about
contingency. They are clearly right, as Aristotle's proof
shows. I will explain.
Aristotle's argument is elegant. He shows that we
don ' t have
(1)
Vx ( Bx-»Q~ Ax ) -4 Vx ( Ax-»Q~Bx )
by showing what would happen if the conversion were allowed.
Given (1): Then, since affirmations in being possible
convert with their denials,
' by complementary conversion, we
would also have
( 2 ) Vx ( Bx-»QAx ) -» Vx ( Ax->QBx ) .
'But this is incorrect: for if it is possible for this to
belong to every that, it is not necessary for it to be
possible for that to belong to every this,' (37a2-3). So,
(2)
is not allowed. Aristotle doesn't explain further, but,
presumably, ( 2 ) is not allowed for contingency because it
isn't even allowed for assertorics. In other words, (3) is
not allowed:
(3)
Vx(Bx^Ax) -> Vx ( Ax-»Bx ) .
Aristotle's A-premises only convert in part -- that is, an
A-premise always converts to an I-premise, never to another
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A premise. If this is how Aristotle is reasoning here, then
it seems he will only allow modal conversions that follow
the formal pattern established by the assertoric
conversions. Since (3) is rejected for assertorics, (2) is
rejected for Q. Since (1) is equivalent to (2) by
complementary conversion, (1) must also be rejected. So, the
fact that complementary conversion turns a QE-premise into a
QA-premise is what ultimately rules out the QE-conversions
.
The consequences for the syllogisms is easy to see. All
but one of the syllogisms in the second figure depend on
E-conversion. ( Baroco is proven differently.) So all but one
of the QQQ syllogisms in the second figure depend on
QE-conversion
. Since there is no QE-conversion, Aristotle
counts as invalid all of the second figure QQQ syllogisms
that need conversion. Also invalid are all the Q+X and Q+L
second figure syllogisms that require QE-conversion.
There is, however, a problem that arises for the
interpretations I suggest for Aristotle's modal
propositions. The problem comes out of the passage at
37a4-9. Aristotle continues the discussion about why
QE-premises don't convert. At 37a6, Aristotle begins again,
making the same point about why (1) is wrong, but this time
he adds terms in place of A and B. The terms are 'white' for
A, 'man' for B:
Assume ' it is possible for white not to belong to every
<any> man,' (37a6).
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(4) Vx(Man x -» Q~ White x) TRUE
But, according to Aristotle, it is not true to say that 'it
is possible for man not to belong to anything
white,
'
( 37a7 )
.
(5) Vx (White x -> Q~ Man x) FALSE
The proof goes like this: 'For man of necessity does not
belong to many white things ,'( 37a8 ) — that is, some white
things are necessary-non-men. This makes (6) true:
(6) 3x ( White x & L~ Man x) TRUE
'And the necessity was not possible,' (37a9).
(7) 3x( White x & ~Q Man x) TRUE
= (8) ~Vx( White x -» Q Man x) TRUE
If we were to assume that (5) is true, then by complementary
conversion we would also get (9).
(9) Vx( White x -> Q Man x)
(8) and (9) are contradictories. So (9) must be false. Since
(9) means the same as (5), (5) must also be false. So the
original conversion from (4) to (5) is rejected. So,
QE-conversion again is shown to fail.
Here's a problem. On the interpretation I develop in
Chapters 5 and 6, 'some white is necessarily a man’ isn't
analyzed as 3x(White x St L Man x) . I relied on AristOi_le s
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comments in An. Post. A22
,
in order to restrict subject
terms of L-propositions always to substance terms. This
makes any L-proposit ion an instance of genuine predication.
Here, in Chapter A17, Aristotle is pretty clearly analyzing
man of necessity does not belong to many white things' as
x ( White x & L Man x), with the accident 'white' as the
logical subject. From what I have said, it would seem that
the analysis ought to be 3x(Man x & L~ White x ), but that is
not the analysis Aristotle appears to give here.
Aristotle has very strong reasons for rejecting
QE-conversion. QE-conversion would make (2) Vx(Bx^QAx) ->
lx(Ax->QBx) valid, and Aristotle is explicit about the fact
that he doesn t want that
. He seems not to want ( 2 ) because
the assertoric version of (2) is invalid. Aristotle gives
another reason for rejecting QE-conversion. If one term is
an accident and the other is a substance, then Aristotle
won't want the Q-operator to shift from the accident to the
substance. That seems to be at the heart of his explanation
at 37a4-9. That still doesn't explain why he might want to
analyze 'man of necessity does not belong to many white
things' as 3x(White x & L~ Man x), since that seems to go
against much of what he seems to hold elsewhere about
apodeictic propositions.
Maybe we can explain the analysis like this: Aristotle
clearly says the proposition 'man of necessity does not
belong to many white things' is 'of necessity (ex anankes )
,
1
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but what he is talking about in this passage is really
contingency. So, perhaps, what he has in mind here is not an
apodeictic proposition at all. Aristotle does allow
accidents as subjects of Q-propositions
. It might even be
that the subjects of ampliated Q-propositions must be
accidents, since they are always in the scope of a Q. So,
when Aristotle says 'man of necessity does not belong to
many white things' perhaps what he has in mind is that there
are many white things (e.g., horses, swans, pieces of chalk,
etc.) that fail to be contingently non-men (because they are
necessarily-non-men)
. That would make proposition (5) true,
but would disallow it as a genuine apodeictic proposition.
When Aristotle disallows interpreting 'some white is a
necessary man' as 3x(White x & L Man x), he is talking about
the form of a premise in the syllogistic. It would be absurd
to suppose that Aristotle would deny that in Nature there
are things that are white but of necessity are not men. Of
these things, it would be true that they are white things
that are not contingent men.
That is, (8) 3x(White x & ~Q Men x). And since Aristotle
does allow Q-propositions with accidents as subjects, this
gives a statement about contingency that he does allow.
All this is a bit tenuous, since there is no direct
textual justification for it. But this way of taking
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Aristotle isn't obviously at odds with the text
best I can do now is suggest this as one way of
how Aristotle might be reasoning. In Chapter 8,
more detail some of the issues raised here.
either. The
describing
I pursue in
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CHAPTER 8
PROBLEMATIC TERMS
8 • 1 Some Possible Restrictions on Terms
±he results from the last two chapters suggest that it
is plausible to suppose that terms in Aristotle's modal
syllogistic fall into two sorts: the substance terms and the
a«~«„ident terms. In accounting for Aristotle's apodeictic
premises, I suggested that the valid apodeictic syllogisms
are simply the valid assertoric syllogisms in which certain
a. estr ict ions are placed on terms. In particular, restricting
terms to substances seems to answer the traditional problems
about the apodeictic syllogistic and gets the all the right
apodeictic syllogisms valid and none of the wrong ones. I
want to consider, now, whether in the problematic premises
imposing any restrictions on terms will help make sense of
the results Aristotle claims for this part of
the syllogistic.
Since terms in apodeictic premises appear to all be
substance terms, it would seem that terms in problematic
premises might all be accidents. Certainly, terms in
ampliated problematic premises would seem to fit that
restriction. Some examples might be
(A) All Q-moving things are Q-white
All Q-moving things are Q-not white
(B) All Q-brown things are Q-white
All Q-brown things are Q-not white
There are two ways we might take these to be true. Consider
(A). 'All Q-moving things are Q-white' might be true because
every i_hiny that is a contingent mover (e.g., every man or
horse or whatever) is also contingently white. The (B)
propositions might be true because anything that is
contingently brown, might fail to be brown, and so might be
white instead. But, by reading (A) and (B) this way, we're
not taking moving' and brown' to be the logical subjects
of the predications. We are taking (A) and (B) as though the
real logical subjects are things like men or horses, i.e.,
substances. Suppose, on the other hand, that 'moving' and
'brown' really are the logical subjects of the (A) and (B)
propositions. This would require that there be such things
as accidents of accidents. There is good reason to think
that this can't be right. Aristotle explicitly rules out
accidents of accidents in An. Post., A22, and in Metaphysics
T, 1007blf f
.
Aristotle doesn't give any examples of explicitly
ampliated premises with terms in place of predicate
variables. And, as noted earlier, in Chapter 7, ampliation
doesn't sit well with some of Aristotle's other remarks
about predication and syllogisms. In general, his discussion
of ampliation is too sketchy to tell exactly what the right
analysis is. Nowhere does Aristotle tell whether he thinks
of ampliated premises as premises relating two
accidental terms.
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There is, however, plenty of evidence that shows it
won't always do to restrict premises about possibility to
premises about accidents. In the first place, problematic
premises sometimes involve substantial subjects, as for
instance, 'all men are possibly white’ or, equivalently, for
Aristotle, 'all men are possibly not white.’ Aristotle
offers these as true problematic premises at A17, 37a4-9.
Since these premises about possibility do involve
oubs cant i a 1 terms, premises about possibility cannot be
restricted generally to premises that relate two
accident terms.
If a general restriction to accidental terms is too
strong, perhaps a modified restriction will work. One
possibility is that in the problematic premises any term in
the scope of a Q-operator must be an accident. Then, since
an ampliated premise involves two Q-operators, both terms in
an ampliated premise must be accidents. This would allow
'all contingently moving things are contingently (not)
white. ’ It would also allow the unampliated premise 'all men
are contingently (not) white.’ But, the restriction would
disallow 'all contingent horses are contingently white’ as
Vx(Q Horses x -> Q White x), because 'horse' is a substance
term and inappropriately qualified by a modal Q. That much,
at least, makes good sense.
Even if terms in the scope of a Q or Q-not are
restricted to accidents, it doesn't follow that any
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substitution of terms yields a true Q-proposition
.
Consider ( C )
:
(C) All chalk is Q-musical
All chalk is Q-not-musical
Here, it would seem that both (C) propositions are false,
since being musical (though it's an accidental property of
some substances) isn't an accidental property of chalk. So,
it isn't an accident of all substances. We might expect,
however, that Aristotle would say 'all chalk is not possibly
musical’ in the not-L-not sense of possibly. But then that's
not a Q-prpposition; it's really an LE-proposition
. And that
isn't evidence against taking terms in the scope of a Q or
Q-not to be always restricted to accidents.
There is, however, a problem with even this
restriction. In Section 7.6, I suggested that Aristotle
wants to analyze 'man of necessity does not belong to many
white things' as a premise about possibility equivalent in
meaning to 'some white things are not contingent men’:
3x{White x & ~Q Men x) . If that’s right, then sometimes a
substance term such as 'man' does fall within the scope of a
Q-operator. This would make even the modified
restriction wrong.
So, is the problematic syllogistic, perhaps, fully
general with respect to our choice of terms? As we've seen
in Chapter 6, Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic appears to
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be fully general. If the problematic is too, then anytime we
have a valid assertoric syllogistic form, we would then
expect to also have a corresponding valid problematic
°y 1 1 v-',y i s t i xorm. But it is clear that this is not right for
Aristotle. It would make all of the second-figure QQQ
syllogisms valid, and Aristotle explicitly rejects them in
Chapter A17. From this it would seem that Aristotle does
somehow restrict terms in his problematic premises. In order
to see what sort of restrictions might be at work, I want to
look, next, at the evidence Aristotle's QQQ counter-examples
provide. These counter-examples make clear which kinds of
premises about possibility Aristotle counts as true, and
which he counts as false.
8 . 2 Counter-Examples Involving Contingency
In Chapter A14, Aristotle discusses those cases in the
first figure in which a syllogism follows from two premises
about possibility. He also describes in the same chapter
four premise-combinations that do not yield any syllogism.
In this section I want to look at his comments about these:
If the premise in relation to the major extreme is
taken as particular and the premise in relation to
the minor as universal, then whether both are put
as affirmatives, or both as privatives, or they
are not put as the same in form, or both as
indeterminates or particulars, there will not be a
deduction in any way, (33a34-38).
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Aristotle's method of determining invalidity here is very
similar to the method used for the assertoric invalids.
Again his idea is to show that 'there will not be a
deduction by setting out terms that give true premises, but
a x a 1 se conclusion. Matters are just more complicated by the
addition of modals and by excessive brevity. What Aristotle
seems to be saying in this passage, at 33a34-38, is that for
each of the following premise-combinations, there is no
conclusion
:
possible-I + possible-A,
possible-0 + possible-E,
possible-I + possible-E,
possible-0 + possible-A.
Aristotle is only considering premises in the first figure,
here, so the pattern in each case will be
BA
CB
CA
where the term on the left is the subject term. In the
assertoric syllogistic an I+A premise pair gives an
I-conclusion relating subject C to a predicate A. So, adding
the modal qualifiers, a possible-I + possible-A
premise-combination will be:
Some B are possibly A
All C are possibly B
Some C are possibly A
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xhau this is invalid will be evident from terms, 33b4.
Aristotle explains that we can choose sets of terms in such
a way that
' it is not possible for the first term to belong
to any of the last,' (33b5)
and
(i- 1 ) it is also necessary that the first necessarily
belongs to all of the last,' (33b6).
So, when Aristotle gives terms, he gives two different sets
— one set to satisfy each condition (i) and (ii).
Terms in common for all cases, for belonging of
necessity, are animal, white, man; for not being
possible, animal white, coat. 33b7-8.
The first set of terms gives:
Some white is possibly an animal
All men are possibly white
Some men are possibly animals
The second set of terms gives:
Some white is possibly an animal
All coats are possibly white
Some coats are possibly animals
In the first case, the purported conclusion is 'some men are
possibly animals.’ But for Aristotle, that is a false
statement. It is rejected because of (ii) above -- it is
necessary that the first term [animal] belongs to all of the
last [man].' In other words, all men are necessarily
animals. A conclusion about possibility might seem alright
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if we think of possibly as not-necessarily-not
,
but
Aristotle makes it clear that this is not the way he's using
possibly here. He reminds us of the new definition: 'what is
necessary was not possible,
’ 33bl6. So because the terms
admit a conclusion about necessity, Aristotle rejects a
conclusion about possibility. This means that if 'all C are
necessarily A’ is true, then 'some C is possibly A' must
be false.
The terms for the second case also give a false
conclusion: some coats are possibly animals.' This
conclusion is rejected because of condition (i) -- 'it is
not possible for the first term [animal] to belong to any of
the last [coat].' No coat is possibly an animal. This is,
plainly, an LE-proposition
. So, here, it seems that
Aristotle rejects a conclusion about possibility -- 'some C
is possibly A' -- because it is true that 'all C are
necessar i ly-not A.
’
Later in Chapter A17, Aristotle sums up his strategy
for falsifying a premise about possibility:
It is clear, then, that as the opposite of what is
possible or not possible in the way in which we
originally determined it, one must not only take
'of necessity belongs to some 1 but also 'of
necessity does not belong to some.’
(A17, 37a28-30
)
So, to falsify a Q-conclusion Aristotle gives terms for
belonging of necessity and terms for not possibly belonging
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(ie, for necessarily not belonging). That's the point of the
passage above at 37a28-30. And this explains why
invalidating a syllogistic form involving contingency
generally requires two sets of terms. 1
Since any proposition about possibility (any
Q-proposition) can be denied in either of two ways,
Aj. io Lutle generally shows that there will not be a
Q-conclusion by giving a set of terms to deny each of the
two ways. Consider a QI -proposition : 'some C are
contingently A.' This entails both 'some C are M-A' and
some C are M-not-A.
' So, in order to falsify a
Ql-proposition, Aristotle gives one set of terms to show
that a conclusion cannot be M-not; these are the terms for
belonging of necessity. He gives another set of terms to
show that a conclusion cannot be about what is M; these are
the terms for 'not being possible.' 2
To show that a Q-conclusion doesn't logically follow
from true premises, all Aristotle really needs to do, given
*In Chapters A17 and A19, Aristotle sometimes offers
only one set of terms. I'll look at these cases later in
this section.
2Modern logic helps to represent Aristotle's modal
equivalences
:
Q
E M & M~ def Q
E ~L~ & ~ L def M
e ~(L~ v L) DeMorgans
e ~(~M v L) LM Interchange
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his definition of Q, is show that when we put the terms in
the appropriate relations, what results in each case is
really an apodeictic proposition. That is, we get either an
affirmative or a privative L-proposition
. Given the results
for L-propositions in Chapters 5 and 6, we would expect to
find that Aristotle's counter-examples for Q-syllogisms
involve term-triples giving genuine L-conclusions -- that
is, L-conclusions in which the subject is a substance term
and the modal L-operator is on the predicate term. In fact,
that is what we find in all three figures, with a only a few
obvious exceptions. I'll discuss the exceptions later in
this section. Table 14 lists all of Aristotle's term-triples
for the invalid problematic syllogisms. In Table 14 I use
P' instead of 'M' or 'Q.' This is because in his
discussions of the invalid problematics Aristotle sometimes
equivocates between the different meanings of 'possibly.'
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Table 14
Terms in the Problematic Syllogistic
belonging not possibly
of necessity belonging
I : A14 33a34-bl7
II : A17 37a32-bl0
37bl0- 16
III : A20 3 9b 2 -
6
Invalid Q+Q Premise Combinations
<animal, white, man>
<animal, man, white>
<animal, white, coat>
<white, man, horse>
<white, man, horse>
chorse, man, white>
Invalid P-t-X Premise Combinations
I : A15 34bl 1-18
34b33-35a2
35a20-24
3 5b8 - 1
4
35bl4-22
<animal, moving, man>
<moving, science, man>^
<white, animal, snow>
<white, animal, snow>
<animal, white, man>
<man, moving, horse>
<raven, reasoning, man>
<white, animal, pitch>
<white, animal, pitch>
<animal, white, coat>
II:A18 37b35-38 <health, animal, man> chealth, horse, man>
III : A21 40al-3 <animal, man, white>
(same as 3 9b 2 - 6 ? )
<horse, man white>
Invalid P + L Premise Combinations
I : A16 36a27-31 <white
,
animal
,
snow> <white, animal, pitch>
36b3-7 <animal
,
white man> eanimal, white, coat>
3 6b 7- 1
0
<animal white raven> eanimal, white, pitch>
36bll-12 <animal white, swan> eanimal, white, snow>
36bl2-18 <animal white man> < animal , white , inanimate
>
II : A19 38a26-b4 emotion, animal
,
awake
>
<white, man, swan>
38bl3-23 <white, swan, man>
38b27-29 (same terms)
38b35-37 (same terms)
III : A22 40a35-38 <sleep , sleeping horse ,man> <sleep , waking horse, man>
TAristotle is unhappy with these terms and notes that
they 'should be better chosen,' (35al-2).
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In Table 14, I use Roman numerals to indicate whether
the terms should be taken in the order of the first, second,
or third figure. A14, A15, etc., refer to chapters of the
Prior Analytics
.
There are several points worth noticing in Table 14.
Some of them are incidental. For instance, in A17, Aristotle
only offers one set of terms to illustrate the invalidity of
some of the second-figure QQQ syllogisms. The single sets of
terms aren't an oversight. In fact, even the single counter-
examples are unnecessary since Aristotle has already
established that there are no valid QQQ syllogisms in the
second figure at all. The proof of this through terms just
repeats the same point.
In A19, again, we sometimes find only single sets of
terms instead of the usual paired sets. In A19, 38bl3-23,
for instance, Aristotle considers syllogisms involving an
LA-premise and a QA-premise. He appears to take it to be a
fundamental principle of logic that from any two affirmative
premises only an affirmative conclusion can possibly follow:
However, if the premises are put as positive,
there will not be a deduction. For it is evident
that there will not be one of not belonging or of
not belonging of necessity, because a privative
premise has not been taken, either as expressing
belonging or as expressing belonging of necessity.
But neither will there be a deduction of being
possible not to belong, (38bl3-18).
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Aristotle gives terms to illustrate that point. His terms
are Wni i_e, swan, and man, from which we get the
following premises:
All swans are L-white
All men are Q-white.
But, from these we will get neither 'all men are possibily
not swans’ nor 'some men are possibly not swans,’ because,
simply, all men are necessarily not swans. That fact is
enough to rule out both a QE- and a QO-conclusion
. But
Aristotle doesn't give terms to show that an affirmative
conclusion doesn't follow. All he says is 'Nor, indeed, will
there be a deduction of the opposite affirmations, since B
has been shown as of necessity not belonging to C,
’
(38b20-21). This appears to mean that neither an assertoric
affirmative, an apodeictic affirmative, nor a problematic
affirmative follows from the premises taken. Aristotle's
general practice in cases like this is to set out a second
set of terms to establish this.
Some of the evidence presented in Table 14 is not so
easy to explain. I want to look now at some of the more
serious troubles about the terms Aristotle offers for the
problematic invalids.
All but three of the purported conclusions from Table
14 are genuine apodeictic propositions. This isn't difficult
to see when we decode Aristotle's term-tr iples . In Table 14,
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I list the terms in the order <A,B,C>. The patterns for each
of the three figures is as follows:
I 11 III
BA BA CA
CB CA CB
CA CB BA
where the term on the left gives the subject, and the term
on the right gives the predicate. So in the first figure,
any purported conclusion will relate a C subject and an A
predicate. Where C is 'snow' and A is 'white,' 3 the
purported conclusion will not be a genuine apodeictic
proposition. But, as noted in Chapter 6, Aristotle routinely
treats this as a premise about necessity. The case is
similar when C is 'pitch' and A is 'white': just as it's
true for Aristotle that all swans are necessarily white, it
is true that all pitch is necessarily not white.
In the second figure, the purported conclusion will
always have a C subject and a B predicate. All but one of
the term-triples in the second figure give genuine
apodeictic CB-propositions
. The lone exception is very
interesting, and I want to look at it closely.
In A19, 38a38-b3, Aristotle investigates the results of
combining a QE-premise and an LA-premise in the second
figure. He tells us that in such a case there will not be a
deduction, and he offers the term-triple <motion, animal,
3A15
,
35a20-24 ; 35b8-14; and A16, 36a27-31.
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awake> to show that the purported conclusion cannot be about
not belonging. That is, a proposition about belonging comes
about from the terms:
Moreover, it is also possible for B to belong to C
when these things are supposed. For nothing
prevents C being under {hupo) B, it being possible
[Q] for A to belong to every B, and A belonging of
necessity to C, as for instance if C is awake, B
is animal, and A stands for motion: for motion
belongs of necessity to what is awake, it is
possible [Q] that it belongs to every animal, and
everything awake is an animal. It is evident,
then, that neither is there a deduction of not
belonging, given that when the terms are like this
it is necessary for B to belong to C, (38a38-b3).
The statement ' it is possible that motion belongs to every
animal' appears in surface form, at least, to be an
affirmative Q-premise. But earlier in 38al3-17, when he sets
out the general method of Chapter A19, Aristotle makes clear
that he's concerned in this chapter with premise-
combinations involving a privative and an affirmative. A19
is about the second figure, and all syllogisms in the second
figure have at least one privative premise. But in the
passage quoted above, it looks as though Aristotle uses two
affirmative premises. There is, however, a sense in which
'it is possible that motion belongs to every animal' might
be considered a privative. Since it is a Q-premise, it is
equivalent to ' it is possible that motion does not belong to
every animal.' Putting it formally,
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Vx (Animal x -» Q-Moves x)
Vx (Animal x -> Q-not Moves x).
Ordinarily, Aristotle calls both of these affirmatives, but
here in A19 he appears to think of
\/x(Animal x -> Q-not Moves x)
as a privative Q-premise. This would make the syllogism
in question:
Vx (Animal x -> Q-not Moves x)
Vx(Awake x -» T,-Moves v)
Vx (Awake x a Animal x)
And this seems to fit Aristotle's discussion well.
Aristotle sums up this passage saying 'It is evident,
then, that neither is there a deduction of not belonging,
given that when the terms are like this it is necessary for
B to belong to C,
'
(38b2-3). It isn't clear whether the
necessity here is de dicto or de re. if it is de dicto
,
then
this remark seems simply to describe the necessity of the
conclusion given true premises in a valid form. That's
nothing troublesome or surprising. If the necessity here is
de re, then it seems that Aristotle is taking the conclusion
to be an L-proposition : Vx(Awa/ce x -* L-Animal x). Clearly,
this isn't a genuine apodeictic proposition. Neither,
however, is the premise Vx(Awake x -» L-Moves x), and the
modality of this premise will be a problem no matter what we
say about the conclusion.
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This passage in A19 presents what I think is the single
biggest counter-example against the interpretation I suggest
for apodeictic propositions. It’s difficult to know what to
say about it. It is worth noting, however, that no other
passage presents quite the difficulties this does.
Mocters are only slightly more straightforward in the
t_h i j_ j_ igure counter-examples. In the third figure, the
Pu^pO^tsd conclusions will always relate a B subject and an
A predicate. In Chapter A22, Aristotle is again full of
surprises. He gives two sets of very unusual terms:
<sleep, sleeping horse, man>
<sleep, waking horse, man>
These are entirely unprecedented. Nowhere else in the
syllogistic does Aristotle ever use complex terms.
Let's look closely at how he wants to use these terms
in A22, 40a33-38. He begins by taking the minor premise to
be affirmative and necessary. When the minor extreme is like
this, and the major is privative and contingent 4
,
then there
will not be a deduction in the third figure. Look at what we
get putting in the first set of terms:
"This involves taking a premise of the form Vx(Cx->Q~Ax)
to be, in some sense, privative. Again, this goes against
Aristotle's earlier stipulation that propositions of the
form Vx(Cx->Q~Ax) are affirmatives and so equivalent to
Vx(Cx-»QAx). The sense of the present passage requires that
there be privative Q-propositions . The reason here is the
same as in 38a38-b3.
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nxx men are contingently (not) sleeping
All men are necessarily not sleeping-horses
sleeping-horses are necessarily asleep
The second set of terms gives:
All men are contingently (not) sleeping
All men are necessarily not waking-horses
All waking-horses are necessarily not sleeping
I give the purported conclusions as L-propositions because
says from these premises, the conclusion 'may both
belong necessarily to all and also be possible to belong to
none, (40a35-37). Robin Smith offers a different reading:
he suggests it might be a good idea to take the necessity
here to be the kind of necessity that relates syllogistic
premises to conclusions [Smith, 1989, p. 139]. This is a de
dicto necessity. But the fact that Aristotle says the
conclusion may both belong necessarily and also be possible
to belong to none
,
suggests that, whatever he has in mind
here, de dicto isn't really what he means. 'Belonging
necssarily and being possible to belong to none' is the
standard de re formula Aristotle uses to illustrate the
falsity of Q-propositions
.
More troubling than the actual terms Aristotle gives in
A22 is the fact that he appears to give them in order to
invalidate a third-figure QE + LA premise-combination. Since
he counts the third-figure Felapton QXQ as valid in A21,
39bl7-22, it seems that he should really count the QE + LA
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combination in A22 as valid also, though the conclusion
should then be a QO-proposition
. To see this, compare the
logical structure of the rejected A22-syl logism with
Fe lapton QXQ:
Fe lapton QXQ
Vx(Cx-»Q~Ax
)
Vx ( Cx->Bx
)
A22
:
QE + LA
Vx ( Cx->Q~ Ax )
Vx ( Cx->LBx
)
-lx ( Bx&Q~Ax
( valid)
* Vx ( Bx->Q~ Ax
)
( invalid)
Since the CB-premise converts from a universal to a
particular, one would expect that the conclusion in each of
the above cases would be a particular-proposition. Aristotle
doesn't explain why he wants a universal conclusion in A22.
Perhaps a good way to answer the problems here is just
to say that when Aristotle sets out terms for the Q+L
invalids, he is particularly sloppy. So perhaps the troubles
we find in Chapters A19 and A22 are really just the result
of simple carelessness. That may not be a very satisfying
answer, but it does seem that this last section of the
syllogistic involving Q+L premise-combinations is by far the
least polished part of the syllogistic. When we set aside
the handful of problems here, what remains of the
problematic syllogistic is largely coherent and sits well
with the results of the apodeictic syllogistic. In the next
section, I will show why.
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8 • 3 Interpreting O-Propositions
I want to return for the moment to the counter-example
from the first set of terms in A14, 33a34-bl7. This is the
first entry in Table 14 -- <animal, white, man>
. Aristotle
<~lcaj. ly offers this as an invalid, instance of
Some B are possibly A
All C are possibly B
Some C are possibly A.
Any invalid instance shows that the syllogistic form is
really invalid. That means that Aristotle takes the premises
as true, but the conclusion as false. The terms he offers
make the premises some white is possibly an animal' and
'all men are possibly white.’ This last seems
straightforward. In modal LPC it goes to
1x{Men x -> Q-White x) . And the term under the Q is the
accidental term. But what is the right modal LPC analysis of
'some white is possibly an animal 1 ?
Suppose that the right analysis is
3x(White x & Q~Animal x) . If this were right, then contrary
to what Aristotle says, the syllogism would really be valid.
Further, we would then need to know what counts for
Aristotle as a contingent animal. Since anything that is Qc{>
is, by definition, both M<j) and anything that is a
contingent animal is both possibly an animal and possibly
not an animal. And that seems not to make good sense. To see
why, consider the following Q-propositions
:
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(E) Some white things are Q-animals
Some white things are Q-not animals
These two propositions are, for Aristotle, equivalent in
meaning. But what do they really mean? There are two ways we
might try to explain.
In the first place, we might recall the L-not Principle
from Section 6.7. The L-not Principle allows that for any
subotance $, L(}> is equivalent to L. ~
.
So anything that's
not-necessar i ly an animal is necessari ly-not an animal. This
worked on the assumption that for any substance cj>, to be (j)
is just the same as to be L4>. As, for instance, to be an
animal is to be necessarily an animal, or essentially an
animal. On the other hand, consider something that is not an
animal. Then it is not a necessary animal. By the L-not
Principle, it is also necessari ly-not an animal. So it is
not-possibly an animal. This would seem to hold no matter
what our sense of possibility. Looking back to (E) now, if
some white things are animals, then they are necessarily
animals, and so they cannot be contingently animals. If the
white things are not animals, then they are not-possibly
animals, and so, this way too, they cannot be
contingently animals.
Aristotle does talk in the Physics and later in
Metaphysics G about 'potentiality.' In Metaphysics 07, he
describes why a seed is not a potential man but an embryo
is. If Aristotle means that an embryo is not a man, but is a
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possible man, then some of what I’ve said here might be
wrong. Anything that is a potential man is certainly a
potential animal. But it is not clear whether the
potentialities dealt with in the Physics and in the
Metaphysics are in any way included in the Prior Analytics
.
I follow Paul Thom in assuming that they aren’t included; if
they are included, then much of what I have been arguing
will need to be revised.
L«=(_ o return to the question about how to understand
the propositions in (E). There is a second way we might try
1 them. In earlier chapters I have often made a
distinction between logical structure and surface structure.
I rciied on that distinction in order to get clear about
which term really functions as the subject of a proposition.
Given the results in Chapter 6, we might expect that if the
propositions in (E) are true for Aristotle, then he is
taking the logical subject in each case to be 'animal.
’
So suppose that lx{White x & Q-Animal x) is not the
right analysis of some white is possibly an animal.’
Aristotle clearly offers this as a true proposition. But
perhaps the underlying logical structure of the proposition
disallows 3x(White x & Q-Animal x) for the same sort of
reason that 'some white is a necessary man’ cannot be
analyzed as 3x(White x Si L-Man x). Perhaps, in the case of
affirmative premises about possibility, such as 'some white
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is possibly an animal,’ a substance term cannot come under
the scope of a Q.
This might appear to be ad hoc
,
since in Section 7.6, I
suggested that 'some white things are contingently not men'
is analysed as 3x{White x & Q-not Men x). And that does put
a substance term under a Q. But the apparent difficulty here
can, perhaps, be explained away.
It would seem that
(1) some white thing is Q-man'
as 3x( White x & Q-Man x)
isn't allowed because there is nothing in Aristotle's
metaphysics that's a Q-man since 'man' is a substance and
anything that's a substance is what it is essentially. On
the other hand,
(2) 'some white is not-Q man'
as 3x( White x & ~Q Man x)
is allowed, for reasons given in Section 7.6.
Why might (2) be alright but not (1)? The answer would
seem to depend on the fact that (2) is privative and so
doesn't violate any of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines.
There are things in Nature that are not-contingently men --
e.g., horses and pieces of chalk. But there are not things
in Nature that a re contingent men. (Of course, I am still
assuming here that there is no place in Aristotle's logic
for Aristotelian potentialities.) So (1) is not allowed.
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If we take some white is Q-animal
' as true because it
is really 3x(Animal x St Q White x ), then we still have true
premises and a false conclusion. From true premises
(3) Some white is Q animal 3x{Animal x & Q White x)(4) All men are Q white Vx (Men x Q White x )
no Q-conclusion about men and animals follows. It is false
that some men are Q animals' because it is true that all
men a^e necessarily animals. So only when we analyze some
white is Q animal' as 3x(Animal x St Q White x) does
Aristotle's counter-example work. Taking the premise to be
3x(White x St Q-Animal x ) makes it false, and so cannot be
the basis of a proof of invalidity, since that depends on
having all true premises. So only when we analyze 'some
white is Q animal' as 3x {Animal x & Q White x) does
Aristotle's counter-example work.
What all of this suggests is that Aristotle's ideas
about problematic predication, like apodeictic predication,
are not merely linked to his metaphysical notions, they are
in fact dependent on them. This is what makes
3x(White x St Q-Animal x) an inappropriate analysis of 'some
white is contingently an animal.’ For Aristotle there are no
contingent animals, and so 3x(White x St Q Animal x) is
false. Since he takes it as true that 'some white is
contingently an animal, ' 3x (Animal x St Q White x) must be
the right analysis. And, in fact, the problematic syllogism
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x na^e been considering provides independent evidence that
this is so.
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CHAPTER 9
IS THERE A MODAL SYLLOGISTIC?
Is there a modal syllogistic? This might seem an odd
question, since, of course, in one sense obviously there is.
uut there is an important sense in which maybe there isn't.
In this last chapter, I will explain what I mean.
The results from Chapters 5 and 6 show that if $ is a
subotan^e i_erm, such as man, ' then (}> and L cj> are
xiiLersubstitutable
. Being a man and being essentially a man
are the same thing. Chapters 5 and 6 also show that if cj? is
a substance term, then ~<p and L~4> are intersubstitutable
.
So, anything that is not a man is by necessity not a man;
its essence excludes being a man. A plant or a horse is a
good example of such a thing. Because all substance terms
satisfy the L-Not Principle (Section 6.7), anything is L~<j>
if and only if it is also ~L<}>. So the necessary-non-men are
precisely the not-necessarily-men
. Another point that
emerges in Chapters 5 and 6 is that Aristotle's apodeictic
premises are instances of what I have called genuine
predication. That is, true apodeictic premises predicate a
substance term of another substance term.
Not every term is a substance term; some terms are
accidentals. Examples of Aristotle's accidental terms are
'white,' 'moving,' and 'musical.' These accidental terms do
not take subject position in L-propositions . They do occur
under an L or an L~ in predicate position. When they do, an
affirmative proposition is always false and a negative
proposition is always true. 1 No substance is essentially
moving or essentially musical. Also, no substance is
essentially not-moving or not-musical. Accidental properties
are properties that might hold of thing but, equally well,
might not -- as, for example, a man might be musical or
might not be. We can represent Aristotle’s reasoning this
way: for any accidental term <j>, any substance that might be
$ also might be ~cj>. Since moving and not-moving are only
accidental properties of a substance, it is clear that
accidental terms can fall within the scope of a modal Q. It
is important to note that in one of his metalogical proofs,
Aristotle does put a substance term under the scope of a Q;
see Section 7.6. But, perhaps more importantly, none of
Aristotle's examples of syllogisms or counter-examples put
substance terms under Q's. In the syllogisms and counter-
examples, only accidental terms are under Q's.
All of the distinctions above fit the way Aristotle
uses terms in his own examples of modal propositions. These
distinctions amount, I think, to restrictions on terms.
There appear to be no restrictions on terms in the non-modal
or assertoric syllogistic. But the ways in which Aristotle
J There are exceptions to this, since, for example,
Aristotle does take it as true that swans are essentially
white. So swans are L-white. But, as I explain in Section
6.6, there is some reason to think this is a glitch since it
doesn't sit well with many of Aristotle's other comments
about whiteness.
214
restricts terms in his modal propositions makes all of his
modal premises just special instances of assertoric
premises. Modal LI-, LA-
,
and LE-conversions turn out to be
just special cases of non-modal I-, A-, and E-conversion.
The de re analysis set out in Chapters 2-4 makes this clear.
Were our modal is a Q or an M, again, conversions follow
the same pattern as the one established by the assertoric
conversions.'' These Q and M modal versions are just special
instances of the same assertoric patterns, as Chapters 7 and
8 make clear.
The same is true of the modal syllogisms themselves:
Valid modal syllogisms are simply valid syllogisms that
follow the restrictions on terms set out above. The
assertoric syllogistic provides the basic structure. The
assertoric syllogistic is about syllogisms that are formally
valid. But sometimes we want to know if we can get a
conclusion about necessity or possibility from a syllogism.
In the case of necessity, we start with an assertoric
syllogism that is formally valid, and we ask if we can get
an L-conclusion
. Aristotle seems to be saying that whether
we can will depend on certain features of the premises we
take. If they meet certain conditions then we can syllogize
to an L-conclusion. In determining whether there is a
2
I do not include Complementary Conversions. These are
based on purely modal considerations and not on any pattern
established by the assertorics.
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syllogism to an L-conclusion, or on the other hand, to a
Q- conclusion, then we’re entitled to make certain non-formal
distinctions. These appear to be dictated by the
restrictions above.
Ii ior Ar is lo
L
xe cnere is just syllogistic' and that
is assertoric, then it is perhaps misleading to talk about
Barbara XaX, LaL, XLL, and LLL, since the apoueictic
syllogisms are noL different syllogisms from the assertoric
ones -- the modal ones are special versions of the
assertorics. This way of taking Aristotle makes his modal
syllogistic seem easy and pretty nearly trivial. Aristotle’s
apodeictic logic doesn't add any extra 'logical' rules. The
problematic syllogistic does add one new rule: complementary
conversion. Aside from that, the rules for the modal are
just the rules for the non-moual subject to the appropriate
restrictions on terms. The Kneales, of course, think this
must make it wrong. 3 But Aristotle's concerns in the Prior
Analytics seem to me to have as much to do with metaphysics
and predication as they do about formal logic.
The results in this work show that validity in the
modal syllogistic is always obtained by substitution in the
assertoric syllogistic. One way we might put the point is to
say that the only logic that Aristotle believes in is the
assertoric syllogistic, and that a modal syllogism exists if
3See Section 5.6 for a discussion of their views about
this
.
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and only if the corresponding assertoric syllogism exists
and certain restrictions on terms apply.
If all this is right, then why would Aristotle bother
with the modal syllogistic at all? I think the answer is
that he has set out to prove just how powerful his
syllogistic is. He does believe that every scientific
argument can be reduced to a syllogism. The modal
syllogistic is, for Aristotle, a step towards proving this.
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